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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation

I

shall present an analysis of a very
old

argument wnich has come to be well known
among both philosophers and

non-philosophers.
15

The argument is:

“!! Create

a

,^

one that He

lift or God cannot create

a stone that He cannot lift.

2) If God can create a stone that He
cannot lift, then He is not onmipoL GH tl •
3) If God cannot create a stone that He cannot
lift, then He is not omni-

potent.

4) Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

The argument, which has come to be known as the stone
paradox, has

often proven to be a frustration to the religious believer
and a puzzle-

ment to the philosopher.

Despite this fact, the stone paradox has re-

ceived very litde careful analysis from any contemporary
philosopher.
received a fair amount of attention in the contemporary philosophical journals, but the treatment it has been given has generally been

rather fascile.

In this dissertation I plan to provide an adequate ac-

count of the stone paradox.

By this

I

do not mean that

I

intend to

provide an adequate account of all the crucial theological notions that
lie behind the stone paradox, nor even that

I

quate account of the nature of divine agency.

intend to provide an ade-

Rather

I

intend to provide

an adequate analysis of the logic of the argument of the stone paradox

and a decisive answer to the question of its soundness.

This dissertation falls fairly naturally into three divisions.

Chapters I-IV constitute what might be called "the Preparation".
ter

I

Chap-

will consider whether and why the stone paradox is of interest and

vi

will lay out the plan of the dissertation in some
detail.

Chapter II

will deal with the relationship between Cod and logical
truth.
III will settle on a definition of

'omnipotent

fication for that choice of definition.

1

Chapter

and provide some justi-

And Chapter IV will consider

whether "God is omnipotent" is either provable or true by
definition.
Chapters V-VII give
the argument.

a

topical survey of the recent literature on

Chapter V deals with the form of the argument. Chapter

VI with the first premise, and Chapter VII with the
third premise.

There

is no chapter on the second premise of the argument, since that
premise

has received no comment in the recent literature.

It has been assumed

to be innocuously true.

Finally, Chapters VIII-XI give my own analysis of the argument.

Chapter VIII

I

In

develop a formal language, with semantics, which is ade-

quate for the purpose of giving representation to the argument of the

paradox in full formality.

Chapter IX gives the formal construction of

the paradox and a reappraisal of the third premise on the basis of the

formal construction.

In Chapter X

I

provide a model of the language

developed in Chapter VIII on which the second premise is false.

Also

in Chapter X, I consider those recent writers on the stone paradox who

have supported its soundness, since obviously they and
right.

I

cannot both be

Chapter XI considers other possible dilemmas which may appear to

grow out of my solution to the traditional stone paradox and shows that
they can be handled by the same basic procedures used on the traditional

paradox in Chapters IX and X.
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CHAPTER

I

THE STONE PARADOX

Almost

every student who has gone through an
Introduction to Philo-

sophy course, almost every child who has gone
through a few years of

religious education in Church, has at one time or
another been bothered
by two very closely related questions: 1) Can
God create a stone that He

cannot lift? and 2) Does it follow from either an
affirmative or
ative answer to question 1) that God is not omnipotent?

question is clearly troublesome.

neg-

The second

(The first question is primarily of

interest only insofar as it leads to the second one.)

It raises the

question of whether it is logically permissible to accept
article of the Christian faith.

a

a

fundamental

This problem has come to be known in

philosophical and religious literature as "the stone paradox".

While

it has long been the subject of considerable discussion, the stone
para-

dox has received very little careful analysis.

Where it has been the

subject of philosophical analysis, those analyses, as
later chapters, have been inadequate.

I

shall argue in

It is my intention in this dis-

sertation to provide an adequate analysis of the stone pa -adox.
The basic paradox is as follows:
A.

(1) Either God can create a stone which He cannot lift, or He cannot
create a stone which He cannot lift.
(2) If God can create a stone which He cannot lift, then He is not
omnipotent (since He cannot lift the stone in question).

(3) If God cannot create a 3tone which He cannot lift, then He is not
omnipotent (since He cannot create the stone in question).
(4) Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

As can be seen, nothing peculiar about God is involved in the argu-
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W e could substitute any other name
in place of ’God' throughout

ment.

the argument and obtain a similar
result.

Thus, while the argument, if

sound, shows that God is not omnipotent,
it may be varied to show, agfin
if anything, that an omnipotent being
of any kind is a logical impos-

sibility.

However, this need not imply a denial of God's
existence.

The minimal conclusion which must be drawn from
argument A, if sound,

is

that the notion of omnipotence against which the
paradox is posed, a no-

tion drawn largely from medieval theology and philosophy,
does not apply
to God.
I

must note at the outset that the stone paradox is largely irrele-

vant to contemporary theology, especially contemporary protestant
theology.

(The situation is somewhat different among Roman Catholic theolo-

gians because of the continuing influence of medieval theology on the

Roman Catholic Church.)

Among modem protestant theologians,

I

am aware

of no one who understands by 'omnipotence' any notion which would have

anything to do with a task of the sort posed by the stone paradox.
typical of a more

modem understanding

of

'omnipotence',

I

As

cite briefly

from Gustav Aulen's The Faith of the Christian Church:

From this point of view God's "omnipotence" is not the causality
of the divine will in relation to everything that happens, but
the sovereignty of love. ...
If God's sovereignty has this character, what is then implied
in the omnipotence of God? It is clear at once that we need not
be concerned with a number of meaningless questions about God's
omnipotence which have appeared even within theology. Can God
do everything? Can he transform a stone into an animal? All
such questions are beside the point and completely meaningless.
They have nothing to do with faith. They are based on a conception of the will of God as entirely capricious, v/hich fails
to understand that it is here a question about the power of
love and nothing else.
1

Gustav Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church

,

trans. by Eric H. Wahl-
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This obviously warrants some explanation.

Why does not the stone para-

dox or some variant prove relevant when we view
divine omnipotence as
"the sovereignty of love"?
It would be a misunderstanding of this view to think
that it leads
to a stone-type paradox based on the question "Can God
create a power of

love so strong that He cannot overcome it?"

Aulen's claim is that divine

omnipotence does not have to do with "the causality of the divine
will”.
It concerns, rather, the ultimate power of God's love#

Perhaps the best

way to understand this is by looking at the ways in which we do
and do
not speak of the power of human love.

Imagine a lover uttering the fol-

lowing sentences to his behoved:
1) My love for you is so strong that

I

would do anything for you.

2) My love for you is so strong that

I

would climb the highest mountain

for you.
3) My love for you is so strong that it can do anything.

4) My love for you is more powerful than a locomotive.
1) and 2) clearly are the sort of thing which a lover might say.

4) clearly are not.

simpliciter.

3) and

The power of love is not a power that does things,

It is rather a power that motivates the lover to do things

for the beloved.

God's omnipotence, as the "sovereignty of love", is of

this nature and not concerned with His general creative and active caus-

ality.

Given this interpretation of divine omnipotence, the supreme nature
of God's love is perhaps best exhibited in its ability to change the

hearts of men and its ability to bring about God's forgiveness of man's
strom and G. Everett Arden, (Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1948),
pp. 143 and 147.
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sins.

I

Should like to Illustrate the latter
point with a story fran

"The Gospel According to Saint Mark".

He was preaching the word to them when
some people came bringing
him a paralytic carried by four men, but
as the crowd made it
impossible to get the man to him they stripped
the roof over the
place where Jesus was; and when they had
made an opening, they
owered the stretcher on which the paralytic
lay. Seeing their
faith, Jesus said to the paralytic, "My
child, your sins are
orgiven." Now some scribes were sitting there,
and they thought
to themselves, "How can this man talk like
that? He is blaspheming
Who can forgive sins but God?" Jesus, inwardly
aware that this
was what they were thinking, said to them, "Why
do you have these
thoughts in your hearts? Which of these is easier:
to say to the
paralytic, 'Your sins are forgiven’ or to say ’Get
up, pick up
your stretcher and walk?’ But to prove to you
that the Son of
Man has authority on earth to forgive sins," - he
said to the
paralytic - "I order you: get up, pick up your
stretcher, and
go home." And the man got up ... (Mark 2:2-12)

The motivation behind the shift in the notion of
omnipotence is a
shift in the notion of divine agency.

Since people first thought about

gods there has been a strong tendency to see gods on an
anthropomorphic

model, only bigger and better.

A part of this has been the tendency to

see divine agency as being of the same kind of causality as humsn
agency.

Thus God has been seen as having unlimited efficient causality over
all

possible effects.

This view of divine agency is a fairly natural one.

We tend naturally to see God as being like us, only bigger and better.

Such a view is, moreover, reinforced by a literal interpretation of the

biblical myths.

For the theologian who does not view God anthropomorphically , however, there is not the same motivation to view divine agency as efficient

causality.

The point of the above quotation from "Mark" is that God

exercises greater power in forgiving sins than in performing nature

miricles.

The power than brings about forgiveness is not a power to

perform, but rather a power to motivate.

Perhaps a better model on which
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to view divine power is that of
final causality.

God's unlimited love

motivates reconciliation, of man and man, of man
and God.

That is for-

giveness.
If divine agency is looked at in this way,
it becomes fairly natural

to understand omnipotence not as ability to
perform any logically possible

task, but as the total sovereignty of love, as the
possessing of a love
so powerful as to bring about even the moat
difficult reconciliation,

the reconciliation of perfection and imperfection.

Many other theologians could be cited to the same point as
Aulen’s.
The details would differ, but the common theme would emerge
that creating
stones possessing unusual properties has nothing to do with any of
the

concepts o: omnipotence held by most

modem

theologians.

Yet it remains

an interesting question whether argument A is sound, whether it shows

what it sets out to show.
The question remains interesting for two reasons: one historical and
the other practical.

In the first place, a notion of omnipotence to

which the task posed in the stone paradox

is

relevant was attributed to

God by at least some of the Church fathers, by the medieval Christian

philosophers and most early modern philosophers.

It is surely of histo-

rical interest to determine \*hether that notion of omnipotence is

a

self-consistent notion.
On the practical side, the paradox remains interesting because

theology tends to reach more upward than outward.

While notions of omni-

potence to which the stone paradox is relevant are ascribed to God by
almost no one in the modem theological community, such notions are

ascribed to God by a fair number of lay Christians.

The stone paradox,
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being a much publicized problem, has long
been a cause of concern to many
such laypersons, from fifth-grade Sunday School
students to far older

and more sophisticated laypersons.

To such persons, an answer to the

question of the stone paradox's soundness is of
practical religious interest.

If argument A is sound, then their notion of
omnipotence must be

abandoned or revised.

If the argument is unsound, then they can turn

their attention to other and more serious questions of faith.

Finally, for whatever reason, there has been a fair amount
of dis-

cussion of the stone paradox and its more general cousin, the paradox
of omnipotence 1) Either God can make things which He cannot fully control or God
can-

not make things which He cannot fully control.
2) If God can make things which He cannot fully control, then He is not

omnipotent.
3) If God cannot make things which He cannot fully control, then He is

not omnipotent.
4) Therefore, God is not omnipotent. in various philosophical journals over the past twenty years.

While this

is, in itself, no sign that the paradox is an interesting issue, a survey

of that literature ^ill show that the paradox does warrant a more com-

plete analysis than has heretofore been given.
In the remainder of this dissertation

I

shall show that argument A

is unsound, that the appearance of necessity v/hich attaches to the con-

clusion dissolves when the paradox is given adequate formal representation.

My basic procedure will be to examine the crucial preliminary issues:
survey the contemporary literature on the stone paradox; develop a formal
language adequate to the expression of the paradox and see what solution

7

issues forth from the formalization of
the argument.
The second, third and fourth chapters
will be devoted to examining
the crucial preliminary issues.

Chapter II will be a largely historical

analysis of the problem of the relationship
between God and the truths
of logic.

It might seem initially that there
should be no problem here,

that we should be able to carry out logical
discussion and argument

about God just as we do about any other being.

Descartes, however, made

the peculiar claim that the eternal truths,
including the truths of

logic, are free-will creations of God, and that God
could equally well

have made it the case that all contradictions are true.

This claim must

be faced seriously, if for no other reason, simply because
it was seri-

ously held by a philosopher of such great stature as Descartes.

It might

be argued on the basis of Descartes’ position that the
stone paradox is
l rre l evari t

since God can bring about logically impossible states of

affairs.

Two questions arise in connection with Descartes' claim: 1) What
does it mean?

Does it follow from what Descartes said that God is not

bound by the truths of logic even after their creation?

2) Is Descartes'

claim at all plausible?
In Chapter III I shall consider what is meant by 'omnipotent' in

the context of the stone paradox.

Because of the context,

I

shall not

even mention any modern theological discussion on omnipotence, but shall
limit myself to two notions of omnipotence which have been put forward
in the literature on the stone paradox: one analyzes omnipotence in terms

of degrees of power; the other analyzes omnipotence in terms of the abil-

ity to perforin tasks.

While the former notion seems to make the stone
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paradox less paradoxical, on

a

closer analysis it is not sufficiently

well-defined, for the present context, to be at all useful.

I

then

attempt to develop the latter notion of omnipotence into
its most clear
and perspicuous form.

Chapter IV deals with the matter of whether God is, if omnipotent
at all, necessarily omnipotent.

A number of recent writers on the stone

paradox have offered solutions to the stone paradox on the tacit assumption that God is necessarily omnipotent.

To my knowledge, that assump-

tion has never been supported or even explicitly faced in any of the

recent literature on the stone paradox.

Yet, as we shall see, it is

absolutely crucial to an adequate consideration of the paradox.
In response to the need for such a consideration,

I

shall consider

what might be offered in support of the claim that God is necessarily
omnipotent.

In the end, the answer must rest on linguistic intuitions,

presumably with some basis of support from the traditional Christian
understandings of the word 'God'.

For this reason,

I

shall give a brief

survey of what several important medieval Christian philosophers have
said about the meaning of 'God*.

Also,

I

shall informally show the very simple solution to which the

stone paradox is susceptible if one goes beyond the minimal Christian

tradition to the point of assuming that God is necessarily omnipotent.
The remainder of this dissertation will take it for granted that 'f
God is omnipotent it is at least not a

i

ecessary truth that God is omni-

potent.

Chapters V-VII will present a survey of the contemporary literature
on the stone paradox.

In particular, Chapter V will deal with some lit-
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erature on the form of the argument of the stone
paradox.

noted that the form of argument A is that of

It will be

constructive dilemma.

a

It

has been claimed that no stone-type argtanent can
disprove God's omnipo-

tence unless it starts from the assumption of God's
omnipotence and derives a contradiction.

This view is certainly puzzling.

Its basis may

lie in the fact that argument A is not, strictly
speaking, a paradox.

While we certainly do use the word 'paradox' in everyday, informal
language to characterize a result which is merely surprising, 2 we
have a

paradox in the strict sense, or a logical paradox, "whenever we seem to
have two incompatible propositions both of which, for certain reasons,

would, if appearances were correct, be true."

A paradox is

which we are confronted with an apparent contradiction.

a case in

For an argu-

ment to be a paradox, then, it must be a reductio ad absurdum argument.

While it may be legitimate to conclude on this basis that the form of
argument A is not properly that of

a

paradox, it is surely not legiti-

mate to conclude that the form of A is not

a

valid argument form.

If

anything, the constructive dilemma is a more widely accepted form of
proof than the reductio ad absurdum , given the objections of intuitionistic logicians to the latter form.

Chapter VI looks briefly at A(l).
ward tautology.

A(l) looks like a straight-for-

Despite some protest from George Englebretsen , which

I

examine in this chapter, it is.
In Chapter VII I present an analysis

of the third premise of the

_
James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer, Fundamentals of Logic
The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 175.

,

(New York

o

C.I. Lewis and C.H. Langford, Symbolic Logic
tions, Incorporated, n.d.), p. 438.

,

(New York: Dover Publica-
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stone paradox:

A(3) If Goo' cannot create a stone which He
cannot lift, then He
omnipotent.

is

not

Most of the writers who have attacked the stone
paradox have attacked
this premise.

A(3) has been criticized through the use of
more or less

formal constructions of the argument.

These criticisms fail because, in

every case, the formalization of the argument is either
faulty or inadequate.

A(3) has also been criticized on the basis of purported
analogies

between the argument of the stone paradox and various other arguments

which obvicusly fail in ways which suggest that A(3) is faulty.
analogies

c.lso fail.

The

Finally, A(3) has been criticized on the basis of

various interesting, if at times bizarre, analyses of liftability.

The

only criticisms which are at all damaging to A(3) are those which operate on the assumption that God is necessarily omnipotent.

assumption is explicitly not in effect in Chapter VII.
from Chapter VII unscathed.

Yet that

A(3) emerges

What does become obvious from Chapter VII

is the desirability of an adequate formal construction of argument A.
It may puzzle the reader that there is no chapter on the literature

on the second premise, A(2).

ature.

A(2

)

The reason is that there is no such liter-

nas been accepted as innocuous by everyone who has written

on the stone paradox, as far as

I

can tell.

This is surprising, as it

turns out in Chapter X that the second premise is precisely the point

where the argument of the stone paradox in fact fails.
Chapters VIII-X present a fully formal analysis of the stone paradox.

In Chapter VII some of the difficulties of formalizing the argu-

ment emeige.

There are three difficulties which must be met oy any at-
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tempted formalization of the argument.
izing the

can'

in the argument.

The first problem is in formal-

It cannot be captured by any
standard

use of our normal modalities, at least
on any reasonably standard inter-

pretation.

The 'can' in the stone paradox is a
very restrictive notion.

The 'can' of the paradox must be so
restrictive that a lack of ability
of any kind will be excluded.

The second difficulty is less problematic.

It becomes evident in Chapter VII that
there are problems involved in

using the existential quantifier in connection
with the predicate 'create'.
This can presumably be taken care of by the
use of standard alethic modalities.

In this way we can speak of possible, but
uncreated, hence un-

actual, objects.

The third difficulty is that of giving a precise and
formal notion
of what a task is.

This is important because the notion of task is in-

dispensible in giving the notion of omnipotence.

In a formalization cf

the argument, we need to show that God lacks some ability,
that that

ability is the ability to perform some task, and that that task
is logically possible.

In order to do this, we need to have a clear and perspic-

uous notion of task.

(Actually, this notion of task comes in Chapter III,

but it is developed there in response to the demands that will be made
of it in Chapter VIII.)

The surface logic of the argument is very simple.

Its form is:

A'. (1) A or not-A.
(2) If A, then not-O.
(3) If not-A, then not»0.
(4) Therefore, not-O.

To get beyond this, into the deeper logical structure of the argument,
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involves us in a fairly complicated
logic.

development of such a logic.
with two sets of modalities.

Chapter VIII will involve the

It will be a two-sorted, second-order
logic
It must be two-sorted in order to
make the

distinction between agents and other objects
in the universe.

This is

necessary in order to provide an adequate
formalization of the notion
’can'.

It must be second-order only in so far
as it provides a means of

quantifying over well-formed formulae of its own
language.

This is need-

ed in order to give a precise analysis
of the notion of omnipotence.

Finally, it must have two sets of modalities:
a set of praxiological

modalities to capture the notion of ability which

is so central to the

paradox; and a set of standard alethic modalities, since
logical possi-

bility plays a role in the analysis of omnipotence, and
since we will

wish to be able to speak of possible, but non-actual,
objects.

The

logic will be presented by means of a language of the
appropriate sort

and order with a Kripke-type semantics.
In Chapter IX

I

shall give the formalization of argument A along

with an informal proof in the metalanguage that the third premise is
true simply by virtue of the logic and semantics of the problem.

Chapter X provides the actual solution to the stone paradox.

It

does this by presenting a model for our formal language which satisfies
the semantics given in Chapter VIII such that on that model there is a

possible world in which the formal construction of the second premise of
the stone paradox is false.

This shows that tnat premise is not true sim-

ply by virtue of logic and semantics and therefore that it will not serve
to carry us through to the conclusion of the stone paradox.

The stone paradox has, of course, received support as well as crit-

1
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icism in the various philosophical journals.

In particular, J.L. Cowan

has written a very fine article in defense
of the stone paradox. 4

Cowan

presents a formal construction of the argument
which appears to be sound.
This leads to the conclusion that there is
something wrong either with

Cowan's construction or with mine.

For this reason,

I

go on in Chapter

X to examine and criticize Cowan’s formalization
of the argument, drawing

not only on Cowan's article, but on some correspondence
which

I

have been

carrying on with Prof. Cowan over the past few months.

While this concludes the treatment of the paradox in the
form of
argument

A,,

one leaves Chapter X,

I

think, with a feeling that while this

form of the paradox may not work, nevertheless some extension
or revision
of it surety will.

In Chapter XI

I

look at some other arguments: revisions

of the stone paradox which suggest themselves in light of the natue of

the solution given to the standard version of the paradox; and other,

more general versions of the paradox of omnipotence.
with these other arguments in full formality,
what direction a solution lies.

I

While

I

do not deal

do indicate clearly in

In those cases where it is possible,

I

show how the argument can be formalized and solved by means of the lan-

guage and semantics of Chapter VIII.

Where that is not possible,

I

indicate roughly how the formal language must be extended in order to
give adequate expression to the argument.
In the end, it is apparent that neither the traditional stone para-

dox nor any of its likely revisions or extensions prove that God is not

omnipotent.
4

We are left not knowing whether God is omnipotent, in the

J.L. Cowan, "The Paradox of Omnipotence Revisited", Ca nadian Journa
of Philosophy , Vol. Ill, No. 3, (March 1974), pp. 35-45.
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appropriate sense of 'omnipotent'.
is not,

We really don't even know that
there

lurking In the bushes, some other proof
to the conclusion that

God is not omnipotent.

What we do know is that one type of
argument will

not lead tc that conclusion.

Yet because of the generality of the
solu-

tion it seems likely that there is
no disproof of God's omnipotence to
be had in another quarter.
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CHAPTER

II

GOD AND LOGICAL TRUTH

In a very brief article, ’’The Logic
of Omnipotence’’, Harry Frankfort

suggests that the paradox of omnipotence may
be disolved by accepting the

principle, which Frankfort claims is put forward
by Descartes, that God’s

power is not limited to the logically possible.

Frankfort solves the

paradox as follows:
Suppose, then, that God’s omnipotence enables Him
to do even what
is logically impossible and that He actually
creates a stone too
heavy for Him to lift. The critic of the notion of
divine omnipotence is quite mistaken if he thinks that this
supposition plays
into his hands. ... But if God is supposed capable
of performing
one task whose description is self-contradictory that of creating the problematic stone in the first place - why
should He not
be supposed capable of performing another - that of
lifting the
stone? After all, is there any greater trick in performing
two
logically impossible tasks than there is in performing one?

Frankfort's proposed solution raises

a

number of interesting ques-

tions both concerning the relationship between God and logical truth,
and concerning the history of philosophy.

plore some of these questions.
f ott

'

I

I

shall ex-

shall consider whether Frank-

principle is intelligible and whether Descartes did accept such

s

a position.

tion,

First,

In this chapter

I

As it turns out that Descartes did not accept such a posi-

shall try to determine, by means of the relevent Cartesian texts,

what Descartes did maintain concerning the relationship between God and
logical truth.

Because of the radical nature of Descartes’ position it

Harry G. Frankfort, "The Logic of Omnipotence", Philosophical Review ,
LXXIII (1964), p. 263. Frankfort is writing in response to George Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence", Philosophical Review ,
LXXII (1963), pp. 221-223. Mavrodes* main claim is that the paradox
of omnipotence presents no problem since a stone that God cannot lift
is not a logically possible object, and omnipotence is only the ability
to do anything that is logically possible.

is of interest to look into the
background against which Descartes saw

the issue of God's relationship to
logical truth.

What is the basic

motivation behind Descartes' position?
Because Frankfort's principle is much stronger
than anything implied
by the Cartesian position, as

I

shall show presently, and because, un-

like Descartes, Frankfort offers no defense
for his view, I shall spend

very little time dealing with Frankfort's
principle £er se.
shown easily that Frankfort's principle leads to

a

It can be

manifest absurdity.

Frankfort's principle claims the total subordination
of logic to
something else (God).

Perhaps the principle's clearest statement is:

"God's omnipotence enables Him to do even what is logically
impossible."

To show that this subordination leads to logical absurdities of a
certain sort is not a refutation, but merely a reiteration of that
subor-

dination.
sorts.

I

Yet this reiteration may itself constitute a refutation of
cannot, without begging the question, argue to the falsity of

Frankfort's principle, for that would require appealing to the laws of
logic as universally and without exception true in order to show that
the laws of logic circumscribe even the power of God.

would obviously be circular.

Yet

I

Such a procedure

can illustrate the unintelligibility

of Frankfort's principle.

Consider the following sentences:
1) God can swear by some being greater than Himself.
2) God can create a being greater than Himself and yet remain God.
3) God can make it th*1 case that God ^ God.

According to Frankfort's principle, l)-3) are all true.

On the assump-

tion that God is by definition greater than any other actual being, l)-3)
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all claim that God can perform
some logically impossible task.

Let us

look just for a moment at
3), because it is the most striking.

3) claims

not only that God can make a formal
contradiction true, but, given the

particular contradiction involved, that 3od
can cease being identical

with Himself.

This is completely unintelligible.

How then can Frankfort maintain the truth
of 3)?

It would seem that

Frankfort would have to say that sentences about
God, or at least sentences about God's power are not governed by
,
any rules of logic.
seems to be merely a restatement of his earlier
principle.

however, the earlier principle's appearance of
innocence.

This

It has lost,
If sentences

about God's power are not governed by any rules of
logic, then we have

no basis for making inferences about God’s power.

We have no basis for

saying about any sentence concerning God's power that
any other sentence

follows from it.

With the loss of the ability to make inferences con-

cerning God's power all rational discourse concerning God's
power loses
its basis.

There can be no the ology of God's power.

This is where Frank-

fort's principle comes back against itself.

Frankfort's principle that God's power is not limited to the logically possible is itself discourse concerning God's power.
to the result that language about God's power has no logic.

Yet it leads
If a language

has no logic it is presumably unintelligible, in so far as no reasoning
can be carried out in it.

Frankfort's principle, therefore, claims,

among other things, its own unintelligibility.
As

I

mentioned above, Frankfort seems to claim support for his prin-

ciple from Descartes.

Frankfort claims that support on the basis of

Descartes' letters to Mersenne of April

,15

and May 27, 1630; his letter

18

to

Amauld

of July 29,

1648; and his letter to Meslend of
May 2, 1644. 2

If we look carefully at the
Cartesian texts, however, we shall
see that

only one of the cited texts, the
letter to Arnauld, offers cny support
for Frankfort's principle. Another
of the texts, the first letter
to

Mersenne, along with a number of other
Cartesian texts, directly contradicts Frankfort’s principle.

The parts of the two letters to
Mersenne

and the letter to Mesland cited by
Frankfort claim only that God need

not have created the eternal truths
of logic as He did.
well have created the world in such

a

He could equally

way that all contradictions should

have been true.

This much is, of course, quite compatible
with what

Frankfort says.

Frankfort's principle, however, goes on to claim
that

God is not bound by the truths of logic even
after their creation as

eternal truths.

Descartes, with the possible exception of his statement

in the letter to

Amauld

flatly denies this.

,

Let us first look at Descartes’ letter to Mersenne
cf April 15, 1630.

Descartes does say, as Frankfort notes,
The truths of mathematics ... were established by God
and entirely
depend on Him, as much as do all the rest of His creatures.
...
You will be told that if God established these truths He
would be
able to change them, as a king does his laws; to which it is
necessary to reply that this is correct.5

Frankfort seems to do

a

bit of fortuitous editing here, for the text of

the second sentence quoted above, according to Kenny's translation of

Descartes' letters, continues to give quite a different impression of
Descartes' position.

It reads:

It will be said that if God had established these truths He could

1

See Frankfort, Od. Clt .

This is cited in Ibid .

,

,

pp. 262f.
p.

262.
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uul

iu.s

win

is tree.

’Yes, but His power is incompre-

'

hensible.

Thus filled out, this becomes a
very tricky bit of text
Descartes’ point, in this text, is less
clear than one might hope.

The partial text cited by Frankfort
claims that God can change "these

truths" (including the truths of logic).

In the full text Descartes

claims that God can change them if His will
can change.
important.

The ’if* is very

The imagined interlocutor replies that he
takes the truths

to be eternal and unchangeable.

for God is, Himself,
is unchangeable.

For Descartes, this poses no problem,

etemil and unchangeable.

This means that His will

Since God can change the eternal truths if and
only if

God’s will can change, (Although the

’’and

only if" is not included in

this text it is obvious that God can change the
laws of logic only if

His will can change, since He created them by an
act of His will.) it

follows that those truths are also eternal and
unchangeable.

Now the imagined interlocutor raises the real problem.
out that God’s will is free.

changeable?

He points

How can God’s will be both free and un-

The reply - "Yes, but his power is incomprehensible."

We

cannot really understand.

While the problem of the freedom of God's will is
Descartes, as we shall see later, what
4

"

i3

a

crucial one for

important at this point is to
*

"

Rene Descartes, Philosophical Letters , trans. and ed. by Anthony Kenny,
(Oxford: 1970), pp. Ilf. While Frankfort’s translation is slightly more
literal, as far as it goes, it does conclude in mid-sentence. In the
original French, the sentence with which Frankfort concludes continues,
as it does in Kenny’s translation: "a quoy il faut respondre qu'ouy, si
sa volonte peut changer." See Descartes, Oevres , Vol. I, ed. by Charles
Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897), pp. 145f.
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have shown that the letter to Mersenne
of April 15, 1630 gives no support
to Frankfort's principle.

Frankfort’s second citation, from Descartes'
letter to Mersenne of
May 27, 1630, reads:
God we.s as free to make it false that all
the radii of
are equal as to refrain from creating the
world . 5

a

circle

There is no claim here that God could now make
it fail to be the case
that all the radii of a circle are equal, only
that He could have done
so (instead of making it to be the case that
all of a circle's radii are

equal).

This passage does not support Frankfort's extreme
position.

Frankfort's citation from the letter to Mesland makes
precisely the
same claim.

The one text which Frankfort cites which does give me
some difficulty is from the letter to

Amauld

of July 29, 1648.

would not even dare to say that God cannot arrange that ...
one and two should not make three; but I only say that He has
given me a mind of such a nature that I cannot conceive ... a
sum of one and two which would not be three, and S on, and that
9
such things imply contradictions in my conception . 0
I

The problem here is that Descartes uses the present tense, "cannot ".

7

suggest that Descartes' concern here is very similar to that expressed
in his first letter to Mersenne.

Descartes does not want to say that

God cannot arrange it that one and two should make something other than

three because that would claim some limitation on God's power.

On the

other hand, Descartes does not say that God can arrange it that one and
This is cited in Frankfort, Op. Cit .
This is cited in Ibid .
7

,

p.

,

p.

263.

263.

See Descartes, Oevres , Vol. V, (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1903), p. 224.

I
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two should .sake something other
than three.

He cannot say that.

Con-

sider the following argument:
1) Cod can arrange it that one
and two does not make three.
2)

ind
SUCh 3 natUre that 1 cannot conceive a
sum
ot one and two which
? would
?! not
be three.

3)

1

of^rjdT "V
cannot conceive

a

sum of one and two which would not be
three.

4) ° od ca" arran sc It that something
Is the case which
to De the case.
.

I

cannot conceive

5) God can be a deceiver.
6) Being a deceiver is contrary to God's
immutable essence.
7) God cannot be a

deceiver.

8) Therefore, God cannot arrange it that
one and two does not make three.

The above argument proves, on the basis of purely
Cartesian principles,
that God cannot make it the case that one and two does
not make three.

The only part of the argument that involves something
other than what

appears in the letter to Amauld is the part which involves the
position
that God is essentially non-deceptive.

Yet, Since the letter to Arnauld

was written seven years after the Meditations

,

it is surely reasonable to

assume that Descartes was still aware of his argument in the Meditations
for the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions.
This is

a

familiar dilemma for Descartes.

On the one hand, he must

assert, for a number of reasons, that God is now subject to the laws of
logic, mathematics, etc.

On the other hand, Descartes must be reluctant

to assert that God is subject to the laws of logic, mathematics, etc.,

because that seems to imply some limitation on the freedom of God.

Again

I

shall put off fuller discussion of that dilemma and merely note

for the present that the Cartesian text does not offer support for Frank-

n
fort

s

principle as it appears to on a more
casual reading.

In order to reinforce the
conclusions which

I

have reached above

concerning Descartes* actual position on
the immutability of the truths
of logic,

I

shall briefly cite two more texts: first,
from the reply to

the fifth set of objections,

Yet

think that because God so wished it and
brought it to pass,
[including the truths of logic! are [emphasis
is Descartes 'I
immutable and eternal. Now whether you think
this to have serious
consequences or the reverse, to me it is sufficient
if it is
I

t ey

true..

8

and, in a different but for Descartes
very closely related vein, from the

Conversation with Burman,
0. But then would God have been able to
command His creatures to
hate Him, and to make goodness consist in that?
R. He cannot do it anymore; but what
He would have been able to
do, we do not know. But why would He have
not been able to prescribe such a commandment to His creatures?^

These two texts both clearly claim that there are certain
laws which God

might have been able to make differently in the beginning,
but which are

now immutable, even to the extent that God cannot violate
them.
There is one other Cartesian text in which Descartes abandons his
usual claim that God could have created completely different eternal
truths

Further I pointed out [in L^e Monde , Descartes* suppressed treatise
on Physicsl what are the laws of Nature, and without resting my
reasons on any other principle than the infinite perfections of
God, I tried to demonstrate all those of which one could have any
doubt, and to show that they are of such a nature that even if God
had created other worlds, He could not have created any in which
these laws would fail to be observed. 10
Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. II, trans. and ed*
by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.T.R. Ross
CNew York: Dover Publications,
1955), p. 226.
,

Conversation with Burman, Descartes, Oevres , Vol. VII,
10

Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes

,

p.

432.

Vol. I, p. 108.
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It Is difficult to know what
to make of this text.

Discourse on Method, published in
1637.

It appears in the

It reports on Le Monde, never

published because it was destroyed
or suppressed in 1632 when Descartes
learned of the condemnation of Calileo.
Presumably it was written between 1630 and 1632.

The point of the text is clear.

What is puzzling

is that its point is precisely
the opposite of that made in the part
of

Descartes' May 27, 1630 letter cited above.

It may be that Descartes

changed his mind on this matter in
1630, hut if so he also resumed his
former position again sometime before 1644.

Whatever may be said about the above text, we may
now rest certain
that Descartes did not support Frankfort’s
principle.

Descartes is gen-

erally clear in affirming the claim that once
the truths of logic are ere
ated they are eternal and immutable.
even by God.

They cannot be changed or violated

Yet Descartes also generally claims that God might
perfect-

ly well have created worlds which, according
to any of our logics, are

logically impossible.

Descartes was obviously aware that his view on this latter point
was quite radical, for in his April 15, 1630 letter to Mersenne
Descartes
asks Mersenne to raise Descartes' position often in conversation in
drder
to get people used to speaking of God in such a manner, but not to men-

tion Descartes’ name in connection with this view until Descartes published his view in his treatise on physics.^

Descartes’ position or

the relationship between the eternal truths, including the truths of
logic, and God stands in marked contrast to the range of positions gen-

erally held within the scholastic tradition.
11

Descartes, Philosophical Letters , p. 12.
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St. Thomas maintains, as does
Descartes, that the laws of logic

stand inviolable, even by God:
eS

h

^

omnl P otent b "t It seems difficult
to exomnipotence precisely consists. For
there
may
bl a
aS t0
CiSe meanln 8 ° f the "°td "all" when
we say
tha? Cod ^
H
” n* ‘ hln8s ' If
however ,
>
consider
the
matter
ariohr since
<
aright,
power is said in reference to possible
things, this
aSe
d aan do a11 thin Ss. ia rightly
>
^°
understood to mean that
?J can do all things that are possible; ...
God
Nor is this contrary to the word of
the angel saying: No word shall
be impossible with Cod (Luke 1:37).
For whatever implies a contra* 3 U° rd ’ beCaUSa no intellect can possibly conceive
2
such

nlain°?n

/ J

h

r

m

^ U

:

r

w

Tthing^

and again,

Since the principles of some sciences, such
as logic, geometry,
and arithmetic are drawn solely from the
formal principles which
constitute the essences of things, it follows that
God cannot do
anything which conflicts with these principles
thus, he cannot
make a genus not predicable of its species,
or bring it about
that the radii of a circle are not equal,
or that a rectilinear
triangle should not have its three angles equal
to two right angles.
:

This last citation may give the impression that St.
Thomas would go on

further with Descartes to claim that God could have created
different
truths of logic simply be creating different essences of
things or dif-

ferent formal principles which constitute the essences of
things.

Des-

cartes, after all, believed that essences were creatures of God, which

might have been created differently.

That impression would, however, be

mistaken, since those formal principles, according to St. Thomas, are

a

part of God's own essence.
St. Thomas Aquinas, S umma Theologica . Ia, 25, 3, from Anton C. Pegis,
ed., Basic Writings of St . Thomas Aquinas Vol. I, (New York: Random
House, 1945), pp. 262f.
,

Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles , ch. 25, cited in Anthony Kenny, "The
Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths", Journal of Philosonhv, Vol.
67,

(1970), p. 695.

Since therefore the essence of God
contains in itself all the perfeet ion contained in the essence of any
other being, and far more,
can
ow a 1 things in Himself with a
proper knowledge. For the
"
Py°P er to each thing consists in some particular
participation
of the divine perfection. Now God
could not be said to know Himself
" ly unless He knew all the
P
ways in which His own perrection
ff be
perfection
could
shared by others. 14

A number of interesting questions arise
concerning St. Thomas* position in these passages.

present point.

Their exploration, however, is not the the

Rather we should look to the philosophical
position against

which Descartes* view on eternal truths is a
direct reaction.

T.J. Cronin

claims, very convincingly, that the view to which
Descartes was reacting
is the position of Frances Suarez. 15

The textual source of Suarez

;s

position is his Disputation.es Metaphysicae . the thirty-first
Disputation ,
in particular.

Whether Cronin is correct or not, two things can be said with
certainty: first, Descartes claims, in the reply to the fourth
objection,
16
to have read the Disputationes quite early in his
philosophical career;

and secondly, in the Disputationes

,

Suarez expresses a view on the re-

lationship between God and eternal truths which is in substantial op-

position to that of Descartes.
In the thirty-first Disputation Suarez claims that it is not the
case

that the eternal truths are true because they are known by God, but that,
on the contrary, they are known by God because they are true.

Aquinas, Summa Theologica , la, 14, 6, from Pegis,

Oj).

Cit .

1 ^

,

He goes

pp.

144f,

T.J. Cronin, S.J., "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suarez and Descartes”, Modern Schoolman Vol. XXXVIII, (May 1961), pp. 269-288, and
Vol. XXXIX^ (November 1961), pp. 23-38.
,

Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes , Vol. II, p. 107.

Frances Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae
Cronin, Ojx. Cit .
p. 273.
,

,

31, 12, 40, cited in
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on to say that the necessity of these
truths does not have its source in

God, since it is necessary that God
represent things in accordance with
the essences which they do, in fact have. 18

Finally, Suarez claims that

these truths are not, in themselves, created
by God at all.

This is the

case because the eternal truths never imoly any
existential claim.

Since

the eternal truths do not depend for their truth
upon the existence of

anything, and since efficient causality

Ls

simply the bringing of things

into existence, it follows that the eternal truths
do not depend for

their truth upon any efficient causality.

It follows obviously that they

19
do not depend for their truth upon the efficient causality
of God.

If the eternal truths are not created, then either they
are eternal

beings or they are nothing.

The former view is unsatisfactory because

it would mean that there was something co-eternal with God.

That there

was something other than God which is eternal and uncreated wojld
seem
to impugn the perfection of God.

The latter view is also unsatisfactory

since the eternal truths at least involve unactualized essences, and
these essences are not simply nothing.

Suarez tries to run a middle

course between the above alternatives.

These unactualized essences are potential being.
ply nothing, yet they are nothing real.

cannot be created.

They are not sim-

They are beings of reason, which

Since prior to the creation of anything the only

intellect is the divine intellect, unactualized essences and, therefore,
the eternal truths are beings of divine reason, but nothing in themselves.

The eternal truths are not, therefore, dependent on the divine will.

19

Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae , 31, 12, 46, cited in Ibid .

,

p.

273.

Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae

,

p.

274.

,

31,

12,

45, cited in Ibid .
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While a great deal more might be
said about Suarez's treatment
of
essences and eternal truhts, this brief
sketch shoos the two points which
Descartes found objectionable: the view
that God’s freedom is not wholly

unlimited and the view that there is some
separation of God’s will from
His intellect.

In seeing how Descartes is driven
to his position on the

relationship between God and the eternal
truths, we must first look at
his view of the nature of the eternal
truths and then at his, acknow-

ledgedly limited, view of God.
To determine Descartes' view of eternal
truths we must look at two
issues: the nature of those truths £er se,
and why, consequently, they

must be created.

In looking at the nature of the eternal
truths, it is
l

perhaps best to start by noting that Descartes did
not view truth as

being in any way dependent on proof.

This independence fits well with

Descartes' preference for the analytic mode of inquiry
(Descartes' notion of

'analysis' is highly non-standard; whereas it is best
illustrated

in the Geometry , Descartes claims that it is also
exemplified by the

Meditations .) over the synthetic, which is the standard notion of proof.
It is perhaps this view of the independence of truth from
proof that

leads Descartes to lump under the heeding of "eternal truths" not only
the truths of logic, but the truths of arithmetic, algebra, geometry,

astronomy and optics as well.
A second element in Descartes' view of the nature of eternal truths
is his rejection of Aristotelian substantial forms.

This view is ver>

closely related to that mentioned in the last paragraph and could well
20

~

"
"

;

Much is made of this point in lan Hacking, "Leibniz and Descartes:
Proof and Eternal Truths", read as the Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy, June 6, 1973, (London: 1973), pp. 7f.

”

^

t
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have either led to it or followed
from it.

According to Anthony Kenny,

this rejection was the major novelty
in the Cartesian physical system.

Kenny points out that in Le Monde,
Descartes* suppressed treatise on
physics which is mentioned, among other
places, in the letter to Merseme
of April 15, 1630 and the Discourse
on Method . Descartes includes "a
.

sustained polemic against these chimerical
entities (AT XI, 3-36, and

especially 37). 21

This rejection of substantial forms leads
also to

rejection of the Aristotelian essences,

a

a

rejection of the idea that an

essence might be an explanatory principle causally
affecting the history
of the substance.

While Descartes gives up the Aristotelian doctrine
of essences, he

maintains the terminology of essences.

In doing so, of course, Descartes

was required to reinterpret that terminology rather
considerably.

That

reinterpretation of the terminology of essences is never very clearly
given.

There are, throughout the Cartesian corpus, passages which
give

conflicting impressions of what Descartes thought an essence was.
the May 27, 1630 letter to Mersenne, he

In

3 ays,

For it is certain that he is no less the author of creatures'
essences than he is of their existence; and this essence is nothing
other than the eternal truths.
As stated, this is not at all clear.

Which essence (Presumably there is

no such thing as the essence of all creatures.) is nothing other than the

eternal truths? (Or which eternal truths?)

A fairly plausible view of

what Descartes is saying here is that he claims that, for each creature,
21

Anthony Kenny, Od. Ci . p. 698. The "AT" in the parentheses refers
to Descartes' Oevres
edited by Adam and Tannery.
,

,

22

Descartes, Philosophical Letters, p. 14.
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its essence is identical with
all the eternal truths concerning
it.

This
interpretation is called into question,
however, by Descartes’ methodology of inquiry.

If the essence of a thing were
all the eternal truths

about that thing, then, since this
would include all the conjunctive
eternal truths of which at least one
conjunct was about that thing, simply knowing the essence of one thing
would involve knowing the essences
of all things.

The essence of any other thing would simply
be

a rear-

ranging of the conjuncts which we already know
to be eternally true.

A more modest interpretation would be the
claim that the essence of
a thing is

identical with all the eternal truths concerning it
which have

a basic prepositional form of some sort.

This is really no improvement

since one can formulate multi-placed predicates
which will serve pre-

cisely the same function as a conjunctive sentence.
It is pointless, if not futile, to attempt to give a
precise char-

acterization of Descartes’ notion of essence at this point.

In the first

place, Descartes said so little about the precise relationship
between

essences and eternal truths.
a

Secondly, Descartes has not even given us

clearly defined notion of eternal truths.

,

We know some of the things

that are included among the eternal truths, but we do not know exactly

what additional things are among the eternal truths.

This is because we

don't know what it means, for Descartes, for something to be an eternal
truth, except that eternal truths are eternally true.

Moreover,

I

sug-

gest that, since Descartes has made no precise characterization of eternal truths at the time of his letter to Mersenne, he did not intend the

above citation as a precise analysis of essences.

Rather Descartes in-

tended merely to indicate what kind of thing the essences are.

This

30

would seem to be a plausible
interpretation on the basis of the
context
of Descartes
letter. Moreover, Descartes three
letters toMersenne,
'

from April 15 to May 27, 1630,
constitute an attempt by Descartes
to set
forth his position on eternal truths
and essences in opposition to the

scholastic tradition.

In this context, the issue
of what kind of thing

the essences are is an important
one.

Given this reinterpretation of the language
of essences, it follows
that, for Descartes, essences and, a
fortiori

created.

,

eternal truths must be

David Ross, in his exposition of Aristotle’s
philosophy, sa 5 s,

The point that Aristotle chiefly stresses
here lin Metaphysics
Book i 1 is that the essence is not to be
thought of either as a
component existing alongside of the material
components, or as
itself consisting of material components. If we
view it in the
former way we shall need a further principle of
structure to explain nos it is united with the material components; ...23

For Descartes, essences are certainly not material
components.

Essences

are, however, additional components existing alongside
of the material

components.

Let us take as an example the circle and its essence.

Aristotle, the circle is

a

substance,

For

and,

We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the
samo
or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning
substance; for each thing is thought to be not different from
its
substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each
thing.

Therefore, the essence of the circle is not some additional thing which

must be created along with the circle.
circle.
23

For Descartes, the case is quite different.

God could have made

——
—

"

William David Ross, Aristotle. (London: Methuen and Company. 1923).
p.

24

It is simply identical with the

172.

Aristotle, Metaphysics Book D, Ch. 8, in The Basic Works of Aristotle ,
ed. by Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 761.
,

25

Aristotle, Metaphysics

,

Book Z, Ch. 6, in Ibid .

,

p.

789.
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it the case that all the
radii of a circle were not equal,
according to

Descartes.

This is to say that the circle could
have been created with

a different, essence.

same thing.

The circle and its essence are
therefore not the

The essence of the circle is

other, of the circle.

a

component, of some sort of

This, as Ross noted, requires some
further prin-

ciple of structure to explain how the
essence is united with the other

components of the circle.

For Descartes, that further principle
of struc-

ture lies in an appeal to the will of God.

The essence of the circle is

united with the circle as it is precisely
because God willed to so unite
them.

Given that the essence of the circle is a
component of the circle,

different from the circle and from its other
components, it must be

created just as the circle and its other components
must be created.
There is a final reason why, for Descartes, the
eternal truths must
be created.

Beatrice Rome, in "Created Truths and Causa Sui in Descartes",

brings together an argument which is basically as follows: 26
1) Incomprehensibility is in the divine essence. 27
(Although we have a
clear and distinct idea of God, we do not comprehend the
divine es-

sence itself.)^”

2) What is not a creature must belong to the Creator. 2 ^

3) Assume that the eternal truths are not created.

4) Therefore

*

5) Therefore,

76

27
28

the eternal truths belong to (are in) the Creator.
the eternal truths are incomprehensible.

—

——

—

Beatrice Rome, "Created Truths and Cau sa Sui in Descartes", Philosophy
and Phen omenological Research , Vcl. XVII, No. 1, (1956),
pp . 69f.
Descartes, Philosophical Letters

,

p.

11.

Ibid . , p. 14, and Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. II,
218.

p.

29

Descartes, reply to Bunnan, Oevres

,

Vol. V, p. 166.

.

6) The eternal truths are
comprehensible.
7)

Therefore, the eternal truths are
created.

It might be objected at this
point that the move from 1) and 4)
to 5) is

not legitimate.

It might be claimed that although
the divine essence,

as a whole, is incomprehensible,
parts of that. essence, eg. the eternal

truths, can remain comprehensible.

We do, it seems, comprehend God’s

existence.

This objection is not well-taken, however.

guishes among comprehending (c omprendre )

.

First, Descartes distin-

conceiving

knowing (savoir) as different epistemic states. 30

(

concevoir ). and

To say that we know

that God exists is quite different from saying that
we comprehend His

existence.

God's incomprehensibility is a part of His essence.

not, therefore, comprehend anything about God.

things about Him.

We can-

W e can merely know some

Secondly, Descartes maintains the radical unity and

simplicity of the divine essence.

Therefore, the distinction among parts

of the divine essence is at most a verbal distinction.

This leads to the other factor influencing Descartes' view
of the

relationship between God and the eternal truths.

In addition to the

above considerations on the nature of the eternal truths themselves,
Descartes' view of the nature of God lead further to his rejection of

Suarez's position on the eternal truths.

As

I

mentioned in the last

paragraph, Descartes viewed God as characterized by radical unity.

This

forced Descartes to reject Suarez's distinction between the divine intellect and the divine will.

That distinction did not remain for Descartes,

even as a distinction of reason.
30

There was no room for Suarez's position

See Jean LaPort, La Rationalisme de Descartes, (Paris: 1950), pp.

2 92 f
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that God could know possibilities
before creating anything.
they must first be created, as
possibles,

For Descartes

As Descartes wrote to Mesland

on May 2, 1644,
In order to know the immensity of
God's power, we ourselves
ought not to represent nor should we
conceive any preference or
t7
etWee
is unde rstanding and His will,
for the idea
!!
which we £have of*l God
teaches us that in Him there is but one
sole act which is wholly simple and
pure; in God to see and to
will are the very same thing. 31

This view stems from Descartes' doctrine
that to be dividible is an im-

perfection.

Therefore, God, who is wholly perfect, is
wholly indivisible.

The same doctrine also led Descartes
to the view that God’s will

cannot change.

In the doctrine of absolute divine unity,
all the divine

attributes become identical and indistinguishable. 32

I

follows that

God’s will is identical with, not only His
intellect, but His power,

existence, etc., as well.

From this it follows that if any of these

attributes are susceptible to change, they are all
subject to change.

Clearly some of them, eg. power, existence, are not.
them are, and,

ji

Therefore none of

fortiori , the divine will is not.

At this point the problem of divine freedom must be faced.
will cannot change.

God's

Therefore freedom, for the divine will, must consist

in something other than the ability to will something in the future
other

than what is being willed now.

The need to affirm the freedom of the

divine will, also led Descartes to claim that God could have created eternal truths other than the ones which, in fact, hold.

God is, among

other things, the efficient cause of the entire created order.

It is,

moreover, a fundamental principle of the Cartesian project that one can
31
32

Descartes, Philosophical Letters , p. 151.
This point is made in Rome, Og. Cit .

,

pp.

76f.
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move, through analysis, from those
of the eternal truths which
are given
by the natural light to a complete
knowledge of the physical sciences.
All the facts about the physical
world follow from the eternal truths.
Therefore, If God were not free to create
other eternal truths He would

also not have been free to create the
world differently.

God would have

been constrained to create the physical
world as He did.

Thus, given

Descartes' views on the extent of the eternal
truths, they must be created freely by God, for If they were not
then there would be no freedom
to God's causality.

The other important facet of Descartes' view of
God that is important here is his notion of divine incomprehensibility.

divine incomprehensibility is rooted in two sources.

This notion of
First, it is rocted

in Descartes' concern with the radical
transcendence of God.

Throughcut

the Cartesian corpus, whenever God is spoken of.
He is spoken of as being

transcendent in the highest degree. 33
as a guarantor of divine transcendence.

Divine incomprehensibility serves
As long as we realize that God

is incomprehensible there is no temptation to
immanentalize God, to soil

God through association with the comprehensible created
order.

The second root of the Cartesian doctrine of divine incomprehensiblli ty lies in tie distinction between divine infinitude and human finitude.

If anything is fundamental to Descartes,

is finite.

pot.
33

34

34

it is that the human mind

In a sense, Descartes sees the mind as rather like a cooking

It will not hold anything of greater magnitude than itself.

Thus,

~
See Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol.
241, Vol. II, p. 73, etc.

I,

pp.

166, 169,

See Ibid . , Vol. I, p. 166, Vol. II, p. 241, etc., and Philosophical
Letters , pp. 12, 14, 150, and 240.
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while the Infinite divine mind can
comprehend everything, the finite
human mind cannot comprehend
anything infinite. If God were
to be comprehensible, then He would have to
be finite, which He clearly is
not.
Given the above position with
regard to the nature of eternal truths
and the nature of God, Descartes
could have come to no other position
than that the eternal truths were
created by God through a free act of
His will, but that they stand,
once created, as eternal and inviolable,
even by their creator.

Descartes' position does have problems,
however.

As

I

mentioned

above, Descartes does not recognize any
dependence of truth upon proof.

A proof was, for Descartes, merely of
psychological value, helping someone of weaker intellectual vision see what
one of stronger vision might

simply intuit. 35

This is why the fact that some propositions
are provable

means nothing, for Descartes, so long as the proof
is not directly before
the mind, thereby making its various steps
36
and its conclusion indubitable.

As Leibniz observed, Descartes "did not know
the genuine source of truths

nor the general analysis of concepts". 36
We may be able to focus more clearly on this by means of
an example.

Imagire a world in which all the axioms of Euclidian geometry
were true,
all our normal rules of inference were true, and yet the
Pythagorean

theorem was false.

37

say was impossible.
'

35

See Hacking,

This is a world which we should normally want to
Yet, on the Cartesian position, God might have

Cit .

—

—

’

Oj).

,

pp.

7f.

This is cited in I! id . , p. 8, from Leibniz's letter to Philip of December 1679, and found in Gerhardt, ed. Die Philosophische Schriften von
G.W. Leibniz, Vol. IV, p. 282.
,

37

This example is adapted from Ibid., p. 9.

36

brought about such a world.

In such a world, there would
have to be at

least one right tiangle such that
a proposition which is
provably true of
all right triangles was not true
of that right triangle.
A normal response would be to say that any
figure which lacked the property
ascribed
to right triangles by the Pythagorean
theorem would not be a right triangle.

Descartes wants to maintain that in
there would be such a figure.

r.he

world under discussion,

The important question is, how can Des-

cartes maintain that the figure is a right
triangle?

The figure would

not have the same essence as right triangles
in the real world.

Yet it

would be, according to Descartes, a right
triangle nonetheless.

The objection becomes even sharper if we alter
the example slightly.
Let us suppose that all the normal laws hold
concerning geometry except
for the law of self-identity concerning
triangles.

In this case, since

being self-identical is certainly a provable
property of triangles, we
should certainly want to say that anything that was
not self-identical
was, whatever else it might be, certainly not

correct on Descartes* account as well.

a

triangle.

This would be

If the law of self-identity did

not hold with respect to triangles, then it would not be the case
that a

triangle is a triangle.

Descartes would thereby lose his basis for sup-

posing that he was, after all, talking about

a triangle.

While this objection may seem a bit contrived, that appearance
springs from the position against which objects rather than from the

objection itself.

Leibniz is quite correct in thinking that Descartes'

position betrays a faulty understanding of the concepts of necessity,
38
0

contradiction and proof .'

37

In the end, Descartes'
position is no better than Frankfort's.

If

a proper understanding of
such notions as truth, contradiction
and proof
is to be maintained, and if we
are committed to making some sense
of

talk about God's power, then we must
hold to the standard position 39
that God's action is limited to
the realm of the logically possible.

Moreover, it is only on this view that
we can maintain a notion of God
that does not fade into total transcendence
and out of the human picture.

A corollary to the refutation of
Frankfort's principle is that the
claim that God is omnipotent asserts, at
most, God’s ability to perform
any logically possible task.

This follows from the fact that if we take

God's omnipotence to be a power to perform even
logically impossible
tasks, then it follows that if God is omnipotent,
then "God is omnipo-

tent" is a piece of language without any logic.

It is, in short, non-

sense.
38

“—
Ibid., p. 9.

39 _

To ni
illustrate just how standard this view is, it might be
pointed out
that it was maintained at least as early as the first
part of the third
century A.D. when it was put forward by the Church father, Origen.
See
Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma , Vol. II, trans. by Fell Buchanan,
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc.. 1961), p. 350.
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CHAPTER III
THE NOTION OF OMNIPOTENCE

There are two quite distinct notions
of omnipotence which have
been
brought to play in analyses of the
stone paradox. The distinction
between
them is drawn most clearly in a
brief, dialogue-style article by
Julian
Wolfe, called "Omnipotence".

1

These two notions might be characterized

as Cl) an analysis of omnipotence
in terms of power, and (2) an analysis
of omnipotence in terms of capacity
to perform.

I

shall try to formulate

these two notions of omnipotence more
explicitly:
Def. 1: x is omnipotent

Def. 2: x is omnipotent =

for any degree of power
y, if y is required
for the performance of some task z, then x
has y.
df

for any (logically possible) task
y, x can
perform y.

The notion of omnipotence expressed in Def.

i

has been held by a

number of writers who have attempted to show that
the stone paradox does
not disprove the omnipotence of God. 2

pressed in Def.

2

The notion of omnipotence ex-

has been more widely accepted and has been held
by

writers on both sides of the stone paradox controversy.
The motivations behind both notions of omnipotence
seem fairly clear.

In support of (1), we regularly think of power as a measurable
quantity.

We measure the horse power of our automobile engines.

We measure the

Julian Wolfe, "Omnipotence", Canad ian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
(December 1971), pp. 245-247.

I

No. 2,
2

Ihis approach is taken in Ibid . G. Wade Savage, "The Paradox of the
Stone", Philosophical Review , Vol. LXXVI, No. 1, (January 1967),
pp.
74-79; and John King-Farlow s contribution to David Londey, Barry Miller, and John King-I- arlow, "God and the Stone Paradox: Three Comments",
Sophia , (October 1971), pp. 23-33.
;

'
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tons of thrust developed by our
rockets.

be lifted by weight lifters.

We measure the weight that can

It is natural to extend this
model to see

an omnipotent being, an all-powerful
being, as a being that has an unlimited amount of power.
It has been suggested by Sten
Stenson, in Sense and Nonsense in

Religion,

and Ian Ramsey, in -The Paradox of
4
Omnipotence'(and, in-

directly, in Religious Language 5
), that this notion of omnipotence is a

religiously useful one and theologically,
although not logically, quite
proper.

Stenson claims that when we speak of God as
"powerful" and "in-

telligent", as well as "loving", we engage
in analogical thought.

We

begin with a concept of power drawn from
experience with automobiles,

rockets and men, and the idea of proportionality
among these various degrees of power.

When we qualify 'powerful' by adding 'infinitely'

we

make what Ramsey calls "an odd logical claim
6
for the word 'God'".
Ramsey claims that the fact that we predicate
'infinitely powerful'
or 'omnipotent' of

'God' gives

'God' a "destinctive logical placing".

7

Ramsey does not specify how this comes about except to say
that 'infinitely* qualifies

'powerful' in a way which is logically different from

other qualifications.
3

It remains unclear exactly what Ramsey means by

—
Sten H. Stenson, Sense and Nonsense in Religion. (New York: Abinvdon
Press, 1969), pp."T07f.
Ian T. Ramsey, "The Paradox of Omnipotence", Hind Vol. LXV,
,
pp. 263-266.

Ramsey, Religious Language , (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957), Chapter 2. In
this chapter, Ramsey does not deal witn infinite power directly, but
w lbh infinite wisdom, infinite goodness, etc. The parallel is obvious
and appears in the above-mentioned paper.
6

Ramsey, "The Paradox of Omnipotence", p. 263.
Ramsey, Religious Language , p. 66.
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all this.
Unless

the stone paradox offers us a
sound argument, there Is surely

nothing logically improper about
qualifying -powerful' with 'infinitely.
There are numerous ways of measuring
power: n pounds (tons) of thrust,
n

horsepower, etc., where n is some
number.

Certainly, for any natural

number n, it Is logically proper
to speak of n power-units (for
some unit
of power).
Similarly, it is equally logically
proper to speak of n + l
power-units.

To say that x is infinitely powerful
is simply to say that,

for any natural number m, x can produce
m power-units.

Whatever other

problems this notion of infinite power may
have, it is not logically inproper.

Perhaps by "logically odd" Ramsey means
something less than "logic-

ally improper".

His minimal claim is that the above qualification
gives

'God* a "distinctive logical placing".
is trying to say.

It is still unclear what Ramsey

What Ramsey appears to be saying is that what
is in

play here is not a standard case of literal
predication, but a kind of

analogical speaking which is intended to lead to some
theological insight.
Regardless of the theological worth of Ramsey's claim (I
think it is

considerable.), there is nothing logically peculiar about this
predication.

'God'

is a term.

Its logical role (I take it that its logical

role involves such things as what terms may be substituted for it in

certain contexts.) is affected by certain true predications on that term.
Yet this is nothing peculiar about 'God' or about 'omnipotent'. Ramsey
has shown no logical peculiarity in the first notion of omnipotence.

The notion of omnipotence (1) does have other problems.
ens of Def.

1

The defini-

does not capture what one intuitively feels is captured by

.

hi

the definiendum.

There are certain lackings of ability
which would seem

to count against omnipotence
which cannot be accounted for by simply
a

lack of power.

These includes lackings of ability
which do not have the

"trick" appearance of the task posed
in the stone paradox.

A being might

lack the ability to fly not because
of any lack of power, but because
of
a structural limitation, say not
having wings. Similarly, there is no-

thing logically absurd about supposing
that some being can do anything

except lift small red stones.

(it is surely mistaken to suggest
that

there is something logically absurd about the
claim that x has the power
to lift small red stones yet cannot
lift them, since

play the piano, for example, yet

I

cannot: do it.)

I

have the power to

This inability, one

feels, clearly ought to count against that
being's being omnipotent.
Yet, according to Def. 1, such a being would
be omnipotent, at least on
the minimal (and highly intuitive) assumption
that the degree of power

required to lift a small red stone is the same as the
degree of power

required to lift a green stone of the same size, shape,
weight, etc.
Yet on our supposition, the being we have imagined
can lift the green
stone and, therefore, presumably has the degree of power
requisite.

This would seem to disqualify Def.
tent

1

as an adequate account of

'omnipo-

'

Def.

2

of

'omnipotent' has the virtue of appearing, on its face, to

capture our intuitive notion of omnipotence.

It is not subject to any

counter-examples as obvious as that made against Def.
problem with Def.

2

1

above.

The

is rather one of philosophical perspicuity and clarity.

Def. 2, as stated above, requires that we have an ontology that includes

tasks.

For those, like myself, who prefer to keep their ontological
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landscapes fairly spartan, the
Introduction of tasks Is an option
with
very little appeal. Moreover,
If tasks are to be Introduced
Into our
ontology, we should try to get clear
on the Issue of precisely what
Is a
task. That Issue yields to no
simple, readily available solution.
Moreover, for Def. 2 to be helpful, we
must have a precise notion of what
It
is for a task to be logically
possible.

These two problems must be solved before
we can accept Def.

2

(or

some emendation of it) as an adequate
account of 'omnipotent': 1) Either
a clear

notion cf what a task is must be presented,
or 'task' must be

eliminated from Def.

2

In favor of some clearer (and perhaps
ontologlcally

more austere) notion; and 2) In light of
a solution to 1), the notion of
'logical possibility' must be elucidated as
it applies to 'task' or what-

ever notion(s) is (are) substituted for 'task*.

The solution which

I

shall propose to the first problem, while it

is to a degree unintuitive,
I

is both clear and ontologlcally parsimonious.

propose that for the notion of ‘task* we substitute the
notion of
sentence', or, more formally,

'well-formed formula'.

For 'x performs

(task) y.' we shall substitute 'x makes it the
case that p is true.' where
p is

some sentence, or some wff of the formal language in which the para-

dox is cast.

That this is unintuitive is obvious from a few examples.

Some sentences or wffs, most obviously those that are tautological, do
not appear to correlate to anything that we would normally call a 'task'.
It makes no cense to say, "x makes it the case that it is raining or it
is not raining.", since nothing x can do could possibly make "It is

raining or it is not raining." fail to be true.
any effect on the truth of a tautology.

No action by x can have

On the other hand, on my solu-
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tion the same sentence might
correlate to what we would normally
think
of as two or more quite distinct
tasks. Consider "x makes it
the case
that the window is open."

The task performance which this
sentence at-

tributes to x might be either opening
the window or keeping the window
open (preventing someone else from
closing the window). 8 This poses
no
problem for the above solution, however,
as will be shown in connection

with the solution to the second problem.
It is also to be noted that this
solution does not require the in-

troduction into our ontology of any entities
more philosophically suspect
than sentences and languages.

The above solution only requires that the

language in which we cast the stone paradox
have the capacity to talk

about its own wffs.

The existence of such wffs is guaranteed simply
be

virtue of our giving

a

language.

That the language should be able to

talk about itself, of course, presents no
problems in principle.
The solution to the seconu problem follows fairly
simply.

Since

the notion of 'task' is reduced to that of 'sentence',
a task, we might
say, is logically possible if and only if
it is logically possible that
its associated sentence is true.

Thus, creating a round square would

not be a possible task since "There is a round square." cannot possibly
be true.

It is not the case that any being can make it the case that

there is a round square.
In light of this, we might give the following as a revision of Def.
'

g

'

"

'

1

~

~

These distinctions can be made by introducing a slightly more complicated way of describing tasks as changes from a situation described
by one sentence to that described by another. This is done in G.H.
von Wright, Norm and Action , (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963),
and An Essay in Deontic Loy ic and the Genera 1 Theory of Action,
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1968). Such distinctions
are not of any use, however, in connection with the present project.
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Bef. 2': X is omnipotent =

df

for any sentence (wff)
p, if it is logically
possible that p is true, then x can
make it
the case that p is true.

This still contains a problem, however.

Suppose that p is of the form

’there exists a q such that x cannot
make it the case that a exists'.
In this case it is clearly possible
that p is true and, just as clearly,

x cannot make it the case that
p is true.

Yet x's inability to make it

the case that p is true ought not to count
against x's omnipotence in

this case.

The reason for this is that it is not
logically possible

that x should make it the case that
p is true.
that is not logically possible for x.

The case poses a task

Therefore we revise our definition

once more;
Def. 2": x is omnipotent

for any sentence (wff) p, if it is logically
possible that x make it the case that
p is
true, then x can make it the case that
p is
true.

Even with this definition, if we simply allow any
term of the language to be substituted for
If we substitute for

'x',

'a

*x'

there will be ready counter-examples.

man who can only wiggle his finger', Def.

2" will yield the result that such a man is omnipotent.^

This can be

remedied by allowing only names of individual agents to be substituted
for 'x'.

Therefore we stipulate that only names, and not descriptions,

may be substituted for 'x'.
We are now in possession of

a

fully satisfactory notion of omnipo-

tence, and in position to face the problem raised by the failure of the

notion to accord with certain of our intuitions about tasks.
s

—

First, we

;

This counter example was given by Gareth Matthews of the Department of
Philosophy of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
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shall declare, by flat, that
If p is logically true, then,
for any x, "x
makes it the case that
p is true." and hance "x can cake it the
case that
P is true." shall be true.

Similarly, if p is logically false,
then, for

any x, "x makes it the case that
p is true." and hence "x can make it the
case that p is true." shall be false.
Given this, it is obvious that

sentences which are either logically
true or logically false have no
bearing on the question of omnipotence
for any given being. They cancel

each other out in the definition.

This is as it should be.

A being

fails to be omnipotent if and only if
there is some situation such that
it is not logically contradictory
to say that that being brought about

that situation and yet such that that being
is unable, for some reason,
to bring a.iout the situation.

This accords quite well with what

to be the most common intuitions about
omnipotence.

I

take

,
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CHAPTER

IV

IS "GOD IS OMNIPOTENT" EITHER
PROVABLE OR TRUE BY DEFINITION?
<

In addition to
8 SGCOnd key te ™’

'omnipotent’, the stone paradox involves
the use of
’

God

'-

If

^

should turn out, as some philosophers

and theologians have suggested, that
God is omnipotent by definition, or
that "God is omnipotent" is, in some
manner, provable, then it follows
that there is a very simple solution
to the stone paradox.
If "God is omnipotent" is provable,

(I take it, here,

that a defin-

ition constitutes a one-step proof.), then
it is logically necessary

that "God is omnipotent" is true.
is omnipotent,

If it is logically necessary that God

then it follows that the third premise of the
stone para-

dox,

A(3) If God cannot create a stone that He cannot
lift, then He is not
omnipotent.
is xalse.

This can be shown in the following way.

Frcm Def. 2" of Chapter III, we have it that
God is not omnipotent

there is some sentence p such that it is logically possible that God make it the case tnat d
is true, and God cannot make it the case that
p is true.

The sentence p by which we would normally expect that A(3) should be true
is "Ihere exists a stone which God cannot lift."

However, we can show by

means of the following argument that it is not logically possible that
"There exists a stone which God cannot lift" is true.
the conclusion of Chapter II,

On the basis of

^t follows from this that it is not logic-

ally possible that God make it the case that "There exists a stone which
God cannot lift" is true, and that that sentence does not allow us to

reach the conclusion of A(3).

“ ^“JL!“T
P 1S
(Wp

Here is that proof:

C

13
P>
Possible that God make It the
:
true
then God can mak ® it the case
?
that p is true
re supposing, for the moment,
that this is in some way
provable)
.

2) Let S be any stone.
3) It is logically possible
that ”S is lifted” is true.

4)
Is

t™e!

5) God can

8iCally POSSlble that God makes it
the case that "3 Is lifted"

make it the case that ”S is lifted” is
true.

6) God can lift any stone.

We now have a proof of "God can lift
any stone" involving so prior ass'mptions.

Therefore it is logically necessary that
God can lift any stone.

From this it follows that it is not logically
possible that "There exists
a stone which God cannot lift”
is true.

This does not, of course, prove that A(3)
is false.

It merely shows

that the consequent of A(3) doesn’t follow
from the antecedent in the way
in which it was expected to.

It is very difficult to imagine any other

sentence p which would enable the inference of A(3)
to go through, however.

While

I

suspect that the reader is perfectly convinced,

I

do not

have the formal tools at this time to prove, with
all formality, that
A(3) is false if ”God is omnipotent” is somehow provable.

Since an ade-

quate formalism will be developed in Chapter VIII, however,
a perfectly

adequate proof of this can be given.
I

While the proof is fairly obvious,

shall include it as an appendix to this dissertation just in case the

reader is interested in seeing it.
In later chapters

I

shall deal with some philosophers who have writ-

ten cn the stone paradox whose purported solutions to the paradox seem
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to require the assumption
that God is omnipotent by
1
definition.

In

most
cases, however, that assumption
is neither entertained nor
supported in
any explicit manner. Rather
it seems tc be a tacit and/or
unrecognised
assumption*

To my knowledge, the issue
of whether God is omnipotatt by
definition
has received no explicit treatment
in recent literature on the stone
paradox - this, despite the fact
that this issue is so central to any
attempt
to provide an adequate analysis
of the stone paradox.

My procedure for the remainder of
this chapter will be as follows:
First,

shall look at some definitions which have
been put forward as

I

definitions of the term 'God

1

.

In particular,

I

shall try to determine

whether these definitions include or imply
God's omnipotence.
I

Secondly,

shall examine some of my own linguistic
intuitions concerning the word

’God'.

I

shall do this by focussing on a pair of
constructed possible

worlds whose domains include non-omnipotent beings
which seem to me to
satisfy the term ’God'.

Thirdly,

I

shall examine John Duns Scotus* dis-

cussion of the provability of "God is omnipotent”
in the forty-second

distinction in his Ordinatio .

And finally,

I

shall attempt to provide

an assessment of these investigations as they bear on the
attempt to pro-

vide an adequate analysis of the stone paradox.
In "Proper Names”, John Searle claims that:
a proper name may acquire a rigid use without having the verbal

See my tteatments in later chapters of the following articles: George
Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence", Philosophical Review,
LXXII, (1963), pp. 221-223, in Chapter V, pp. 67-74; Bernard Mayo, "Mr.
Keene on Omnipotence", Mind Vol. LXX, No. 278, (April 1961), pp. 249250, in Chapter '/II, pp. 92-94; and the contributions of David Londey
and John King-Farlow to David Londey, et al., "God and the Stone Paradox: Three Comments", Sophia (1971), pp. 23-33, in Chapter VII, p. 102
and p. 104, respectively.
,
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emphasis is Searle'sJ for believers. 2

TEthe
J!

etc “*

As a claim about what most
believers believe, this Is, at best,
very
tenuous.
It might well stand if It were,
instead, a claim about what

most non-bolieving philosophers
believe, or a claim about what most
nonbellevlng philosophers believe most
believers to believe. 3 While it is
true that both the Nicene and Apostolic
Creeds begin with "I believe in
God, the Father almighty, ...",
that credal statement makes no claim
that
God is almighty or omnipotent by
definition , rather it makes the simple

claim that God is omnipotent.

To better assess the claim that God is
omnipotent by definition,
let us start by looking at some definitions
of 'God' that have appeared
in the history of western philosophy.

Anseln of Canterbury starts out his version of
the ontological argu

ment as follows:
’the Fool has said in his heart, there is
no God' (Ps. xiii. 1
lii.
EThis would be Ps. xiv. 1, liii.
1, in any modern Bible.
The Psalms have been renumbered since the time
of Anselm. What
was Ps. ix in the Vulgate Bible has been split
into Ps. ix and x.l
But surely, when this same Fool hears what I am
speaking about,

D

namely , something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
he understands what he hears, ...^
'

'

,

John Sear le, "Proper Names", P.F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical
Logic,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 96.
This certainly does nothing to recommend Searle's claim. Non-believing
philosophers generally tend to accept rather suspect notions of 'God'.
Non-believing philosophers generally seem to have taken as definitive
the model of God held by Nineteenth and Twentieth century fundamentalists, a model that is rejected by many religious believers today and
one that is rejected with near unanimity by the theological community.
Searl's claim is not one that would be accepted by fundamentalists
in general, neither is it one that would be accepted in general by
Christian laymen or theologians of a more traditional approach.

Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion , Ch. II, Arthur Hyman and James Walsh,
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m

the second sentence of the
above citation, Anselm offers
a definition
of 'Cod', namely,
something•

than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thoughf.

Let us take this as
Def. 1)

Got.

=

df

something than which nothing
greater can be thought.

A somewhat different definition
of 'Cod' comes out of the
work of
Descartes.
Descartes offers two different
arguments for the existence
Of God, both of which start
out with a notion of God as
"a supremely per5
fect being’.
We shall take this, then, as
Def. 2) God =

df

a supremely perfect being.

Both of these are what might
be called strong notions of God.
A

somewhat more modest notion of God
appears in St. Augustine’s On Free
Will.

There Augustine attempts to give a nroof
of God’s existence start-

ing as follows:

Aug. -If, now, we could find something
which you could unhesitatingly recognize not only as existing
but also as superior to
our reason, would you have any hesitation
in calling it, whatever
it may be, God?
Ev. - Well, I should not without
hesitation oive
the name, God, to anything that I
might find better than the best
element !n my natural composition. I do
not wish to say simply
that God is that to which my reason
is inferior, but that above
which there is no superior. ... Aug. Very well. It will be
enough for me to show that there is something
of this nature
Ii.e. greater than our reasonl which
you will be ready to confess to be God, or if there be something higher
still that at
least you will allow to be God. b
In this passage, Augustine extracts from
Evodius, his interlocutor, a

confession that anything which would satisfy the following
definition
would be God:
eds. , Phi losophv in the Middle Ages
ers, 196?;, p. 150.

,

(New York: Harper and Row, Publish-

Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes . Vol.

Augustine, On Free Will

,

Hyman and Wal-sh, 0£. Cit .

I,

,

p.

226.

pp. 37f.

•
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Def. 3) God =

df

Finally,
of Ockham.

I

southing such that It l. superior to our reason
and such
that there is nothing superior
to it.
shall draw on some definitions
of 'God' given by William

There are at least two places in his
Quodlibeta Septem where

Ockham discusses the meaning of
the term 'God'.

Ockham observes that

God'S existence does not simply
follow from the proposition, "An
infinite
being exists", "which is proved both
in theology and natural knowledge," 7
.

This is because God is not simply an
infinite being.

First Ockham says,

A theologian understands by the term
'God' an infinite being
which is nobler than an infinity of beings
of a different typeif these were coexistent, it would
be nobler
“uwici than
Liian a

^

all of them »

on 1 V taken
t-flVen separately,
eonnrafol,. U..e.
not only
but even taken together. g
.

,

.

Following this definition of ’God', two
other definitions are given which
also comes from the Quodlibeta . 9

(I

shall use the wording of Quodlibeta .

I.)
I say that the name 'God' can have
various descriptions. One
of them is: 'God is something more noble and
more perfect than
anything else besides Him'. Another is: 'God is
that than which
nothing is more noble and more perfect*

Ockham has mentioned, here, four different possible
definitions for
’God'.

Moreover, it is apparent from the texts that Ockham regarded
the

last three definitions as reasonably adequate and within
the range of

what might be called standard Christian notions of God.

I

shall list

these definitions as follows:
Def.

'0

God =

,^

Def. 5) God

an infinite being.
an infinite being which is nobler than an infinity of

William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings , trans. by Philotheus Boehner,
(New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), p. 110.
Ibid ., p. 110.
9

IbTd.

,

p.

112,

(

Quodlibeta , V, Q. i), and p. 139, (Quodlibeta,

I,

Q.

i).

!»2

beings of a different type (finite
beings, presumably).
Def. 6) God =
df

Def. 7) God =
df

a being

which is nobler than anything
other than itself.

a being than which nothing
is nobler.

None of the above definitions, Def.
1). Def.

Which explicitly say that God is
omnipotent.
imply that God is omnipotent.

7)

include clauses

Some of them do, however,,

Let us lock at the definitions in
order

to determine which of them do and
which of them do not imply that God
is

omnipotent.
Def. 1) God =

something than which nothing greater can
be thougit.

df

It follows very straight-f orwardly
from Def. 1) that God

is

omnipotent,.

Consider the following argument;
1) Assume that God is not omnipotent.

2) God is, by definition, something greater
than which nothing greater
can be thought.
3) Imagine something just like God in all
properties compossible with
omnipotence, but which is, unlike Gou, omnipotent as
well.

4) This thing, being omnipotent, is greater
than God.
5) We can think of something greater than God.

6) Therefore, God is not something greater than
which nothing can be

thought.

7)

Therefore, by our definition, God is not God.

8) Therefore, God is omnipotent.

The above argument is, of course, an obvious parallel to Anselm's onto-

logical argument, which makes use of precisely the same definition in a

very similar way.
Def. 2) God

a

supremely perfect being.

A supremely perfect

being, according to Descartes, is one that possesses every perfection in
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the highest degree. 10

Assuming that the ability to cause
things to hap.

pen is a perfection, then that
perfection in the highest degree is
omnipotence. Def. 2), therefore, also
implies that God is omnipotent.
Def. 3) God =
df

something such that it is superior to
our reason

and such that there is nothing
superior to it.

To show that God's omni-

potence is not implied by Def. 3) we
need only look at how Augustine
goes on in On Free Will to argue for
the existence of God.

Augustine

proceeds to point out that there is at least
one thing which is greater
than our reason.

That is truth. 11

Therefore, there is a God. If there

are things greater than truth, then the
greatest of these things is God.
If there is nothing greater than
truth,

then it is God.

12
It is obvious

from this that any number of non-omnipotent
things could satisfy Def. 3).
Def. 3) is even satisfiable by some things
which lack the kind of agency

to which omnipotence is relevant.

Truth, for example, could satisfy Def.

3), yet lacks the appropriate kind of agency.

Def. 4) God =

df

an infinite being.

While this definition is not,

on its face, very clear, Ockham's claim that
the existence of such a be-

ing is proved in "natural knowledge" makes it quite clear
what Ockham

meant by "infinite being".

From the text it becomes clear that the kind

of being meant here is that which was, supposedly, proven to exist by

Aristotle in Metaphysics

,

Bk. XII.

13

That being an infinite being in this

sense does not imply being omnipotent will be shown later in this chapter,

Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes , Vol.
11

12
13

Hyman and Walsh, £d. Cit .

,

p.

I,

p.

47.

Ibid ., p. 49.

See Ockham, 0£. Cit .

,

p.

110, the second full paragraph.

168.
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In connection with Scotus'
discussion of the provability of
God's Omni-

potence.
Def. 5) God =
df

an infinite being which is nobler
than an infinity

of beings cf a different type.

Initially, it would seem that what
this

definition adds to Def. 4) need have nothing
to do with power or with

ability to cause things to happen.

Even if nobility does involve either

power or ability to cause things to happen,
Def. 5) still does not imply
God's omnipotence.

dition

foi

A

s

If we suppose, on the one hand,

that a necessary con-

being more noble than B is A's having more
power than

it would fellow from Def.

5) that the

produce is non-countably infinite.

B,

number of power-units that God can

It was shown in Chapter III, however,

that omnipotence is not characterizable in
terms of amounts of power.

If

we suppose, on the other hand, that a necessary
condition for A's being

more noble than

B is

A's being able to cause more things to happen that

B is able to, then Def.

5) implies only that God can cause to happen

anything that any finite being or infinite collection of
finite beings
can cause to happen and that God can cause at least one
more thing to

happen.

Even on such generous suppositions as that nobility does
involve

either power or ability to cause things to happen, what is implied by
Def. 5) is something far short of omnipotence.
Def. 6) God

itself.

a

being which is nobler than anything other than

There will be a being satisfying Def. 6) in any non-empty pos-

sible worlo in which there are not two or more things of equal nobility.
In any possible world whose domain contains only one being, that being

will be God, according to Def. 6).

Yet clearly such a being may not only

fail to be omnipotent, it may even be completely powerless.

Def. 6) cer-
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talnly doesn't imply God's
omnipotence, but only that God's
sbiliti es
surpass these of any other
creature.
Def. 7)

Got,

df

a being than which

nothing is nobler.

This definition
implies even less than Def. 6)
since Def. 7) could be simultaneously

satisfied by two beings of equal
nobility.

Since any being that satis-

fied Def. 6) would also satisfy
Def. 7), and since Def. 6)
doesn't imply
God's omnipotence, obviously Def.
7) doesn't imply God's
omnipotence

either.
This survey of some historical
definitions of 'God* has been obviously inconclusive.

It has been shown that some
philosophers have accepted

definitions of 'God' that implied His
omnipotence and other philosophers
have accepted definitions of 'God* that
did not imply His omnipotence.
It

may seem initially surprising that there
should be so many and

such different definitions of 'Cod'.

If we were dealing with the word

’chair’ we would presumably have much less
diversity in the range of

definitions that might be offered.

There are, after all, many chairs in

the world and many other objects which are
not chairs but which bear cer-

tain similarities to certain chairs.

If we were trying to give a defin-

ition for 'chair' we could start by looking for a
definition such that
all and only those objects which are customarily
classed as chairs satis-

fied the definition.

When we are dealing with 'God', however, the case is different.

generally assume that there is at most one God in the world.

We

Moreover,

our acquaintance with that one God is such that different people claim
to

perceive Him rather differently.

We do not have a number of things which

are very similar to God in certain ways but are not God.

We do not, in

other words, have a number of
real particulars, some of which
are God,
some of which are not God, which
we can compare and, through that
comparison, compile a list of conditions
such that a being will be called
'God'

if and only if it satisfies
those conditions.

In trying to determine whether
God's omnipotence is Included in
or

Implied by the definition of 'God' we
have two available arbiters: traditional definitional statements (In
even the brief look at traditional

definitions above we have found significant
disagreement on the question

omnipotent and linguistic intuitions.

of

From the above examination of

traditional definitions of 'God', It Is obvious
that there exists
deal of diversity among linguistic
intuitions about 'God'.

a

great

What can be

called 'God' by the process theologian Is
Incredibly different from what
can be called 'God' by the fundamentalist
preacher.

The Intuitions held

by philosophers on this matter are no less
diverse.
In the following few pages

I

shall bare my own intuitions about

whether God is, by definition, omnipotent, and try to
provide the reader
with some of the motivations for those intuitions.

describing two possible worlds which,

I

I

shall do this by

want to claim, are examples of

possible worlds containing non-ounipotent Gods.
~

every respect not concerning God’s powers,

real world.

is identical to the

God is of such a nature that 'omnipotent', in the sense given

in Chapter II, would be applicable to a being of His sort.

W
l»

omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, wholly benevolent, loving, etc.

God is not, however, omnipotent.
thing.
^2 “

God is, in

^

God can do anything except for one small

He cannot create a purple frog.
*s

a bit stranger.

Let us suppose that in

there are two God-
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like beings

,

Cl and 02.

Each of

then,

creates a solar system, SSI and

SS2, respectively, each of which
Includes a planet (El and E2 respectively) containing forms of life
very much like those contained on
earth in

the real world.

Let us suppose that G1 is very much
like God is supposed

to be in the real world by Christians
who accept the model of God appro-

priate to Chapter II.

G1 is the creator of everything except
SS2

was only created by G2 because G1
permitted it to be so.
tent, omnipresent (except in SS2
etc.

) ,

,

which

G1 is omnipo-

omniscient, eternal wholly benevolent,

Life on El is very much like it is on our real
earth: similar in

balance between good and evil; similar in
contact or lack thereof between
G1 and his creation; etc.

G2, on the other hand, is not omnipotent.

things which He is permitted to do by Gl.

outside of SS2.

He can only do those

G1 permits G2 to do nothing

Within SS2, G2 is permitted to do anything so long as

it doesn't violate the natural laws of SS2.

G2 is, however, omnipresent

within SS2 P omniscient, eternal, wholly benevolent, etc.
moreover, is greatly preferable to life on El.
of good over evil.

Life on E2,

E2 has a very high balance

The natural laws of E2 are such that life there is

very easy and pleasant.

There is also a very close contact between G2

and the human-like inhabitants of E2.

G2's love for His creation is al-

ways very evident to his human-like creatures.
There is no contact between SS2 and the rest of W

inhabitants of
ing Gl.

£.2

.

The human-like

don't know that anything outside of SS2 exists, includ-

They know G2 very well.

They know that G2 cannot violate the

natural laws of SS2, therefore that G2 is not omnipotent.

They do not

know, however, that the reason for this is that G2 is prohibited from
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,

,

doing so by Gl.

1

A

We may now ask whether either

are non-omnipotent gods.
of Wj to which

I

Looking at

or

W.,

are worlds In which there

is that member of the domain
D1

have given the name 'God' really
legitimately so called?

The reasons for answering in
the affirmative are obvious.

That being

can do anything which God has,
supposedly, done in the real world.
He
can bring about any possible
but non-actual state of affairs
which

could reasonably be regarded as
interesting.

(I am presuming that cre-

ating purple frogs is an intrinsically
uninteresting thing, both to God
and to the world.) He is omniscient,
omnipresent, eternal, wholly benevolent, loving, etc.

All these facts seem to me to make
it perfectly

legitimate and proper to call that being
'God'.
The reasons for answering in the
negative are less obvious and,

submit, far less compelling.

I

The most obvious reason would be simply

a

dogmatic belief that God is, by definition,
omnipotent and, therefore,
that any non-omnipotent being was, ipso
facto , not God.

unsatisfying.

This is clearly

To be convincing, such a belief would have to be
supported

either by some argument to the effect that "God is
omnipotent” is provable or by appeal to some antecedently accepted
definition of 'God*.
The latter appeal would be, to a large extent,
arbitrary, since it has

been shown above that several traditionally held definitions
of ’God’

neither include nor imply God’s omnipotence.
There is another approach which might be taken in objecting to

calling the being in
14

’God’.

It might be argued that since that being

The world, V^, has grown out of conversations which I have had on this
matter with Prof. Michael Jubien of the Department of Philosophy of
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

)

cannot create purple frogs It
must therefore lack the
power to create
purple frogs.
In that case, however,
there are a number of other
tasks
which require that same amount
of power or even more (since
it presumably doesn’t require all
that much power to create a
purple frog) which
that being must also be unable
to do. Therefore, it might be
claimed,
there can be no being which fits
the description given in connection
with

V

This objection is ill-conceived.

The problem is that it takes

a

notion of omnipotence which is roughly
equivalent to that expressed by
Def .

° f Cha P ter lr -

1

Omnipotence is given in terms of degrees
of power.

This kind of a notion of omnipotence
was shown to be inadequate in Chapter

so

W
2

I

will say no more about it hare.

raises a different set of problems.

Does W
2

one god or no god?

contain two gods,

There are a number of reasons for calling G1
'God'.

He is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly
benevolent, loving, etc.

very much like we suppose God to be in the real
world.

There are two

factors which might motivate one to object to
calling Gl 'God'.

not the creator of W
2

He is

He is

in its entirety, and he is not known to all of
the

creatures over which he has sovereignty.

(He has sovereignty over the

inhabitants of E2 since G 2 controls them only because Gl
permits it to
be so.

There are also a number of reasons for calling G2 'God'.

He is omni-

scient, wholly benevolent, loving, known to all the creatures over which
he has sovereignty.

The reasons for which one might object to calling G2

'God' are that he is not the sole creator of W
2

and, while he is infinite-

ly more powerful than his creatures, he is fairly limited in ability to
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cause things to happen.
In the cases of both Cl
and G2, the reasons for
calling them .Cod'
seem to me to be more compelling.
Both 31 and 02 are sufficiently
trans-

cendent to warrant being called
'God'.

Both of them are sufficiently

capable of entering into relationships
with worshippers and a worshipping
community.
Both of them are benevolent.
Finally, both of them have a
very great ability to cause things
to happen.

While

I

would not want to

claim that the above four characteristics
are sufficient, in themselves,
to warrant calling any being
possessing them 'God',
if a being

I

do maintain that

possesses them in sufficient degree it
does not need to be

omnipotent as well in order to be called
'God*.

While the above considerations motivate
definition, omnipotent,
ly convincing.
a

I

I

nvjr

claim that God is not, by

do not expect the reader to find them
decisive-

do, however, expect these considerations
to show that

dogmatic assumption that the Anselmian definition
of God (Def. 1) or

any other definition which implies God’s
omnipotence is the only acceptable

definition of ’God’ is unwarranted.
We still have no decisive answer to the question,
"Is 'God is omnipotent' true by definition?"

Before considering the significance of this

fact for attempts to assess the stone paradox,
look at John Duns Scotus

'

I

should like briefly to

discussion of whether "God is omnipotent" is

provable.

Among the portions of Scotus' Ordinatlo which have been translated,
there are at least two passages in which Scotus explicitly denies that
it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent, at least
in

the sense of

’omnipotent' which Catholic theologians of the time took to

"
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be applicable to God. 15

While these passages, in themselves,
don't give

Scotus' reasons for denying that
God's omnipotence can be proved,
in the
proper sense, or even make clear
precisely what the preper ense is,
one
of the passages does make
reference to a fuller discussion of the
question in the untranslated forty-second
distinction of the Ordinatio .
*

In this passage, Scotus draws
clearly the distinction between the

sense of 'omnipotence' which is accepted
as appropriate to theology and

another sense of 'omnipotence' which is
theologically inadequate.
Hie responderi posset, distinguendo,
quod 'omnipotens' aut
potest dici agens quod potest in omne possibile,
mediate vel
mmediate, - et hoc modo est potentia activa
primi efficientis
omnipetentia , prout extendid se ad omnem effectum
in ratione
causae proximae vel remotae; ...
Alio modo 'omnipotens' accipitur proprie theologice,
prout
omnipotens dicitur qui potest in omnem effectum et
quodcumque
possibile (hoc est in quodcumque quod non est
ex se necessarium
nec includit contradictionem)
ita - inquam - immediate quod
sine omni cooperatione cuiuscumque alterius
causae agentis; ...^
,

It appears that the sense of

'omnipotence' which Scotus accepts as oeing

appropriate to theology is very similar to the sense of 'omnipotence'
given in Def.

2

of my second chapter.

We might draw a definition from

Scotus' words as follows:

John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings , trans. by Allan Wolter,
(New
York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964), pp. 69 and 95.
Scotus, Opera Omnia , Vol. IV, (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis
Vaticanis, 1963)', pp. 342f. "It is possible to respond to this by making a distinction, in that 'omnipotence* can indeed be predicated because an agent has power, mediately or immediately, in all things
possible - and in this sense, omnipotence is the active power of a
first cause, as it extends itself to all effects in the system of causal
relations, proximate or remote; ... 'Omnipotence' is accepted as appropriate for theology according to the other sense, as omnipotence is
predicated of what has power in all effects and in whatever manner
possible (that is, in whatever manner which is neither in itself necessary nor involves a contradiction), thus - to repeat - immediately,
because without any cooperation whatsoever from any other effective
cause.
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x 1. omnipotent =
df

has power in all effects
and in whatever fanner
00 ” 6
10" uhatsoever fi
an y it h
‘c::^
,c

^

„

-

take it that having power
in all effects and in
whatever fanner possible
la precisely the safe as
being able to perfona any
possible task. The
second clause of the above
definition is what distinguishes
between the
first and second senses of
'omnipotence-. According to the second
sense,
I

omnipotence is the ability to perform
any possible task without the
use
of any intermediary agency.
According to the first sense, omnipotence
is the ability to perform any
possible task with or without such an
in-

termediary.

While Def.

2

of Chapter II makes no mention
of intermediary

agencies, it is quite easy to see that
it is similar to Scotus
sense on this point.

'

second

Let us suppose that G is able to perform
X by

means of some intermediary agency, but
not without that intermediary.
Suppose, moreover, that it is logically
possible that G perform X without any intermediary.

From this it would follow, according to Def.

Chapter II, that G is not omnipotent.

On Scotus

's

2

of

first sense of 'omni-

potence', however, G might still be omnipotent.

Anything that is omnipotent in the second sense is
omnipotent in
the first sense as well.

The reverse does not hold.

When we claim that

God is omnipotent we are claiming that God is
omnipotent in the first
sense, but we are claiming more than that.

It is for this reason that

Scotus rejects the first sense as being inappropriate to theology.

Among the arguments for the provability of God's omnipotence which
Scotus reports before giving his own position and arguments, two are in-

teresting.

The first one is this:

Praeterea, ratione probatur Deum esse potentiae infinitae (sic-

o.

d
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Sc ° tus introduces the above
distinction, to show

that infringe power, in the
sense proved, cannot sicply be
identified

With omnipotence, in the sense
required.
In his central discussion
of the question, Scotus claims
that such

an argument would be sound if
the premise 'Whatever a first
cause can do

through the agency of a second cause,
it can do by itself, immediately."

were available to us.

In that case, the move from
infinite power, as

mentioned above, to omnipotence would
go through, according to Scotus.
However, that premise,
non est nota ex terminis, neque ratione
naturali, sed est tantum credita; quia si ipsa omnipotentia ex qua dependet- esset
natural! , facile esset probare ipsis
philosophis
multa verxtates et propositiones quas
ipsi negant, et facile
esset probare eis saltern possibilitatem
multorum quae credimus.
quae xpsi negant.

That premise is not known from its terms
nor is it immediately obvious
to natural reason.

The reason all Christians believe it to be
true is

that it follows from, and depends upon, the claim
that God is an omnipotent first cause.

Therefore, to use it as a premise in an argument to

prove that God is omnipotent would be plainly circular.

While the premise, "Whatever

a

first cause can do through the agency

Ibid
p. 341. "Besides, it is proven by reason that God has infinite
power (as it is proven in Physics Bk. VIII and Metaphysics Bk. XII);
.
however it is well known that infinite power is omnipotence."
,

Ibi . ,
346. "is not known from its terms, nor to natural reason,
but is merely believed; because if omnipotence itself - on which it
depends - is known by natural reason, it is easy for those philosophers to prove many truths and propositions which they deny, and it
is easy for them to prove, at the very least, the possibility of many
things which we believe, which they themselves deny."

"
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of a second cause. It can do
by Itself, Mediately... ay
m
have consider-

able initial plausibility, Scotus
does not think it is obvious
to natural
reason since the more general rule
that whatever a higher-otder
cause can
do through the agency of a
lower-order cause, it can do by itself,
immediately, is subject to obvious
counter-examples:
ha
et in se
eminentiorem quam bos
!w
Cvp? aliud
!T non tamencausalitatem
Cvel
animal),
concederet solem posse immediate
generare bovem sicut potest mediante
causa-bove

V°\

generare.19

The otaer interesting argument is
drawn from Richard of St. Victor's
De Tr in Hat e. 20

In that work, Richard claims that
there are necessary

21
reasons for all those things which we hold
by faith,
and that by finding

and showing those reasons we can give
proof of the main articles of the

Catholic faith.

While Richard's proof of God's omnipotence 23
is not,

in itself, interesting, since it is not
concerned with a fully adequate

notion of omnipotence, his general point is of
interest since, while it

wouldn't provide a proof, it would nevertheless
show that one existed.
To this point, Scotus replies as follows:

Ad auctoritatem Richard! dico quod etsi. sint
necessariae rationes ad probandum omnipotentiam et quaedam alia credita,
non
tamen sunt evidenter necessariae et verae: ... - quia
licet sit
ex necessariis, non tamen praemissae sunt necessario
evidentes,
19

Tbid.
p. 344. "because although the sun has in itself causality surpassing that of the cow (or any other animal), it is not nevertheless
permitted to the sun to be able to produce a cow immediately, although
it is able to produce one mediately, by means of a cow-cause.
,

20
21

22
23

Ibid .

,

p.

341.

Richard of St. Victor, De T rinitat e, J.P. Minge, ed., Patrologia Latina,
Vol. 196,

(Paris: 1880), p. 891CD.

Ibid .

,

p.

892C.

Ibid .

,

p.

900BCD.
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quia non sunt notae possibile
est hoc inferre. 24
The key here is in the next
to the last line.
is not true merely by
virtue of its font.

Clearly "Cod is omnipotent"

If God’s omnipotence
is to be

provable, then "God is omnipotent"
must oe true either by virtue of
the
meanings of the terms of the
syllogism, i.e. by definition,
or it must be
the conclusion of some argument
whose premises are either known
from

definition or obvious to natural
reason.

This latter possibility Scotus

denies when he says that the
premises are not evident to us either
from
what we know from the terms or from
what we know immediately. Richard

must have some other sense of -necessary'
in mind when he says that there
are necessary reasons for all those
things which we

I,

old by faith, some

sense of -necessary- which is not
relevant to the present issue.
It seems modest,

if

not miserly, to conclude that some
people have

and some people have not thought that
God is, by definition, omnipotent,

and that, therefore, "God is omnipotent"
is necessarily true; and that
I

don't think that God is, by definition,
omnipotent.

The significance

of this issue for an analysis of the
stone paradox should be clear from

what

I

said at the beginning of this chapter.

The significance of this

chapter is to show that it is not simply obvious,
as many have supposed,
that God is omnipotent by definition.

God is supposed to be aui generis
than Himself.
24

,

not created by anything other

As such, it makes no sense to speak of Him as having been

Scotus, Oge ra Omnia , Vol. IV, pp. 346f. "to the authority
of Richard,
I reply that even if there are necessary
arguments for proving omnipotence and certain other beliefs, nevertheless, they are not clearly
necessary and true: ... - because it is permitted that it should be
from necessity, nevertheless, the premises are not of necessity evident, because they are not known from what we know by the terms nor
can they be inferred from what we kndw immediately."
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created differently.

He just is.

This has led many people
to suppose

that not only Is It necessarily
true that God Is omnipotent,
but that
every true predication of God
is necessary.
This latter claim, however,
has disastrous results.

Among the supposedly true predications
about

God are the claims that He created
David Schrader as a blond; that
He
created Descartes as a Frenchman;
etc. Yet if every true predication
about God is necessarily true, then
it Is necessarily true that God
created the world as He did.
It follows from this that God was
not free to

create the world in any other manner.

Moreover, It follows that ever)

true statement about the world is
necessarily true.

Therefore, to main-

tain contingency and God's freedom one
must reject the claim that every

true predication about God is necessarily
true.

One must at least main-

tain that some predications about the
relation between God and the cre-

ated order are contingently true.

That God is omnipotent is

the relationship between God and the created
order.

a

claim about

It is therefore at

least not obvious that it is necessarily true#
The solution to the stone paradox in the case
where God is not taken
to be omnipotent of necessity is different from the
solution in the case

where God is taken to be omnipotent and which was given informally
at the

beginning of this chapter and will appear more formally in an appendix
at
the end of this dissertation#

For the remainder of this dissertation

I

shall consider the soundness of the paradox of the stone in the case

where God is not taken to be omnipotent of necessity#

I

will therefore

operate on the assumption, from here on, that "God is omnipotent"
a

necessary truth.

is

not
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CHAPTER

v

THE FORM OF THE ARGUMENT

The argument of the atone
paradox in its most traditions!
form is,
to repeat from Chapter I
of this dissertation:
A.

(1) Either God can create a
stone which He cannot lift
create a stone which He cannot
lift.

(2>

’

nrr

®

C£mn0t

te
St ° ne Whlch He CM " ot
lift, then He is not
Omni do font (since He
u cannot
omnipotent
lift the stone in question).

rr

^

(3)

cann

t

create a s tone which He cannot
lift, then He is not
He cannot create the stone in
question)!

11
omm potent ?(since

(4) Therefore, God is not
omnipotent.

The argument’s form is:
A'

.

(1) Pa v ^.Pa
(2

)

Pa

(3)

^ Pa

(4)

~Qa

->

~Qa

This form of argument is most commonly
referred to as a ’’constructive

dilemma”.

George Mavrodes argued, in Some Puzzles
Concerning Omnipotence”, 1

that the conclusion, "God is not omnipotent”,
cannot be reached by an

argument of the above form.

Rather, he claims, that conclusion can only

be reached by means of a paradox, properly
so-called, a reductio ad absur d um argument.
-

The form would then be as follows:

A”. (1) Qa

(n) C &

~C

George Mavrodes, ’’Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence", Philosophical
Review, LXXII , (1963), pp. 221-223.
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(n+1

Qa

)

(n+2)

->

C &

*>C

'''Qa

Havroc.es claims that the stone
paradox poses no limitation on
God's

power.

The way Mavrodes comes to this
conclusion is not by showing that

the task posed is, in itself,
logically impossible, nor by showing
that,

for any x, x's not being able to
make a stone that x cannot lift poses

no limitation on x's power, but by
claiming that we must assume either
that God is omnipotent or that He
is not omnipotent.

If we assume that

God is not omnipotent, then making a
stone that God cannot lift is not
an impossible task for God, but this
proves nothing since we have al-

ready assumed that God is limited in power
and, in so doing, begged the
question.

On the other hand, if we assume that God
is omnipotent, then

the task in question becomes logically
impossible.

It becomes the task

of creating a stone that cannot be lifted
by Him whose power is sufficient

to lift anything.

This is clearly a logically impossible task and,
it is

claimed, poses no limitation on God's power.

Mavrodes claims that any proof regarding God's power to perform the
task in question must start with one of the two assumptions
mentioned in
the last paragraph.

He claims thai a proof that God's power is limited

can only be significant if it starts with the assumption of God's
omni-

potence.

2

Yet that claim surely seems absurd.

Mavrodes cannot possibly

want to claim that all proofs must proceed by reductio arguments.

He has

given no reason why proofs about ood's power should proceed according to

principles different from those which apply to other proofs.

argument A does not have the form of a reductio.
2

Ibid .

,

p.

222.

Clearly,

It is, rather, a di-

S9

lemma, of form A'.

Moreover,

a

great many important and widely
accepted

proofs proceed by methods other
than reductio.

Mavrodes has given no

reason for us to accept this
claim that "to be significant
it must derive
this same conclusion Ithat God
is not omnipotent! from the
assumption that
God is omnipotent; that is,
it must show that the
assumption of the omnipotence of God leads to a reductio.

Clearly, net assuming that God
is omnipotent is quite
different from
assuming that God is not omnipotent.
Given this distinction, argument A
would seem to emerge unscathed by
Mavrodes* charge of question-begging.

Mavrodes says that "on the assumption
that God is omnipotent, the phrase
•a

stone too heavy for God to lift* becomes
self-contradictory." 4

out that assumption, it is presumably
not self-contradictory. 5

With-

Since A

does not make any assumption one way or
the other regarding God’s omni-

potence, it doesn't pose a logically impossible
task.
a task

Clearly it poses

whose accomplishment is incompatible with
God's omnipotence, but

that should be neither surprising nor alarming.

If the task were com-

patible with God's omnipotence, then we would
not have any claim to
disproof of God's omnipotence.

a

Argument A does not beg the question, at

least in the way Mavrodes suggests, since it begins
with no assumption
at all.

Argument A may be open to the charge that it poses

a task

which

is, of itself, logically impossible, but Mavrodes doesn't
make that

charge.

That charge will be dealt with in Chapter VII of this work, in

connection with other writers who do make it.
Ibid., p. 222.
Ibid .
5

,

p.

222.

Ibid ., p. 222.
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On the surface, what
Mavrodes says appears to be
just plain stupid.
Perhaps, beneath the surface,
there Is a good explanation
for what Mav

rodes says In this article.

Perhaps Mavrodes Is operating
fro. certain

unexpressed, but generally sound,
assumptions and actually shedding
see
light on the stone paradox.
I shall consider two
possible motives which
might lead Mavrodes to say the
things he does. These seem to
be the only

possible explanations why a respectable
philosopher like Mavrodes might
claim that the conclusion of the
stone paradox can only be
significantly
derived if it is derived from the
assumption of God's omnipotence.
First , we are dealing with what has
been traditionally called "the
stone paradox".

Yet argument A does not have the
form of a paradox.

Presumably if we start with the assumption
that God is omnipotent and
then derive the conclusion that God
is not omnipotent, then we have a

proper paradox.
I

suggest that the stone paradox iw so called
not because it is

supposed to be

a

paradox in the proper sense of the word.

I

suggest that

what we have is rather a case of a problem being
historically associated

with a particular name.

This kind of association is not at all uncommon

in the history of philosophy.

naturalistic fallacy.

Every philosopher is familiar with the

Yet a great many philosophers would claim that

'the naturalistic fallacy' does not name either a
formal or an informal

fallacy in the strict and proper sense of the word 'fallacy',
rather just
a

presumably wrong philosophical position.
Moreover, argument A can be easily altered so as to give us

paradox.
A.

We need only add:

(0) God is omnipotent.

a proper
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A. (5) God is omnipotent
and God is not omnipotent.

A ' <6)
potent.
A.

1S OTnlp ° tent
-

is omnipotent and God
is not Omni-

(7) Therefore, God is not
omnipotent.

The assumption, A(0), does
not damage A<4) because none
of the steps by
which A(4) is derived depend
on A(0) or any other assumption.

While this search for a proper
paradox may, in part, motivate Mavrodes to approach the problem
as he does, it does not justify
the conclusion he reaches.

A more plausible explanation
might be based on an unexpressed assump
tion to the effect that the meaning
of ’God' changes depending on what

assumption is made about God’s omnipotence.
clear how the me aning Q f

a

While it is not initially

word is affected by assumptions about
pre-

sumably non-necessary properties of the
thing denoted by the word, we

may make some progress here by working
backward to see what possible fact
about the word ’God’ could give Mavrodes
the conclusion he wants.

(I

say

"presumably non-necessary properties" because
Mavrodes speaks of the pos-

sibility ot assuming that God is not omnipotent.

If omnipotence were

taken to be a necessary property of God,
then, given God’s existence,
that assumption would be self-contradictory.

herently wrong with making

a

While there is nothing in-

self-contradictory assumption, since it is

regularly done in reductio arguments, if the assumption that
God is not
omnipotent is self-contradictory, then "God is omnipotent" is
logic.

If that were the case,

an assumption.

a

truth of

there would be no need to introduce it as

This is contrary to the main point of Mavrodes' article.)

Working backwards then, creating a stone that God cannot lift would
be a logically impossible task if and only if a stone that God cannot lift
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Is not a logically
possible object.

It is not sufficient
for the logical

impossibility of there being a
stone that God cannot lift
that God should
be omnipotent.
If God is, as a matter of
fact, omnipotent, then a
stone
that God cannot lift may
still be a possible, but non.actual
object.
In

order for the existence of a
stone that God cannot lift to be
logically
impossible, it is required that
it should be logically
Impossible that
God should fail to be
omnipotent. Omnipotence would have
to be a necessary property of God.
This does not appear to be what
Mavrodes wants to say.

As

I

men-

tioned above, if omnipotence is taken
to be a necessary property of God,
then one needs no assumption about
God’s omnipotence in order to reach
the conclusion that the paradox
poses an impossible task.

Moreover, the

necessary properties of God cannot be
altered in any way merely by making
assumptions about whether God is or is not
omnipotent.
case,

I

This being the

can see no plausible explanation for
Mavrodes* program.

It should be clear at this
point that Mavrodes’ claim that a reductio

argument is needed is false, and that argument A
does not beg the question in the way that Mavrodes claims that
the stone paradox does.
In the second half of his paper, Mavrodes
takes up an even more

bizarre position.

He imagines a particularly obstinate objector to
his

first defense, who claims that

’a

stone too heavy for God to lift' is

self-consistent, even on the assumption that God is omnipotent.
claims

tha':

create it.
is

such a stone would be

a

He then

possible object and that God could

At this point, rather than acknowledge that, if the objector

granted his point and if God creates such

a stone,

that there would

then be something that God could not lift, hence something that God could
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not do; or suggesting that unless
God actually creates the
stone there
will be no such stone, hence no
task; Mavrodes says that
"such a stone
is compatible with the
omnipotence of God." 6

no damage

done to God's omnipotence, according
to Mavrodes.

is

This is surely wrong.

I

have just claimed that, even on
the as-

sumption that God is omnipotent,
consistent.

It follows from this that

'a

stone that God cannot lift’ is self-

have claimed this not on the ground
that the existence of

I

such a stone is compatible with the
omnipotence of God, but on the ground
that unless God is necessarily omnipotent,
if it is logically possible

that God should fail to be omnipotent,
then it is logically possible that

there should be a stone that God cannot
lift.

Since Mavrodes has not

claimed that God is necessarily omnipotent, he
has not forestalled my
objection.

If Mavrodes were to claim that God is
necessarily omnipotent,

then the debate would have to move to the ground
covered in Chapter IV.

Mavrodes could have claimed that God is by definition
omnipotent.

He

could have given some historical and/or theoretical
support for that
claim, and then given the solution given in Chapter IV,
that the paradox
fails because

object.

stone that God cannot lift is not a logically possible

a

That is clearly an option for Mavrodes, but one he has not
taken.

That a stone that God cannot lift should exist is surely
incompatible
the omnipotence of God.

Mavrodes himself does not wish to deny this.

Whet is peculiar about Mavrodes' point here is that he supposes that
such an objector would be forced co accept the conclusion that the

existence of
omnipotence.
6

a

stone that God cannot lift would be compatible with God's
It should be clear from the above that Mavrodes' objector

Ibid ., p. 222.
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is

certainly not forced to that
conclusion.

point is directed against a
straw

„n,

Mavrodes'

ardent

while the proponent of

on this

argent

A,

as amended on pages 70f.
above, goes unscathed.

We remain with argument
A.

Us

form is that of a dilemma,
not that

of a reductio.

Mavrodes seems to suggest that
we cannot arrive at the
particular conclusion, A(4),
this manner, due, presumably
to peculi,
arities about the subject under
discussion. Yet, nothing would seem
more clear than that the form of
argument A is unobjectionable.
If the

m

soundness of A is to be attacked,
it must be claimed that one of
its
premises is false. This is what I'm
sure Mavrodes would do if he were
confronted with argument A as a
representation of the stone paradox.
I
shall examine the premises of
argument A in Chapters VI, VII, IX
and X
of this work.

Before moving on to the analysis of
the premises of argument A, let
us look at a variant on argument A,
presented in the first of two papers

on omnipotence by J.L. Cowan,

7

which argument, Cowan feels, is

cisive improvement on argument A.
we shall label

*B'

is not

a de-

Cowan claims that the argument which

susceptible to the criticism which has been

leveled against A and which will be considered
in Chapter VII.

I

shall

show, in the next few pages that argument G is
no improvement on A, that
it is itself susceptible to one totally devastating
criticism (it is com-

pletely circular.) and that A is therefore

a

more persuasive argument

and the form of the stone paradox most worthy of consideration.

The heart of the issue is best stated in Cowan's own words:
J.L. Cowan, "The Paradox of Omnipotence", Analysis, Vol.
25 (Supplement).
No. 3, (January 1965), pp. 102-108.

^
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The argument follows:
B.

(

1

)

(3F)(3G)(x)(pFx=>~pGx)

by definition

(F)pFg

assumption that God is omnipotent

(3) pFgz>~pGg

from (1) by instantiation

(4) pFg

from (2) by instantiation

(5)

^pGg

from (3) and (4) by modus pone.n 3

(6) pGg

from (2) by instantiation 9

The argument above, which is presented by
Cowan, needs to be completed
as follows:
(

7

)

(8)

pGg & ~pGg

(F)pFgo(pGg

(9) ~(F)pFg

from (5) and (6)

&~ P Gg)

from (2

)

and (7) by conditional proof

from (8) by reduct io

If B(l) is true, and if we assume that

»F'

and

r

G» are limited to
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.

the predicates which may be
appropriately applied to 'God' and
such that
'Fg' and 'Gg' are both
non-self-contradlctory, then argument B
Is wholly

unobjectionable.

Cowan claims that (1) Is a
"simple tact".

clearly not true simply by virtue
of its logical form.

(1) ts

Rather Cowan

claims that "(1) is a logical
truth, since the existence of
mutually e:>
elusive predicates is assured by
1^
definition."
3

Unfortunately, Cowan provides neither
theoretical nor definitional
support for this last claim.

While the existence of mutually exclusive

predicates is assured by definition, it
does not follow from this that
(1) is a logical truth.

This is because (1) does not concern
predicates,

sim^liciter, but rather predicates of a
particular kind, those involving

ability to bring about states of affairs.
gives for the claim comes from an example.

Rather, the only support Covan

The example, interestingly,

is the ability to create a stone
which the stone's maker cannot lift.

Failing of any other support (Cowan offers none
and

I

cannot imagine

13

ar.y

other.), (1) must rise or fall with the more
traditional stone paradox,
A.

If it is the case that if there is some
possible task that God can do

(create a stone that He cannot lift) then there
is something else (lift
said stone) that God cannot do, then (1) is
true.
is

But if, again, that

the case, then the stone paradox in its
traditional form is decisive.

Argument B is therefore superfluous.
of the issue over A.

Moreover,

B

offers no clarification

On the contrary, B introduces additional complica-

tions by deciding the issue on the basis of a generalization, the sup-

portive case for which is precisely the case which is dealt with speci10
11

Ibid .

,

p.

106.

Ibid .

,

p.

102.
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fically in argument A.
It should be apparent that
we receive no benefit by
abandoning A in
favor of some other argument
or form of argument against
the omnipotence

of God.

A is a straight-forward
dilemma.

unobjectionable form.

It is. therefore,

of a wholly

A certainly involves certain
complexities.

These
are not complexities which
can be obviated by moving to a
different argument. They are complexities
which are inherent in any argument
which
proposes to disprove the omnipotence
of God by introducing incompatible
tasks. The remainder of this work
will therefore be devoted to unravelling these complexities and,
thereby, to assessing the truth of
the

three premises of argument A.

This in turn will enable us to assess
the

soundness of the argument and the weight
of the stone paradox.
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CHAPTER
'HE

VI

FIRST PREMISE AND THE EXISTENCE
ASSUMPTION

It would seem that the
first premise of argument A
is completely

innocuous.

A(l)

It is:

Eithe-'* God can create a
stone which He cannot lift,
or He cannot
create a stone which He cannot
lift.

Surprisingly, it has been suggested
that A(l) Is
the premises of the stone
paradox.

tte

most doubtful of

In "The Incompatibility of
God's

Ex-

istence anc Omnipotence" 1 George
Englebretsen claims that the form of
A(l) is not
(i) (Pa

v~Pa), but rather

(ii) (Pa v Pj),

where 'Pa' means that a possesses some
property which
the property named by -P'.

"(Pa

v~Pa)"

2

contrary of

Englebretsen goes on to claim that while

tautology, "(Pa v PT)" is not.

is a

is a

cannot both be true, they can both be false.

While "Pa" and "?I"

Englebretsen claims that

they can both be false precisely under
the following conditions:
(a) if "Pa" is a category mistake;

(b) if "Pa" has a subject term which
fails to refer;
(c) if "Pa" is semantically paradoxical;
or
(d) if "Pa" is a truth-functionally counterfactual
conditional.^

After rejecting (a), (c) and (d) as not applying in
this case, Englebretsen concludes that if God exists, then A(l) is true.

On this account,

George Englebretsen, "The Incompatibility of God’s Existence and Omnipotence", Sophia April 1971, pp. 28-31.
,

2

3

Ibid .

,

pp.

28f.

Ibid., p. 29.

,

:
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Englebretsen claims that ths
conclusion of the stone paradox
is
(1) if we accept A(l), then
we must conclude that God is
not omnipotent

avoid negative theology, then
we must conclude

tha^od doL n«

This much of Englebretsen 's
claim is right, if we reject A(l),
then
we must conclude that God does
not exist. Englebretsen 's claim
that A(2)
5
end A<3) are "clearly innocuous"
is clearly wrong, as we shall
see in

Chapters VII, lx and X.

While Englebretsen is correct in
pointing out

the fact that the stone paradox
involves an assumption of the existence
of God, much of his supporting
argumentation is based on mistakes.

Englebretsen ’s first problem is his claim
that

Ad)

is of the form

(ii) (Pa v Pa), and not
(i) (Pa

v~Pa).

In the first place, Englebretsen has
no need to make that claim.

led to it on the basis of a very simple
error in logic.
(i) is a tautology.

Yet (i) is clearly rot a tautology.

He is

He claims that

Consider the

following argument.
1) Pa v f^Pa.

2)

(3x)(Px v^Px).

From (i) we can infer that there is at least one object
in the world.
Yet the existence of such an object is clearly not a truth
of logic.

The existence of an object denoted by

'a

1

is required for the truth of

(i) as much as it is for the truth of (ii).

5

Ibid .

,

p.

30.

Ibid .

,

p.

28.

4

exist.

s
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Englebretsen recognizes that

U

Ad)

not a tautology.

Yet. since
he thinks that (1) is a
tautology, he is forced to
conclude that (i)

doesn't give the fora of Ad).

With this confusion disposed
of, let us

see whether there is any
other incentive remaining for
supporting Engle-

bretsen's claim that A(l) is
of form (ii).
First, let us look at the three
sentences: "Pa", "Pi", and "~Pa",

where the interpretation of the
letters is:
a - God, and
P

—

”

_can create

a

stone which

_ cannot

"Pa" attributes to God the property
P.

God does not have property P.

lift.

"~Pa" expresses the claim that

(Note that, contrary to Englebretsen

claim, God's existence is required for
the truth of ’VwPa".)

•

"P^" ex-

presses the claim that God does not have
property P, and that God possesses a kind of agency such that property
P could appropriately,

although perhaps not truly, ascribed to God.

For

"H"

to be true, God

must at least be the kind of agent that
can create and lift stones.

Englebretsen points out that "Pa" and "Pi" can both
be false if,
among other reasons, "Pa" has a subject term
which fails to refer.

As

we have seen, however, in that case "Pa" and "~p "
a
are also both false.

Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that A(l)
is false if there
is no God that the form of A(l) is

(ii) rather than (i).

Englebretsen also gives three other conditions under which "Pa" and
"Pa" can both be false.

Let us look briefly at those other conditions

to see whether Englebretsen is correct in claiming that they give dif-

ferent truth-conditions for "Pa" and

"A

-,

Pa".

Englebretsen claims that if

(d) "Pa" is a truth-functionally counterf actual conditional, then "Pa"
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and "Fa" can both be false while
either "Pa" or "~Pa" must be
true.

By

"truth-functionally counterfactual conditional",
Englebretsen seems to
mean must “counterfactual conditional".
The example he gives here is
"If Columbus had not sailed,
America would not have been discovered." 6

Given the fact that, despite an
abundance of recent literature on
the
subject, there is as yet no generally
accepted logical analysis of coun-

terfactual conditionals, it is not possible
to give a set of truth conditions for such a sentence which would
meet with any degree of general
acceptance.

Given this problem and the fact that
Englebretsen simply

dismisses this case as not being relevant
to the present problem,
say no more about counterfactual conditionals.

I

shall

"God can create a stone

that God cannot lift" is not a conditional at
all, therefore certainly

not a counterfactual conditional.

Englebretsen

’s

treatment is no better off with respect to case (c),

where "Pa" is semantically paradoxical.

His example here is "This very

statement is false."

To illustrate the problem, let us take a closer

look at that example.

We may symbolize the example as Pa, where

?

P*

and 'a' are interpreted as follows:
a - this very sentence (i.e.

P_

-

Thus

"This very sentence is false.")

_is false.
'a'

names this very sentence, "This very sentence is false." and

"Pa" is, in our symbolism, that very sentence, "This very sentence is

false."

'a'

therefore names "Pa".

It follows, therefore,

that to say

that "Pa" is false is to say that a is false, that is, to say that Pa.
6

^

Ibid ., p. 29.
*bid.

,

p.

29.
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TMs

is a problem for Englebretsen
since he claims that
semantically

paradoxical statements present
us with a situation where
the statement
and its contrary are both
false.
Yet in the case of his own
example, if
the semantically paradoxical
sentence is false then it is true.
This

is

untenable.
It is only in case (a), where
"Pa" is a category mistake, that
En-

glebretsen actually has a case where
it is clear that "Pa" and
"?T" can
be false while "~Pa" is true.
In arguing that "God can create
a stone

which He cannot lift." is not a category
mistake, Englebretsen shows
very clearly his theological naivete.

He says,

If, say, "God can create a stone
which He cannot lift" is a cat
egory mistake, then either it is
nonsense or the predicate "can
crreate a stone which He cannot
lift" is being used in some nonstandard non-ordinary way. ... However,
to say that predicates
such as can create ..." are used in a
nonstandard way when
predicated of God ... is to accept Negative
Theology.^

This latter claim is simply untrue.

predicates are used in

a

Not only is the claim that certain

nonstandard way when predicated of God

a dif-

ferent claim from that of Negative Theology,
it is not even a claim about
the same question.

The claim that certain predicates are used in

standard way when predicated of God is
we speak of God.

a

a

non

claim about what we mean when

Negative Theologv, on the other hand, offers only

claim about what kind of things can be said of God.

a

A claim about non-

standard usage, when accompanied by the appropriate sort
of translation

manual (Pace Quine), may very well run directly against the
constraints
of Negative Theology.

Such claims would include the claim that predi-

cations about God are analogical in nature, the claim that religious
8

Ibid .

,

pp. 29f.
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language is reducible to ethical
language, etc.

There is plenty of rooc to slide
between the horns of the
dilemma
posed by the stone paradox, by
claiming that A(l) is based on
a category

mistake.

It may plausibly be claimed
that the kind of agency which
gives

rise to the stone paradox cannot
be appropriately ascribed to
God- Since
I am more concerned to
examine the logic of the stone
paradox rather than
the theological assumptions on
which it rests, I shall not concern
myself

with such claims.
While Englebretsen

’

s

analysis of A(l) is not well supported,
He is

right in pointing out that A(l) is
true only if God exists.
sen

Englebret-

objection to argument A could be met, of
course, by adding

's

God exists

,

then" on the beginning of each step in
argument A.

-'If

The con-

clusion would then be "If God exists, then
God is not omnipotent."
In my formal assessment of the argument
of the stone paradox

shall handle the existence assumption somewhat
differently.

I

In giving

a

model for the formal language which

I

shall simply assume that God is a member of the
domain of the real

world.

The end result is the same.

true only if God is

a

I

shall develop in Chapter VIII,

The conclusion of the argument is

member of that domain.

The more interesting ques

tion, of course, is the one which Englebretsen
claims to be trivial, in

claiming that A(2) and A(3) are innocuous.
if G od is a

Must the conclusion be true

member of the domain of the real world?
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CHAPTER VII
THE THIRD PREMISE

with a clear definition of
'omnipotent' In hand from Chapter
III,
"* may proceed to an analysis
of the second and third
premises of arg-1
merit A.

These are:

A(2>
potent.

030 Create 3 8t ° ne " hiCh He CannOC

A<3)

t^ 0 ^

3

omnipo ten

Uft

•*““ " hlCh

'

then He Is not omni-

Uft

'

«>«, He Is not

In almost all of the literature
on the stone paradox A(2) has been

accepted as innocuous. 1

A(3) has been accepted as the most
obvious

point of attack on the soundness of
argument A.
is a rather

Because of this, there

considerable corpus of literature directed
to the issue of

whether A(3) is true.

In this chapter

I

propose to consider that body

of literature to determine whether any
of the writers on the stone para-

dox have succeded in showing the falsity of A(3).
that consideration

I

At the conclusion of

shall be able to draw at least a preliminary
con-

clusion as to the truth of A(3).

The final judgement on A(3) must, how-

ever, be reserved until Chapter IX, after a formal
logic adequate to the

expression of argument A has been developed.
The attacks on the truth of A(3) fall roughly into
three general

approaches.

One of thse approaches is to give a more or less formal con-

struction of the argument or some part of it and to
attack those points
r\

which are weak, on that particular construction.

The second approach

This general acceptance has been unfortunate as it has obscured points
of real interest concerning the stone paradox. Moreover, it is unwarranted, since A(2) is not only not innocuous, it is not true, as we
shall see in Chapter X.

^
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is to draw an analogy
between the argument of the
stone paradox and some

other argument which

e

ither is obviously invalid 3
or suggests some other

Kind of solution to the
stone paradox. 4

The third approach is to
give

some more general analysis
of the notion of

Usability according

to

which A(3) comes out false.

1

G. Wade Savage gives the
following more general version
of argument
A:
C*

(1>

T

St ° ne " hich X cannot
create a« stone which x cannot lift.

Uft

-

* cannot

<2)

* Can C e e 8 St ° ne Which X COTnot
lift - then, necessarily,
!
in
1' a
leaSt ° ne task which * cannot perform
(namely,
1 ’ lift
at
<
,
the stone
in question).

<3)

n
8 St °" e wMch x can " ot lift
then, necessarily,
°!
.
Jher
5 a
least one task which x cannot perform
(namely, create
5
fh
the
stone in question).

f

eT

(A) Hence, there is at least one
task which x cannot perform.

(5) If x is an omnipotent being, then
x can perform any task.
(6) Therefore, x is not omnipotent.
2

Following this approach are G. Wade Savage, "The
Paradox of the Stone",
Philosophical Revijew, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1 (January
1967), pp . 74-79; C.B.
A Sirap
Soiution to the Paradox of Omnipotence", Mind, Vol.
tytWt"
LXIX
(January !s[
1960), pp. 74-75; and Barry Miller's contribute to
David Londey, Barry Miller and John King-Farlow,
"God and the Stone
Paradox: Three Comments", Sophia (October
1971), pp . 23-33.
,

3

Following this approach are David Londey and John King-Farlow
in
Londey, et al., Od. Cit.
J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence", Mind Vol. LXIV,
No. 254 (April
,
1955), pp. 200-212; and Ian T. Ramsey, "The Paradox of Omnipotence",
Mind, Vol. LX 7, (1956), pp. 263-266 follow this approach,
although in

very different directions.

Such analyses are offered in Savage, On. Cit.,; and Barry Miller's
contribution to Londey, et al., 0£. Cit .

36

Argument C is more general than
argument A because, aside
from
other differences, the
singular term -God- is replaced
throughout the
argument by the free variable
<x’.

Savage makes this alteration
in order

to better capture what he
sees as the basic point of
the stone paradox.
Also, Savage feels, this
strengthens the paradox against
the inclination
to say that God is, by
definition, omnipotent and,
therefore, that a
stone that God cannot lift Is
not a logicaly possible object,
and the

creation of such a stone not a
logically possible task.

Savage states

these two points clearly as
follows:

For if God is by definition
omnipotent, then, obviously,
creating a stone which God (an
omnipotent being who can
lift any stone) cannot lift is a
task whose description
is self-contradictory. What
the paradox of the stone really
seeks to prove is that the notion
of an omnipotent being
is logically inconsistent that is, that the existence
of an om nipotent being, God
or arv^ ether,
impossible I emphasis is Savage
’si. It tries t“d~this by
focusing on the perfectly consistent
task of creating a
stone which the creator cannot lift.
The essence of the
argument is that an omnipotent being
must be able to perform this task and yet cannot perform
the task.''

~l^aT~

I

suggest that ’creating

a

stone which the creator cannot lift’ does
not

in fact name a "perfectly consistent
task", precisely because it does

not name a task at all.

It is, rather, a schema for naming a very
large

number of tasks.
Savage, Londey and Miller all fail to take
note of this kind of

objection.

Cowan, however, is aware of this kind of objection and
devotes

fair effort to showing that real tasks can be named
by expressions in-

T~Savage,
'

Op, Cit., p.

76.

I_bid. , pp. 75f . A similar move is made by
Londey and Miller, in Londey,
et al., On. Cit., pp. 25 and 26; and by J.L. Cowan,
The Paradox of
Omnipotence Revisited", Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. III. No.
3, (March 1974), pp . UOfT.

^
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volving the use of token
reflexives. Cowan attempts to
show this by
giving examples of what he
takes to be legitimate tasks
which ate

named

by expressions Involving
such reflexives.

I

give Cowan’s statement of

what is by far his most
convincing case.

—

We are operating a wilderness
survival training school
WS
Gnd
to get each of our tra nees
-8
l
' ° f buildin
*> •1™. without aid, and
utilLi? ine "l
m erials a
which not only can
carrv^itf"
uilder but which, to negotiate
the inevitable
S? he
U
Can Carry '
Smlth and Brown succeed.
Jonpt f i
t
Can C3rry him " but n0t he il
Have
Smith
mith and
and^’
Brown not demonstrated an ability,
capacity
pacity
or
power Jones lacks? 8

T

^

ZiL

/

*

^ T"
^

The answer is surely, "Yes. M
It does not follow, however,
from the fact that Smith and Brown

have shown an ability, capacity or
power that Jones lacks that Jones has
failed to perform some task which Smith
and Brown have performed.
we should rather say is that Jones
failed to perform

a

What

task which is

related in a particularly intimate way (We
(3)
might say "ref lexively-indexically related”.

ming.

)

to the tasks which Smith and Brown
succeded in perfor-

Yet this needs some argument if it is to be
convincing.

Consider

the following sentences:
(1) Jones builds a boat which he can lift.
(2) Smith builds a boat which he can lift.

Smith builds a boat which Jones can lift.
(1) and (3), respectively, attribute performance of
one and the same task

to Jones

can lift.

ai d

to Smith.

That task is the building of a boat which Jones

To see this, note that any set of actions will, if performed

by Jones, constitute a performance of the task spoken of in (1) if and

—

~~
8

Cowan, 0£. Cit .

,

p.

41.

)
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only if that tame set of actions
will, If performed by Smith,
constitute
a performance of the task
spoken of in
(3).

Here lies the problem for Cowan's
claim that (1) and (2) attribute
to Jones and Smith the
performance of the same task. W e must
suppose
that either (1) attributes to
Jones the performance of one task
or (1)

attributes to Jones the performance of
more than one task.

Let us sup-

pose that (1) attributes to Jones the
performance of just one task.

Let

us further suppose that (1) attributes
to Jones the performance of the

same task the performance of which
(2) attributes to Smith.

Yet we know

that (1) attributes to Jones the
performance of the same task the per-

formance of which (3) attributes to Smith.

This leads to the conclusion

that (2) and (3) attribute the performance
of the same task to Smith.

This conclusion is obviously false.

Therefore, on the assumption that

(1) attributes to Jones the performance of
only one task, we must con-

clude that the task which (l) attributes to Jones
and the task which (2)

attributes to Smith are different tasks, contrary to the
conclusion Cowan

would have us draw from his example.
Assume, on the other hand, that (1) ascribes to Jones the
performance
of more than one task.

Assume, again, that one of the task-performances

ascribed to Jones by (1) is the same as (one of) the task-perf ormanceCs
ascribed to Smith by (2).

Clearly no task-performance which (2) ascribes

to Smith is the same as the task-performance ascribed to Smith by
(3),

yet one of tne task-performances ascribed to Jones by (l) is the same as

that ascribed bo Smith by (3).

We may suppose that the task which (3)

ascribes to Smith may be named unequivocally by 'building
Jones can lift'.

a

boat which

The only plausible candidate for naming the single

r>9

supposed task which is ascribed
to Jones by (!) and to
Smith by (2)
'building a boat which the
builder can lift-. It follows
that .building

u

boat which Jones can lift'
and 'building a boat which
the builder car
lift' name two different
tasks, even when Jones is the
builder.
We must now look for the
difference between those tasks.
Both the
B

tasks are the building of a
boat which fits a particular
description.
If they are different
tasks they must be buildings
which are somehow dif
ferent, one such that it is a
boat that Jones can lift, one
such that it
is a boat which the builder
can lift.
(This is not to say that some
or
all boats might not fit both
descriptions, just as there are some
boats

which can undoubtedly be lifted by
both Jones and Smith, and it

is pos-

sible that Jones and Smith should be
able to lift all and only the same

boats.)

Yet certainly, where Jones is the
builder, both descriptions

pick out exactly the same boats.

Moreover, they do not pick out the

same boats merely by some accident of
nature, but because 'Jones' and
'the builder' are two terms which
pick out the same individual.

There-

fore 'building a boat which Jones can lift'
and 'building a boat which
the builder can lift' do not name
different tasks, but rather are dif-

ferent names for the same task.

There is no difference between

a boat

which Jones can lift and

boat which the builder can lift (when Jones
is the builder).

there is no difference between building

a

a

Therefore,

boat which Jones can lift and

building a boat which the builder can lift..

They are one task, not two.

This contradicts the original assumption.
It may be objected here that just as,

in my possessing the property

of being self-identical and in my possessing the property of being identi-
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cal with David Schrader, I
possess two different
properties, so also (l)
and
(1

*

>

Jones builds a boat that Jones
can lift.

attribute the performance of
different tasks to Jones. The
property of
being self- identical is a
property possessed by me, but also
by every—
thing else.

The property of being identical
with David Schrader, on
the

other hand, is a property that

I

and only

I

possess.

I

share it with

nobody.

There are crucial differences
between tasks and properties.

A task,

unlike a property, is necessarily
related to some state of affairs
or
possible state of affairs which is
brought about by a successful perfor-

mance of the task.

A state of affairs, however, cannot
be uniquely

described by an expression which uses

a

reflexive whose reference is not

determined by another part of the same
expression.

Thus, "Theieis a

boat which he can lift." picks out
no particular state of affairs since
?

he

'

picks out no Particular object as it is
used in the above expression

The same is true for "There is a
boat which the builder can lift."

We may conclude, then, that there is
no task such that its perfor-

mance is ascribed by (1) to Jones and by
(2) to Smith.
convincing case fails.

Cowan’s most

This should show that expressions involving
token

reflexives do not name tasks, but rather are schemata
for naming tasks,
such that, when the reflexive is replaced by a name
or definite description, the expression names a task.

The task at issue in the si-one para-

dox is not that of creating a stone which the creator cannot lift,
but
that of creating a stone which God cannot lift.

Savage fails in his attempt to circumvent the issue of whether God
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is by

definition omnipotent, because
that issue

paradox.

is centra! to the
stone

have, of course, dealt
with it in Chapter IV, and
assume here
that God is not by definition
omnipotent. Therefore, we need
not worry
about the Paradox's breaking
down on that point.
I

Savage continues by giving the
following as a formal representation
of his CO)-C<3>, where 'S'
stands for <u a stone-, -c for
-can

create-

and 'L' for 'can lift':
D.

(1 )

(3y;(Sy.Cxy.-Lxy)v-(3y)(Sy.Cxy*-L:cy).

(2) (3y )(Sy.Cxy*-Lxy)=> Oy)(Sy.-Lxy).
(3) - (3 y ) ( Sy • Cxy • -Lxy )

3 Oy)(Sy.-Cxy)

9
,

Savage proceeds to point out the obvious.
-Lxy)" does not imply

»

(3y)(Sy.-Cxy)".

equivalent to "(y)(Sy.Cxy 3Lxy)".

D(3) is false. »-Gy)(Sy.Cxy.

Rather "-(3y)(Sy.Cxy.-Lxy)" is

"God cannot create a stone which God

cannot lift." is logically equivalent to
"Any stone which God can create
God can lift."

This latter version, according to Savage,
does not make

any claim that God cannot perform some
task.
Savage is wrong in this claim, as we shall
see presently.

One might

just as well say that, since "Any stone that
God can create God can lift.'
is logically equivalent to "God cannot
create a stone that God cannot

lift.", the former claim does imply a limitation
on God’s power.
form, conjunctive or conditional, is quite capable of expressing

Either
a

claim

°f a limitation on something's power.

Unfortunately, Savage makes the above claim without offering any

—

defense for it.
9

10

1
The same claim was, however, also made by G.B. Keene ^

Savage, 0£. Cit .

——

,

p.

77.

G.3. Keene, "A Simpler Solution to the Paradox of Omnipotence", Mind
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.even years before
ded

the appearance of Savage's
paper.

Keene also respon-

to criticisms of the above
position by Bernard Mayo. 12

While
Mayo's objections are not really
very good, they do, at least,
force
Keene to expand on his original
position, Crus giving the reader
an idea
of what is really at play in
this defense against the stone
paradox.

In

order to give Mayo's criticisms of
the Keene-Savage solution most
clearly.
I give the following
sentences:
(1) God cannot create a stone
which God cannot lift.

(2) Any stcne which God can create
God can lift.
(3)

I

cannot make paper airplanes.

(A) Anything

(5)

I

I

can make is not a paper airplane.

cannot tie knots which

(6) Any knot

I

can tie

I

I

cannot untie.

can untie.

Mayo appears to take it as obvious that
sentences like (2), (4) and (6)
do not imply any limitation, while sentences
like (1), (3) and (5) do,
at least on their faces, imply limitation.

The crucial question, once

Mayo has given Keene this much, is whether
(1), (3) and (5) are "rewordable" as (2), (4) and (6), respectively.
ply some limitation of capacity.
that (3) is not rewordable as (4).

It is obvious that (3) does im-

Mayo takes this to support the claim
This should convince us. according

to Mayo, that not all such sentences are rewordable
in this manner.

Mayo

takes it as a good reason against saying that (l) is rewordable as
(2)
Vol. LX1X, No. 273, (January 1960), pp.

74-75.

Keene, "Capacity-Limiting Statements", Mind, Vol. LXX, No. 278, (April
1961), pp. 251-252.
12

Bernard Mayo, "Mr. Keene On Omnipotence", Mind, Vol. LXX, No. 278,
(April 1961), pp. 249-250.

*3

that the following holds
of the closely analogous
(5) and (6): (6)
asserts
an unlimited unknoting
capacity on my part, while
(5) asserts a limits,
tion on my knotting capacity. 13
If this latter claim is
right, the analogy between (1) and
(2), and (5) and (6), respectively,
may support
Mayo's point.

.

First, it must be noted that
(1) and (2) are logically
equivalent,
as are (3) and (4) and also
(5) and (6).
Mayo is claiming, then, that
two sentences which are logically
equivalent nevertheless assert two
different claims. This is a problem.
(1) and (2) may very well differ
in
what they would connote in normal
conversation. They may well differ in

their implicatures, but they differ
in no way which would affect the
logic
of the stone paradox. Whatever can
be deduced from one can be
deduced

from the other.

If the conclusion that God is not
omnipotent can be de-

duced from (l) it can be deduced from
(2) as well.
Keene, in his reply, acknowledges that
(3) implies some limitation
of capacity, but says that (4) does as
well.

This is for the reason that

some things which other people make are
paper airplanes.

Moreover, he

says that (5) and (6) both imply some
limitation in capacity if and only
if it is the case that a knot that

tied.

I

cannot untie could conceivably be

Finally, Keene says that (1) and (2) would both
imply some limit-

ation of capacity if it were the case that such
,

e

created.

]4

That is to say, Keen thinks it is necessarily true that

God can lift any stone.

14

,

p.

conceivably

Keene thinks it is logically impossible that there should

be such a stone.

Ibid .

a stone could

250.

Keene, "Capacity-Limiting Statements",

p.

252
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This is very revealing.

imply

s °me

For Keene at least, (1) does
not fail to

limitation on God's power simply
because it

valent to (2), but rather because
it poses
not logically possible.

If

a

is logically equi-

task whose performance
is

that task were possible, then
(1), and (2)

as well, would imply a
limitation on God's power.

The rewording itself

is only a red hering that
steers us back into the problem with
which we

have already dealt in Chapter IV.

Clearly Savage is wrong when he says,
"it is obvious [emphasis is

minel that the latter statement
["If x can create a stone then x
can lift
if. "I does not entail that
x is limited in power." 15

Savage has appar-

ently forgotten that a statement can
express a negative claim without
the word

'not' occuring in it once.

Be that as it may, Savage is right
in claiming that D(3) is not

logically true.

(Whether the sentence supposedly represented
by D(3) is

logically true or true for other than logical
considerations will not
concern us at this point.)

Savage's point is relevent, however, only if

D(l)-D(3) is an adequate representation of C(l)-C(3).

adequately represent C(l)-C(3).

D(l)-D(3) does not

The problems revolve around the use of

the existential quantifier and the predicate 'can
create'.

not capture the same disjunction that is expressed by
C(l).

D(l) does

Moreover,

the consequent of D(3) does not represent the
consequent of C(3).

To show that D(l) does not provide an adequate representation of

C(D,

I

shall show that the first disjunct of D(l), on the given inter-

pretation of the predicate letters, says something quite different from
the first disjunct of C(l).
15

Savage, 0£. Cit .

,

p.

77.

The first disjunct of C(l) is "x can create
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a St ° ne

WhlCh * CannOC

Uft "‘

Th *

disjunct of D(l), under
the

specified interpretation, represents
"there is a stone which x
can create,
but which x cannot lift".
DU) claims that the stone in
question actually
exists. 0(1), on the other
hand, merely claims that
God can create such
* St ° ne ’
th8t
mlsht f° sslbl y
(and whatever else is
required

^

U

in addition to logical
possibility for a stone to be
treatable by God).

c(l> certainly does not
claim that such

a

stone actually exists.

Moreover, the ’Cxy* is rendered
virtually superfluous in D(l), at
least as

reflection of A(l).

It would seem to be presupposed
in any discussion

of God as a creator that if
something does exist, then God can
create it.
In C( 1 ) , however
"x can create ..." is clearly not
,
superfluous. The

dichotomy expressed in C(l) is between
x's ability to create the stone
and x's inability to create the
stone.
The dichotomy in D(l) is between
the existence and non-existence of
the stone which x can create but not
lift.

Consider the case where x can create

a stone

which x cannot lift,

but, in fact, neither x nor anyone else
has created such a stone and the

stone does not exist in actuality.

That case would satisfy the first

disjunct of C(]), but the second disjunct of D(l).

Thus D(l) cannot be

an adequate representation of C(l).

Similarly, the consequent of D(3) claims that
there exists a stone

which x cannot create.
a

C(3)'s consequent only claims that x cannot create

stone of a certain specification.

W e would normally think that, in the

context of a debate over the omnipotence cf God, if God cannot
create
something, then it doesn' t exist, contrary to the consequent of D(3).

At very least, C(3) doesn't claim that such a stone does in fact exist.
It can be seem, therefore,

that D(l)-D(3) Is not an adequate formal

:
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representation of C(l)-C(3), even
less of
son and because, as

AU)- A < 3 ).

Both for this rea-

showed earlier. Savage fails
to show by virtue of

I

Its formal equivalence
to

"(yXSy-Cxy =Lxy>" that the second
disjunct

of

D(l> does not entail any
limitation on Cod’s power, Savage's
formal
analysis of the stone paradox
removes none of the paradox's teeth,
nor
does it lessen the weight of
the stone.

Barry Miller, in his contribution
to "God and the Stone Paradox:

Three Comments", renders the argument
of the stone paradox in yet
another way.
In the following, -M- is
the modal operator of possibility,
(2)
’X’

names some arbitrary creator, and

'Y'

names the stone.

We have the

argument
E.

(1) M(X creates a stone Y which it
cannot lift) or -M(X creates a
stone Y which it cannot lift).
If M(X creates a stone Y which it
cannot lift), then there is
a task which X cannot perform
(viz, lift Y which has been created

(3)

U

M(
6ateS 3 St ° ne Y which
cannot lift), then there is a
r which
J/5 X cannot perform
task
(viz. create Y which is unliftable by

(4) Therefore, there is a task which X cannot
perform (i.e. X is not
omnipotent. 10

Miller goes on to argue that the task mentioned in
(2) and (3) of

X's

E,

creating a stone Y which it cannot lift, poses no
limitation on X's power
since it is "inherently unperf ormable ".

1

'

I

shall examine later what

Miller means by "inherently unperformable".
For the present,

I

should like to criticize Miller's construction.

E, of the argument as providing no helpful analysis of the paradox.

“
"
“
ITT
Londey, et al., 0£. Cit.
17 Ibid
-« P- 27.

,

pp. 26f.

The
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first problem Involves the
conclusion.

omnipotent."

A<4> is "Therefore, God
is not

*(*, is "Therefore, there is a
task which X cannot perform

(i.e. X is not omnipotent)."

For better or worse, "There
is

a task which
X cannot perform." does
not mean the same as "X is not
omnipotent." "X
is not omnipotent." means
that there is some task which
is not logically
impossible and which X cannot
perform. This is not a trivial
difference.
If "There is a task which
X cannot perform." were to
mean the same as

"X is not omnipotent", and
if Miller is correct in his
claim that the

task in question is inherently
unperf ormable (assuming that
"inherently

unperformable" means "logically impossible"),
then there will clearly be
a task,

albeit

a

logically impossible one, which X
cannot perform and X

will clearly not be omnipotent.
task"

18

Calling the task in question a "pseudo-

does not help if one still calls
it a task.

This is, of course,

replacing "there is

problem which Miller can easily get around by

task which X cannot perform" in E(2)-E(4) with
"X

a

(2)
is not omnipotent".

a

With that substitution. Miller's construction
would

clearly not be subject to the above criticism.

Moreover, such an alter-

ation would clearly be more in tune with Miller's
general approach to the
paradox.
E*.

This would give us the following argument;

(1) M(X creates a stone Y which it cannot lift) or -h(X
creates a
stone Y which it cannot lift).
If M(X creates
omnipotent.

a

stone Y which it cannot lift), then X is not

(3) If -M(X creates a stone Y which it cannot lift), then X is not
omn ipotent.
(4) Therefore, X is not omnipotent.
18

Ibid .

,

p.

30.

)
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Another problem with Miller's
construction of the stone parndox
arises iron, his use of the modal
operator.
It Is not at all clear

that
the possibility operator,
on any of Its fairly standard
interpretations,

captures what It must capture if E
(or E-) is to express the stone
paradox adequately.
If we give -M' the interpretation
of logical possibility,
then the formulation, E',
guarantees Its own unsoundness as
follows. In
that case, E<3) expresses the
claim that if It Is not logically
possible

that X creates a stone Y which it
cannot lift, then X is not omnipotent.

However,

if

it is not lofically possible that
X creates a stone Y which

it cannot lift, then it does not
follow that there is a logically pos-

sible task that X cannot perform.
is not omnipotent.

Thus, it also does not follow that X

Hence E’(3) is false and the argument fails.

(This

interpretation well illustrates the problem with E(4)
as an expression
of the conclusion of the stone paradox.)

Even on the most restrictive of the fairly
standard interpretations
of the possibility operator, physical
possibility, it still expresses

a

notion which is somewhat less restrictive than
that expressed by the
'can'

m

argument A.

Consider the case where it is physically possible

that X create a stone Y which it cannot lift, but
for some reason or other
X cannot create such a stone (just as it is ohysically
possible that

I

should make 100 free throws in 100 attempts, but clearly for other
reasons
I

cannot do so).

This case would fall under the second disjunct of A(l),

but under the first disjunct of either Evl) or E

'

(1 ) ,

Moreover it is

certainly not obvious, and generally not thought to be true, that God
cannot perform physically impossible tasks.
do not capture the same dichotomy as A(l).

Therefore, E(l) and E

•

(

1
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This should show quite clearly
that, at least on two
Interpretations
of 'M' , Miller's construction,
E, does not at all
well represent the
traditional stone paradox. Perhaps
Miller could give a suitable
interpretation for 'M', but he has not
supplied one in the present
article.
The notion that <H> must
express is not so much possibility
as ability.
The difficulty in expressing such
a notion formally becomes
apparent if
we look at the wide variety of
conditions in which we say that
some agent
fails to have a certain ability.
Some of our normal notions of
impos-

sibility do imply lack of ability,
but in combination they do not
exhaust
it by any means.
E and E'

do not give enough formalization
to shed any light on the

deeper structure of the argument.

What formalization they do give is
not

a representation of the traditional
paradox.

While the particulars of Miller's construction
of the stone paradox
play virtually no role in his analysis
of the paradox, he nevertheless
gives the construction as a representation
of the traditional stone
20

paradox.

E is not an advance on A in terms of
clarity.

Rather

E re-

quires much work to be done on it if it is to
express at all the ideas

which are expressed much more clearly in A.

—

19

20

Both Miller and Savage fail to provide through
their, more or less,
"

"

—

The relation between ability and any of our normal notions
of possibility is, to a point, open to dispute, but that dispute is strictly
peripheral to the present point so long as none of the standard notions of possibility are identical with the notion of ability at play
in the stone paradox. A more careful consideration of the
relationship
between various notion of possibility and ability will follow in
Chapter VIII.
Ibid .
p. 26. Actually, Miller's construction is based on that of
Geroge Englebretsen and inherits one of its problems, the one concerning its conclusion, from Englebretsen. s construction.
,
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formal constructions fail so
badly i„ their attempts
to capture the
original paradox. A correct
formal rendering of the argument
in question
is always necessary before
one can expect any formal
analysis to be helpful.

In connection with the stone
paradox, such a correct formal
ren-

dering poses certain problems,
which we have just encountered,
which
make that task a very difficult
one, requiring a logical apparatus
which
rs not

available to us in most of our standard
first-order systems, be

they extens;ional or modal.

David Londey and John King-Farlow
both attempt a different kind of

attack on the stone paradox. 21

Each of them tries to analogize the stone

paradox to another argument which poses a task
which is clearly logically
impossible-,
F.

Londey gives the following presumed parallel:

(1) God can state a problem which He cannot
solve or God cannot state
a problem which He cannot solve.
(2) If Cod can state a problem which He
cannot solve, then there is a

task which God cannot perform.

(3) If God cannot state a problem which He
cannot solve, then there is
a task which God cannot perform.

(A) Therefore, there is a task which God
cannot perform.*^

Londey quite correctly points out that the argument is
sound, but that
it doesn't prove that God is not omnipotent.

the task which it is claimed in F ( 2

ally impossible one.

)

The reason for this is that

that God cannot perform is a logic-

On the assumption that God can do anything your

average logician can do, God can state the problem of giving

TT
22

Ibid., pp. 23ff. and pp. 31ff.
Ibid.

,

p.

24.

a formal
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decision procedure for the first-order
predicate calculus.
is, however, logically unsolvable.

That proble.

Therefore, God's Inability to
solve

it does not show that God is
not omnipotent.

Londey thinks that the stone paradox
poses
task.

a

He reasons as follows: We must
suppose that

unusual sort of being who might be
omnipotent.

similarly impossible
'God'

refers to some

The argument loses its

bite without this supposition, for
"if we were to replace "God" every,

where in the argument by "The Prince
of Wales" or "Christopher Columbus",
we would just get an elaborate
demonstration of what no one doubts." 23

Londey acknowledges that one must try to
avoid allowing the usual assumption of God's omnipotence to become explicit
in the argument.

Otherwise

we might be able to substitute 'God, who
is omnipotent' for 'God' through
out the argument.

In that case,

'a

stone that could not be lifted by God

who is omnipotent* would obviously be self-contradictory. 2 ^
Londey thinks that this problem cannot be overcome.

He suggests,

as the best possibility for getting around the
problem, the formulation

of the "Generalized Stone Paradox". 25

This is fundamentally che argu-

ment C, but under universal quantification.
according to Londey.

He claims that we must suppose that x ranges over

all conceivable beings.
the range of

a

This still doesn't help,

(This is certainly a non-standard way of setting

variable, but let us suppose that Londey has

of some sort, in which this is a legitimate practice.)
23

24

25

—

a

free logic

But, "a being who

Ibid., p. 24.

John King-Farlow makes a similar point in Ibid . , p. 32. The criticisms
that I make against Londey's position will apply equally to that of
King-Farlow.
Ibid ., p. 25.
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can perform any logically
perfo^able task appears to be a
conceivable
being, and hence within
the range of *." 26
Therefore, "(x)Cx cannot

create a stone that x cannot
lift*, is not omnipotent)" is
false, since
'an omnipotent being' is
a possible value for
'x'.

Three criticisms can be made
against Londey's analysis of the
stone
P radox.
First, Londey's claim that we
must suppose that 'God' refers
to some unusual sort of being
lest the argument lose its bite
is surely
wrong. That an argument proves
"what no one doubts" certainly
does not

count against the argument.

No one doubts that 1+1=2.

We can also

give an elaborate proof of that
in Zetmelo-Fraenkel set theory.

The

proof in no way suffers because
it proves something that no one
doubts.
That we can use a stone type
argument to prove that Richard Nixon
and

David Londey are not omnipotent does
not require that we suppose 'Cod'
to refer to some different sort
of being.

We need make no supposition

at all about what kind of being 'God'
refers to, as long as we do not

suppose that God is necessarily omnipotent.
Secondly, there is no reason to think that
we should be able to sub-

stitute 'God, who is omnipotent' or something
to that effect for 'God'

throughout the argument.

Clearly such

unless God is necessarily omnipotent.

a

If

substitution is illegitimate
it were legitimate without that

assumption, then we would be able to prove that

I

am blond, by substitu-

ting 'David Schrader, who is blond' for 'David Schrader'.

In Chapter IV

ic was argued that God may not be necessarily
omnipotent.

The present

consideration is carried out under the assumption that if God
potent, He is only contingently omnipotent.
26

Ibid., p. 25.

is omni-
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Finally, Londey's criticism of
the generalized stone
paradox Is
quest ion- begging. Londey claims
that an omnipotent being
appears to be
conceivable. It is not at all clear
that such a being is conceivable.
A being is conceivable only if
it is logically possible.
But if the

stone paradox in its general form
is sound, then an omnipotent
being is
logically impossible. The argument must
not assume anything about what
kind of being is conceivable. Rather
it, if sound, proves something

about what kind of being is conceivable.

That Londey begs the question

can best be shown by pointing out
that, on Londey's assumption that an

omnipotent being is conceivable, and his
practice of having variables
range over all conceivable, not just actually
existing, entities, it

impossible to reach the conclusion by any means
since the
Cx is not omnipotent)'

'x'

in

is

'(x)

is presumed to range over an omnipotent
being.

Londey assumes that there can be such
stone argument is impossible.

This is

a being.
a

On that assumption the

case of using an assumption

to immunize a position against rational debate.

King-Farlow' s analogical criticism of the paradox is more
interesting.

King-Farlow reminds us of the familiar truth of mathematics,
that there
is no greatest number (NGN).

After an uninteresting and pointless argu-

ment which purports to show that F.T. Sommers is

a less

matician and logician than any of the editors of Sophia

powerful mathe,

which argument

fails due to the truth of NGN, King-Farlow states the principle that there
is not a greatest task (NGT):

"For any time t and for any tdeg-ee of

power 1 dl, there is a d2 such that Is-Desired-dl at

t

Is-Available-d2 at

King-Farlow does not

27

Ibid .

,

p.

33.

t

AND d2 Is-Greater-than-dl."

ENTAILS that BOTH
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spell out explicitly how this
principle Is supposed to seve
God fr OT the
stone paracox.
If we state NOT more
perspicuously, It becomes
apparent:
for any degree of power that
Is desired (for performing
a certain task),
an even greater degree of
power Is available (to God).
Thus stated, It
Is obvious how NGT solves the
problem.

It begs the question.

Moreover,

in King-Far low's defense of NGT,
he says, "If there is an omnipotent

Deity ..., then for every degree
of power desired ... there is
no ...
task ... demanding a degree of
power too great for more than enough

power to be available."

oo

NGT is a principle that arises from
the assump.

tion of the omnipotence of Cod, then
it is used as a we„pon against an

argument against the omnipotence of God This
is clearly circular.
The surface parallel between NGT and NGN,
which is not only true,
but highly intuitive as well, is
deceptive.

able.

Numbers are all commensur-

For NGT to be plausible, even on the
assumption that some omnipo-

tent God exists, degrees of power must be
commensurable as well.

If we

could determine the degree of power necessary
in order to perform some
task simply in terms of the amount of energy
required for the accomplish-

ment of that task, the degrees of power would be
commensurable.

Power,

in the sense relevent to the stone paradox,
cannot be so simply deter-

mined in degrees.
It might be noted here that King-Farlow'

s

formulation of NGT is

based on the notion of omnipotence characterized in Chapter III above

under Def.

i.

That notion was rejected at that time as failing to cap-

ture what we intuitively understand by ’omnipotence'.

sufficient for the rejection of King-Farlow' s argument.
28

Ibid .

,

p.

33.

That alone is
Yet in the event

.
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that, for any reason,
this should not be compelling
to someone, I lnclud(
the following ardent to
dispose of King-Farlow'a
position decisively.
If degrees of power
are commensurable, then we
should be able to
give a comparative ordering
of the following: the degree
of power re-

red to see a bacteria, the
degree of power required to lift
the Washington Monument, the degree of
power required to prove the
independence
Of the Continuum Hypothesis
relative to the axioms of
Zermelo-Fraenkel
and the degree of power
required for a ISO pound creature
to fly from
q

Hartford to DesNolnes.

It is clear, however,

that there can be no such

comparative ordering of those degrees
of power.

In that case, we must

also say that degrees of power are
not commensurable, that the relation
'is greater than'

is not everywhere defined for
degrees of power and,

therefore, not that NOT is false, but
that it makes no sense, it is not

well-formed, even on the assumption that
an omnipotent Cod exists.

We

may conclude that King-Farlow's
attempted analogy with NGN provides no
help in assessing the soundness of the
stone paradox.
J.L. Mackie, in his famous article,
"Evil and Omnipotence", 29 sets

forth a more general paradox of
omnipotence, involving the same principle

which is at work in the stone paradox, and
then suggests a solution which
arises through his analysis of a presumed analogy
to his paradox of Omnipotence.
This leads us to what I call the Paradox of Omnipotence;
can an omnipotent being make things which he cannot subsequently control? Or, what is prectically equivalent to this,
can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind himself?
• • •

It is clear that this is a paradox: the questions cannot

29

J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence", Mind, Vol. LXIV, No.
254. (April
1955), pp. 200-212.
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This la obviously a more general
version of our atone paradox.
Hackle
seems to assume that the argument
of the paradox la sound, for
he gives

no In depth analysis of it.

As such, It poses a problem
and needs a

solution.
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a solution of this paradox,
I would
15 3 parallel Paradox of
Sovereignty.

n make

a

U“ —rioting

its own future

-sovereign’ we mean -absolute sovereign',
then the analogy seems

to be a good one.

Mackie's solution comes as no surprise.

Following the legislative

distinction between the authority to make laws
governing the authority
of legislative bodies (Mackie
calls this

’sovereignty (2)’.) and the

authority to make all other laws (Mackie
calls this ’sovereignty (1)*.),
Mackie draws
tence (2).

a

parallel distinction between omnipotence (l) and
omnipo-

Omnipotence (1) is the unlimited power to act, and
omnipo-

tence (2) is the unlimited power to determine what
power to act things
shall have.

Mackie concludes that we may consistently say that God is

omnipotent (1) or that God is omnipotent (2), whichever we
prefer for
theological reasons, but not that God is omnipotent, in an inclusive
sense of ’omnipotent'.

Mackie ’s solution involves something of
30
31

Ibid., p. 210.
Ibid., p. 211.

a

retreat from the tradi-
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tional

theological claim of divine
omnipotence, but it does, at
least,
provide some presumably solid
ground to which the theologian
may retreat.
Yet Hackle s solution may be
offered a bit prematurely. A
solution is
only necessary where there is a
problem. In particular. Heebie's
solution
is only necessary if the
argument of the paradox of omnipotence
is sound.

At the present point, we are
not yet in position to say with
certainty
that it is sound.
I shall, therefore,
lay aside Mackie’s solution and
get back to the matter of whether a
solution is necessary at all.
I

should point out here that Mackie’s
solution introduces an inter-

esting distinction between two senses
of ’omnipotent'.

These also give

rise to two parallel senses of 'power'
which will be considered in

Chapter XI in connection with some possible
complications which may

b«

thought to arise from my treatment of the
stone paradox.

Finally Ian Ramsey, in "The Paradox of Omnipotence",
claims that

Mackie's analogical "Paradox of Sovereignty"
suggests a different solution to the paradox of omnipotence.

Specifically, Ramsey claims that by

varying qualifications on the model of power
('scarcely powerful', 'rather
powerful

'

,

'definitely powerful',

'very powerful',

we vary the "logical placing" of the subject on
which
power is predicated.

a

certain kind of

When we reach 'all powerful' or 'omnipotent', we

have made an "appropriately odd logical claim"
this case, God.

!2

'most powerful*, ...~

about the subject, in

In this way, Ramsey claims that "the question which

sets the paradox, despite Mr. Mackie's assertion, is not a proper question, and it is not a proper question precisely because of the notion
32
33

'

—

"

See Ramsey, "The Paradox of Omnipotence", p. 263.
Ibid ., p. 263.

),
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Of omnipotence which is
nothing if not logically odd." 34

I emphasis

is

Ramsey 'si.
As

previously considered Ramsey's
position in Chapter III above
and rejected at least its
logical claims, I shall devote
no more time
to it here.
I

3

This brings us to the more general
analyses of

relation to omnipotence.

Usability

Savage suggests one such analysis.

and its

Savage

summarizes his analysis as follows:
"Whether x=y or x^y, x's inability
to create a stone which
y cannot lift constitutes a limitation on x's

power only if (i) x is unable to create
stones of any poundage, or (ii)
y xs unable to lift stones of any poundage." 35

Conditions (i) and (ii)

are not necessary conditions for x's
inability to create a stone that
y cannot lift to constitute a limitation on x's
power.

Suppose that

x can create stones of any poundage and
that y can lift stones of any

poundage, but that y cannot lift a slippery
stone and that x, similarly,
cannot create slippery stones.

In that case clearly x's inability to

create a stone that y cannot lift does constitute
power.

a

limitation on x's

It is absurd to think that the only reason
y might not be able

lift a certain stone is because of its weight.

Conditions (i) and (ii) must be revised.

The most likely candidates,

in light of the traditional notion of omnipotence, are (i)
and (ii) with

of any poundage" replaced by "of any non-contradictory description".
‘

34
35

Ibid .

,

'

p.

263.

Savage, 0£. Cit .

,

p.

78.

.
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Yet .a stone which God cannot
lift- Is a non-contradictory
description,
but in that case, Savage would
have to claim that God's
failure to be
able to create a stone which
God cannot lift constitutes
a limitation on
God s power
*

savage is making the issue
needlessly complicated.

On our normal

understanding of omnipotence, x fails
to be omnipotent if and only
if
x cannot perform seme task which
is logically possible.
U e determine

whether God's power is shown by the
stone paradox to be limited by
determining whether God's creating a
stone which God cannot lift is a
logically possible task.
Barry Miller presents

a

bold, if peculiar, argument in
attempting

to show that X's creating a stone Y
which X cannot lift 36 is an "inherently unperformable" task.

"Inherently unperformable" seems to mean
"impos-

sible by virtue of the rules of logic
and certain meaning postulates

regarding 'create' and 'lift'" in light of
Miller's argument.

The fol-

lowing is Miller's argument to the effect
that the task posed in the

stone paradox is "inherently unperformable",
although Miller doesn't pull
all the steps together in this form.
G.

(1) X creates Y if and only if X makes it the
case that Y exists.
(2) Y exists if and only if Y is individuated.
(3) Y is individuated if and only if the
being-lif ted-of-Y is in-

dividuated.
(4) The being-lifted-of-Y is individuated if and only if the
being-

lifted-of-Y exists.
(5) Y exists if and only if the being-lifted-of-Y exists.
(6) X creates Y if and only if X makes it the case that the being-

lifted-of-Y exists.
36

See Hiller’s construction of the stone paradox, argument E.
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(7) X makes it the case that
the being-lif ted-of-Y
if X lifts Y (directly or
through*.^*

°" ly

(8) Therefore, X creates Y if
and only if X lifts Y.

The concision clearly means that
X's creating a stone which
X cannot lift
is impossible.
G is not a valid argument if
we are limited to standard
propositional logic.
In particular. G makes use of
one rule that goes considerably
beyond anything available to us in
propositional logic. That rule is

something like the following:
R(1)
it

^'tsVtha^r

6

that P ’ and P lf and ° nly lf
Q: th

“X» “
fc

While a(l) is hardly obvious, it does
bear some initial plausibility.
For the benefit of assessing the rest of
argument G, let us give Miller
the rule he needs.

With something like R(l) available, argument
G

obviously valid, but its soundness is still very
questionable.
look over the steps, in order to see whether
they are all true.

gives a fairly intuitive rendering of

MX

creates Y."

cisely the same construal to "X creates Y." as
a

I

is

Let us

G(l)

This gives pre-

shall use in developing

more precise logic for the stone paradox over the next
three chapters

of this paper.

G(2) expresses

versial.

a

philosophical claim which is not wholly uncontro-

Nevertheless, nothing interesting in the present argument turns

on this premise.

If the philosophical claim which G(2) expresses were

rejected, tne argument could, without too much effort, be patched up on
the basis of some replacement for G(2).

G(3 ) looks false.

would think it true.

It is initially hard to understand why anyone
G( 3)

is based on one fairly

controversial onto-

logical elate, that "accidents
are, In a sense,
particulars." 37
t he
being-1 If ted-of-Y is not a
particular, an entity which
can, itself, be
individuated, then argument C
fails. Even if Miller is
given the above
ontological doctrine, a concession
I am more than
willing to make in
order to be fair to his case,
0(3) depends on other, yet more
blzzare,
assumptions.

„

I

Shall try, here, to give Miller's
support for G(3).

Miller takes

the first big step when he
says,
E
S
** ° f course a contingent
predicate, which means
that "Y
Y evi
exists" can be affirmed only on the
basis either of
1
eVlde "", or of a contingent premise.
In this case
the premise would be "X creates
Y". Moreover, "Y exists" cm
continue iemphasis is Miller's! to be affirmed
only on those
me a ses.
In particular, it cannot
continue to be affirmed
at any time when "X creates Y" has
ceased to be true. 33

^

Let us accept Miller's claim that
'exists' is

a

contingent predicate. 39

Then it is true that "Y exists" can
be affirmed only on the basis of

either empirical evidence or a contingent
premise.
that

Finally, it is true

X creates Y" is a basis for affirming
the truth of "Y exists".

However, it is not true, nor does it
follow from anything Miller has said,
that "Y exists" can continue to be
affirmed only so long as "X creates
V" remains true.

Where Y is a stone, from the moment when X
first cre-

ates Y there is empirical evidence on
which to base the affirmation of
Y's continued existence.
37
38

39

Londey, et al., 0£. Cit .

,

p.

29.

Ibid ., p. 28.

This claim may be debated by advocates of the ontological argument
for God’s existence, but it is certainly indisputable that the
predicate ’exists’ is only contingently applied to stones. Since
this is «_he application involved in the present case, we can accept
Miller’s claim here.
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We can make sense of Miner's
views if we note that
Miller is
bringing into play a highly
non-standard notion of creation.
It

appears
that Hiller believes that
creation is an on-going activity,
that the
duration of the creation of
some object (by God) is
identical with the
duration of the existence of
that object, 40 This rules
out, say, a
deist position to the effect
that God created the universe
long ago and
then left it to its own devices.
On this view of creation,
Miller would
be right in claiming that
"Y exist" cannot continue
to be affirmed at
any time when "X creates Y"
has ceased to be true. The
reason, however,
that this would be true is not
that there would then be no
basis, either
evidential or logical, for affirming
"Y exists", but rather that "Y
exists"
would then be false.

This notion of creation involves a
theological assumption which
Hiller has given us no reason to accept,
viz. that divine creation is
such that its products will pass out
of existence unless the creative
act is performed constantly and
continuously.

Moreover, there seems to

be two very good reasons for
rejecting that assumption.

On a religious

level, it is assumed that divine creation
is in some sense superior to

human creation.

It is also assumed that an object
is better created if

it can continue to exist without
the constant attention of its creator.

Human beings can create objects which continue
to exist without the

constant attention of their creators.

God should be able to do the same

On the level of language, if Miller's notion
of creation is accepted,
the presumed analogy between divine and

tenuated to the breaking point.
40

Ibid .

,

p.

28.

human creation must become at-

It is not at all clear that we can even

make sense of divine creation
on Miller's account of
it.
While Miller's claim to the
effect that "Y exists" can

only be

affirmed so long as "X creates Y"
is true is, strictly
speaking, not
essential to his support of
0(3), it does lend a certain
plausibility
to Miller's program.
In particular, it insures
that the relation which
X bears to Y by virtue of X's
creative activity will hold through
any
accidental change in Y.

At any tine when Y is lifted,
since Y must exist

in order to be lifted, X will
be, at that same time, creating
Y.

Miller's support for 0(3), £er se,
is basically as follows:
(i) Accidents are particulars.

(ii) The being-lif ted-of-Y is an
accident of Y.

<1U)

e
Ul 1 ty 0f ai’ aCCldent 13 d6rlVed from
the Particularity
of tharof
b- w it
,
that of which
is an accident.
.

(iv) The particularity of the being-lif
ted-of-Y is derived from the
particularity of Y. 4i

Miller seems to take this conclusion, (iv),
as equivalent to G(3).
There is one obvious problem here.

(ii) commits us to the existence

of the being-lif ted-of-Y, to Y's having
the property of being lifted at

some time or other.

Yet since it is an accidental rather than an
essen-

tial property of Y, we may well suppose
that Y might lack that property.

(Certainly it would seem that some stones are never
lifted, eg. the Rock
of Gibralter.
a

)

At best, the individuation of the being-lif ted-of-Y

is

necessary and sufficient condition for the individuation of Y
only

the being-lif ted-of-Y exists.

This forces a moderation of the conclusion of argument G tot
41

This argument does not actually appear in Miller's article, but is
contained in substance in Ibid. , p. 29.

if
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G(8)' Therefore, if X creates
V and Y is lifted,
then X lifts Y.
Yet this conclusion does no damage
to the stone paradox. We
remain

without any decisive criticism of
the third premise of the
paradox,
A<3)
0'
3
Whleh "* ' a " not Uft
H. is not
omnipotent?
Moreover, despite the fact that we
have looked at several attempts,
we
remain without any adequate formal
analysis of the paradox.
The first part of this chapter has,
at least, shown where some of
the principle difficulties lie in
giving a formal construction of the

stone paradox.

Perhaps the most severe difficulty lies
in the attempt

to capture the notion expressed by

formal aparatus.

Miller's position.

'can'

in the paradox by means of some

This came out most clearly in my treatment
of Barry
The other major difficulty encountered by
the

writers mentioned in this chapter was that of
capturing precisely the
same disjunction in their formal representations
of the stone paradox
as is expressed by the first premise of the
traditional statement of

the paradox, A(l).

This latter difficulty is easily dispensed with

once an adequate answer is given to the former
problem.

It is indis-

pensible , therefore, at this stage in our inquiry to develop some
formal
logic which will allow us to give adequate formal expression to
the

stone paradox.

wzSee
43

—

-

—

this chapter, pp. 98f. above.

See this chapter, pp. 94f. and 98 above.

115

CHAPTER VIII
A FRAGMENT OF A FORMAL LOGIC
OF ACTION
In the last chapter

I

presented one attempt to capture
the notion

expressed by 'can' In the stone
paradox by means of standard
logical
1
modalities.
That attempt failed. For any
of the fairly standard
interpretatrons of the logical modalities
it was very easy to provide
counterexamples which showed the inability
of such modalities to express
the

relevant sense of 'can'.
It should be apparent at this
point that the

'can' of the stone

paradox must be expressed by some other
means, be it through some different interpretation of modalities or as
a relation sign in some non-

modal system.
A logic adequate for the expression of
the stone paradox must in-

elude the standard modalities as well,
however.

A being is omnipotent

if and only if it can perform any
logically possible task.

Therefore an

adequate formulation of the stone paradox will involve
the standard notion of logical necessity.

This means that if it is determined than the

’can' of the paradox can best be expressed by means
of some interpreta-

tion of modalities then the logic required to express
the paradox will

have to contain two different sets of modal operators.
It should be noted here that a logic for the stone paradox need
not

be based upon as comprehensive a logic of action as might be
desirable,
say, for deontic logic.

The deontic logician, for example, may well want

to draw the distinction between bringing about some state of affairs and

See the construction of the paradox by Barry Miller, Chapter VIII, p.
96, above, from Londey, Miller and King-Farlow, Op . Cit .
pp. 26f.
,
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serving that same state of affairs
(closing a door and keeping
" d)#

action.
’

2

For the purposes of dealing with
the stone paradox, how-

such distinctions are not important.

What is important in the
stone

rot whether something is brought about
or preserved, not whether

:ox is

stone

t

L ° giCS ° f actl ' n have been
developed which provide for
that

it

actually created or rather merely
sustained.

What is im-

tant in the stone paradox is whether
the action involved can or canC

"° n

be P erfcrmed -

would

conclusion.

;>eset

-

^ile

the ambiguity between production and
preserva-

the premises of the paradox, it would
not affect the

In either case, whether God cannot
create (bring about the

existence of) a certain stone or whether God
cannot sustain (preserve
the existence of) a certain stone, there is
something that God cannot
do.

The same would hold true of lifting a stone and
holding it or keen-

ing it in a lifted position.

For this reason

I

snail follow the more simple course of not adop-

ting a logic which comes at action through change,
specifying both the

beginning-state and the end-state for a given act.

Rather

I

shall adopt

a logic which specifies only the end-state, that
state of affairs which
is brought about by the act under discussion.

Before laying out the language for our fragment of a logic of action,
a

brief discussion is in order concerning the various senses of the word

'can* which confront and confound theories of action.

Consider the following sentences:
1) I can photograph the Empire State Building now.
2

~
Two examples of such logics are provided by G.H. von Wright in Norm and
Action , (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), and An Essay in D eon tic Logic and the General Theory of Action , (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1968).

2) I can play the piano

3) Horowitz can play the
piano in a rocm, which
contains no piano.
4) 1 Can play the pian
° in a room which contains

.

no piano.

Presumably we want to say
that all these sentences
are false. Yet we do
not want to say that they
are all false for the same
kind of
reason.

is false because

I

dint with a camera in hand.

I

do not. in other words,
have the opportu-

nity to photograph the Empire
State Building now.
is false

that

“cause

I

1)

am not now within the
sight of the Empire State
Buil-

2), on the other hand,

lack the ability to play the
piano.

While it is true

am not now near a piano, and
therefore lack the opportunity
to
play one now, as well as the
ability, 2) does not claim that
I can play
the piano now. Rather it
claims that I have the ability to
play the
I

piano.

It claims, among other things,
that if I should be in a room

containing a piano tomorrow

I

could play it.

3) is clearly false because

In a room containing no piano
Horowitz would not have the opportunity
to

play the piano, despite the fact
that he clearly has the ability.
course, if we were sitting in a
piano-less room with Horowitz and

"Horowitz can play the piano.", my
statement would be true.

Of
I

said,

That, how-

ever, would be because my claim was
not that Horowitz could play it there

and then, but that he had the ability.

If

I

said, on the other hand,

"Horowitz can play the piano here and now.",
the case would be different.
That statement would clearly be false.
reasons.

In a room containing no piano

nor the opportunity to play the piano.

Finally, 4) is false for two
I

would have neither the ability

From all this it is clear that

there are at least two different senses of 'can'.
the ability to perform some task.

One of these claims

The other claims the opportunity to

,
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perform some task.
J.L. Austin suggests that
-can' has, in addition
to the above to
senses, what he calls an "all-in',
sense which seen,* to include
both the

ability and the opportunity
senses of 'can'. 3
really an additional sense
of 'can'.

I

suggest that this is not

When we speak of human
action, the

'can' of opportunity is
generally taken to presuppose
the 'can' of ability.
What is really at play here
is Austin's "all-in" sense
of 'can'.

There is no human-action sense of
'can' which would allow one
to say that
I can play the
piano simply by virtue of the fact
that there is a piano
at hand.
The "all-in" sense of 'can' is
not a sense different from the

opportunity sense.

Rather it is the opportunity sense.

All this is not to say that the
opportunity sense of 'can’ and the

ability sense exhaust the senses of ’can'.
'Can' is also used, albeit
perhaps in a rather attenuated sense,
in connection with what night be
called "second-order abilities", that
is the ability or capacity to ac-

quire some other ability or set of abilities. 4
the sense of

I

take it that this is

'can' used in a sentence like "Human beings
can use tools."

In addition to these senses of

'can', there are also various sub-

sidiary senses which involve various combinations
of the above senses
and perhaps others."
In the claim that x is omnipotent if and only if
x can perform any
J .L. Austin,

"If s and Cans", Myles Brand, ed.. The Nature of Human Action, (Clenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Company,
1970)
177.
p.

,

Cf. von Wright, Norm and Action
5

,

p.

317, and Austin, Ibid .

,

p.

177.

This has been pointed out in Bruce Aune, "Can" in Paul Edwards, ed.
Encyc l opedia of Philosophy Vol. 2, (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 196 7"), pp. 18-20.
TT^e

,
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iogically possible task,

I

sub.lt that we must take
'can'

1„

the broadest

possible sense. A failure in
tents of any of the above
senses of -can'
would, according to the standard
Intuitions regarding omnipotence,
con.
stitute a lack of omnipotence.
To be adequate for our
purposes, a formal
analysis of 'can' must be able
to express that broad range
of senses.
A great deal of effort has
been spent In the attempt to
give a conditional analysis of -can- statements.
Let us take as our example the

sentence
1) S can perform a.

One might initially think that
2) If S tries to perform a,

then S will perform a.

provides an adequate analysis of l). 6

Yet a moment's reflection will

show that this analysis of 'can' is not
adequate.

All of us frequently

try to do things, which we would normally
want to say that we can do,

and yet fail.

casion

I

Suppose that

I

can make a certain shot at pool. If on
oe

fail to make that shot we would clearly
not want to say that

cannot make the shot, although we would,

ticular occasion when

I

I

think, want to say, on a par-

fail to make the shot that there is some
point

before the pool ball stops rolling after which we
should say that
not make the shot on that occasion.
home run.

I

I

can-

Similarly, Dick Allen can hit a

Yet he does not hit one every time he comes to the plate in

every baseball game.

A possible way out of this problem might be to offer in place of

2)

as an analysis of 1)

This view can plausibly be ascribed to G.E. Moore (Cf. Ethics, (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1912), p. 127.) adn P.H. Nowell-Smith (Cf. Ethics,
(London: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 240).

i::o

perform a

e

o^^S^lSe‘p^tag^ L^.°^i~;. th,n

At first glance, this would
seem to provide

test for dete™i„l ng
„ hen

Perf °™ SOme act and “ ha" a
person does seething simply
by

“ PerSO "

ccident.

a

wlU

S

If a baseball player hits
a home run one time
In every twelve

at bats, then we should
certainly say that he can hit
home runs.
If
someone only hit one home run
In twelve thousand at bats,
then we should
be fairly Inclined to say
that he cannot hit home runs.
Clearly the

percentage of successes which would
be relevant would be different
for
different activities.
3) however has serious problems
of its own.

In those cases where S

has not tried enough times to
determine whether he has the relevant
suc-

cess percentage, then 3) would require
that we say that

S can

perform a.

Clearly it is not the case that everyone
can do everything that he has
never tried.

Even beyond this, we might suppose that
there is

person who, we should normally say, can
perform a certain act.

a

certain
Yet every

time he tries to do so, some remarkable
event intervenes to cause his

attempt to fail.

Suppose, for example, that every time Dick
Allen hits

a ball toward the fence a bird
flies over the stadium and collides with

the ball, causing it to fall in the outfield.

not,

I

In this case, we should

think, want to say that Dick Allen cannot hit home
runs.

There are a number of ways in which one might attempt to patch
up
3), by adding conditions to the antecedent, in order to retain the cri-

terion of success in the consequent.

problem which we encountered with 3).

All these attempts retain the first

Consider

-

"S can perform a if

and only if, if S tries to perform a on a certain number of occasions

and ... then

S

will perform a on an appropriate percentage of those

oc.-

caslons."

6l0nS

If "S fries to per fo™
. on . certain

^

^

^

^

that CaS<? ’ th * deflnlens
“f 3) is true, but
surely we
*lght want to say that the
definiend™ is false. I have,
for example,
never tried to play Bath's
Minuet in G" on a truspet.
Vet my failure
to so try is not sufficient
grounds for claiming that I
can play it.

Ability is, however, connected
in some way with successful
perforNance. This seems intuitively
obvious. To give an adequate
analysis of
1) we will have to get away
from trial and success in
the real world,
for that does not work for
the reasons slated above.
We might, of course, try to
alter

junctive.

3.'

by making its antecedent
sub-

The result of such an alteration
would, however, be a counter-

factual conditional.

That being the case, it would
offer little insight

Into the logical analysis of
1), since the logical analysis of
counterfactual conditionals is no more
clear then that of 'can ’-statements.
It has been argued that the basic

physical possibility.

'ran' of action is identical with

7
I

considered this claim briefly in Chapter
VII and

rejected it on the basis of the following
counter-example.

ally possible that
in 100 attempts.

I

Yet

It is physic-

should successfully shoot 100 basketball
free throws
I

cannot do so.

My counter-example may not be damaging
if

a

certain radical physic-

alist thesis is true: namely that the laws of
physics account for all
events in the physical world.

In that case it could be claimed that it

is not physically possible that I should
successfully shoot 100 free

throws in 100 attempts.

t~~

:

It could be claimed that my vision or my eye-

—

—

Cf. Otorrs McCall , "Ability as a Species of
Possibility". Brand, ed.,
Og. Cit., pp. 139-147.
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to-muscle coordination was
such that my shootl„
8 100 successful free
throws would constitute a
violation of the laws of
physics for such bodies
as mine. This claim
would also psychological
laws, etc.

This approach need not rest
upon so radical

a

The minimal claim required
to make such an approach

physicalist thesis.
useful is that all

behavior is governed by rules
which, if known, could be
stated, be they
Physical, psychological, or of
some other sort. While
this claim is not
unobjectionable, it is a much weaker
claim than the above phsicalist
thesis.
On this weakened claim we are
no longer dealing with simple
physical
possibility, but rather some more
stringent kind of possibility.
Yet
even this species of possibility
is not identical with the
notion we
want to express by 'can-. We
might well suppose that my performing
sane
act is quite compatible with all
the rules which govern my
behavior.
Yet if some other agent
intervenes to prevent me from performing
that
act, then we should want to say
that

I

cannot perform it.

To account
for the relevant sense of 'can' we
must take into consideration not only

the rules governing my behavior,
but also the actions of other agents

which may have some bearing on my
behavior.
This can be done by defining ’can* in terms
of other action modalities.

Ingmar

The approach

Pom

I

follow in analyzing ’can’ here follows that of

in The Logic of Power .

represented by

'D'

and 'C*.

8

Pom

gives two action modalities,

A formula of the form ’D^p’ is interpreted

to read something like
It follows from what

—

i

—

does that p;

Ingmar Porn, The Logic of Power

,

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970).
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1

sees to it that
p;

i

brings it about
that p;

i

acts in suc h a
way that p;

U
i

is a thing
done by i that
p; or

does p.

A formula of
the form

'C p-

is

i

interpreted to read something
like

it is compatible
with everything
it is possible
for all that

what

i

i

i

does that p;

does that p; or

9
does allows (permits) that
p.

These modalities
will be clearer presently when
for Pern’s language, L

,

provide a formal seman-

I

and my revision of it, L

.

s

'can'

Can(p(l )

is then defined as follows:

)

=df

(

t )C
t

pU).

Specifically, CanD.p, "i can do
p" is defined as

(t^D.p,

is compatible
with everything any person does.”

This clearly vacuates

the problem

of interference from another
agent.

"i. c doing p

If I am prevented from

performing some act due to
another agent's interference, then my
perforing that act is
not compatible with everything that agent
does.

Yet there is another problem
which may appear to remain unsolved.

Although the above definition
of 'can' solves the problem of interference
rom another agent, it
appears to leave unsolved the problem of inter-

ference from the cooperative
activity of
pp

ranee

is

deceptive, however.

a

number of other agents.

Among the things that every agent does

are things he does in
concert with other agents.

If Smith and

^ llftin S a large rock, then one of the
things
9

i^id., pp. 2f.

This

I

I

do is that

cooperI

cooper-
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ate W lth

SmUb

In lifting a la rg e
rock.

Thus

,

lf

x

^

„

d °lng p by the joint
activity of a number of
agents, then thete are
a

number of agents of whom
it may be said that
they do something
incompatible with my doing
p.

Let us now check this account
by looking at seme
of our previous
examples.
1)

can photograph the Empire
State Building now.

I

ve analysis this must be
false.

that

I

do.

Everything

be in New York now.

It is not compatible
with everything

have done up to this moment
requires that

I

If

According to the

I

am not in New York now, then

1

I

not

cannot photo-

graph the Empire State Building
now.
2)

can play the piano.

I

do that

I

play the piano.

Again, it is not compatible with
everything
I

have not played the piano in
years.

last did so I did quite badly.

read music rather poorly.

I

I

When

All these

together are not compatible with my
playing the piano.
3) Horowitz can play the piano
in a room which contains no
piano.

Here

we get a truth value of false,
which is what we want if we are to
take
'can'

in the broadest sense.

Being in a room with no piano is not
com-

patible with playing a piano.
4)

I

can make a certain shot at pool (which

we have a certain ambiguity in the English.
of shot, then

I

one else dc_s.
pool table, etc.
I,

certainly can.

I

miss on occasion).

Here

If we mean a certain type

It is consistent with everything every-

It is consistent with my past performances
around the
If, on the other hand, we mean a particular
shot which

in fact, miss, then we should certainly want
to say that up to the

moment

I

start my shot everything

I

do is compatible with my making the

I
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Which is incompatible with
m y making that patticulat
shot.

.

I

cannot make that particular
shot.

5)

Pot that

This seems quite natural.

can successfully shoot
100 free throws in. 100
attempts.
It is no,
compatible with everything I
do that I should do
so.
My past performances at throwing things,
including basketballs,
clearly are not compatible
With shooting 100 successful
free throws in 100 attempts.
I

6) Finally, we have the
hardest case.

Dick Allen can hit h OT
e runs (sup-

posing that every time he has
hit one toward the fence
to date it has
collided with a bird and fallen
in the outfield).
Here I should think
we would say that he can hit
home runs.

It is fully compatible
with the

way he hits the ball, both
in terms of power and
trajectory.

It is com-

patible with everything anyone
does that on future occasions
birds might
not get in the way and the
ball should gc over the fence.
This final
case seems to pose no problem
for the above analysis of 'can'.
It is this analysis of

Of the stone paradox.

I

'can' that will become a part
of the logic

am now in position to present

a

formal language

and semantics which will provide
our logic for assessing the soundness
Of the stone paradox.

First,

I

shall present the logic of action,
lan-

guage 1^ and semantics, given by Porn
in The Logic of Power .
shall present my extension of that
language, L
tics for it,

10

dox*

lOTn

;

Then

I

and a Kripke-type seman^

Which Will then be adequate for the demands
of our para-

——

—

orn provides a Hintikka-style modelling as
his semantics for L. . I
prefer to offer a Kripke-type model structure
as my semantics for L
due to my greater familiarity with the Kripie-type
semantics.

,
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Pom

language

s

^

la a two-sorted
language based on the
language
of first-order predicate
11
logic with Identity.
The slgns of L are;
12
'

,

'

>=>~>-»>D,C,F,i,t,a,x.

~

»ols in

h

and

°n the lnte:,ded
interpretation, are the symfor the left and right
13
parentheses,
’

’

identity, negation and

material implication, respectively,
just as In the standard
predicate
calculus With identity.
M>. and -C

are the signs for the action
sodal-

ities which were introduced
on pages 1121. above.

The Sign

•!'

is a free individual symbol.

On the intended inter-

pretation it will denote an agent
throughout any given context and
may
therefore be called a free agent
symbol us well.
If s is a free
agent

symbol, then so is s’.

W e will use

to designate the free agent
symbols of L

The sign 't' is a bound individual
variable.

It will also be called

a bound agent variable as it
is used as a medium for
cross-reference in

quantif icat ional contexts about agents.
variable, then so is w’.

Again, if w is a bound agent

We will use

t»u,v,t ,u ,v ,t ,...
1
1
1

2

to designate the bound agent variables
of L,

The sign

'a'

.

is another kind of free individual symbol,
except that

throughout any given context it is interpreted as
referring to

TlZFor
12

13

7
the exposition of

I

am following Ibid .

,

a non-

pp. 1-3.

lo designate the first seven signs in this list we shall
use the signs
themselves autonymously.

We shall follow the usual conventions about omitting parentheses.

>
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asent, an individual which
canr ot be sald
.

actions,

If

t|>

perfon„

^

^^

Is a free non-agent
symbol, then so Is s'.

s

^

wln

use

a.b.c.a^.b .c^.a^,...
to designate the free
non-agent symbols of L

The sign 'x- Is the second
kind of bound Individual
variable. It
will be used as a medt»
of cross-reference In
quantlf icatlonal contexts
concerning Individuals which
are not agents. Again,
if „ ls . bound
non-agent variable, then so is
w'. We will use
x »y»^»x
]

,y ]

,

2^*2

» •

• •

to designate the bound
non-agent variables of L

.

The sign -F> followed by
any finite, non-empty sequence
*...* Q f „
stars Is called an n-place
predicate of L] .
'F* Is Interpreted as
designating an n-place relation among
the Individuals In the range
fixed fcr
the free Individuals, both
agent and non-agent,
of 1^.

place predicate, then so is P».

If P ls an n-

We will use

f,g,h,f ,g ,h ,f ,...
1
1
1
2
to designate the predicates
of L^.

The well-formed formulae (wffs)
of L
1)

If

and

S;L

wff of L

s

2

r

are as follows:

are free individual symbols of
1^

This is called the identity of
and
2

2

,s
2

then F(s^ ,s

, .

2

SpS 2 ,...,s

n

.

. . ,

s^

)

ls a

s

and is interpreted

designate the same individual.

s

is an n place predicate and s

dicating F of

and

)

2

2

as expressing the claim that s

symbols of

s,

then (f =s

,

2

,

*"*» s
n

are free individual

is a wff of L^.

This is called pre-

When n^2, this is interpreted as expressing

the claim that the relation designated by F holds among
the individuals

designated by

,®2

*

* " *

s

n

*

taken in that order.

When n=l, it is inter-

158

Preted as expressing the

data

that the individual
deslgnaged h y

ls a

.

member of the class designated
by F.
3)

If p is a wff of L

r

then D^p and C.p are wffs
of

of this kind are called basic
D-statement s.

D

and
t

o logical

operators.

'

^

^

as well.

Wffs

are called 'praxl-

The wff p constitutes their
scope.

The interpreta-

tion of basic D-statements was
given on pages 112f. above.

"

4>

P

U

3

°f L
l>

5)

th0n s ° ls ~P-

If p and q are wffs of

^

Is called the negation
of p.

then so is (p

It ls called the

q ).

conditional of P and q, with
p as its antecedent and q as its
consequent.
We read (p -> q) as: if
then
p

6)

If p is a wff of L

r

q.

and p(w/s) is the result obtained
by substituting

an occurence of the variable w
for every occurrence of the free
individual symbol s, then (w)p(„/ s )
is a wff of

^

also.

(It is assumed that free

agent symbols are only replaced by
agent variables and that free nonagent symbols are only replaced by
non-agent variables.)

called

a

universal quantification.

p(w/s) constitutes its scope.

(w)p(w/s) is

(w) is the universal quanitifer
and

The universal quantification is read as:

for every (actually existing) individual
w, p(w/s).
1)

There are no wffs of

L.

other than those given in l)-6).

The following standard abbreviations are used in

(s^s^

for ~(s =s
1

and read as:

)

2

S;L

L,

:

is not identical with

2

(p & q) for ~(p ->~q)

and read as: p and q;

(p v q) for (~p

and reed as: p or q (or both);

(p

(Ew)p

q) for

for

(

->

(p

q)
q )&(q

s

p))

^(w^p

In providing a semantics for

and read as: p if and only if q;
and read as: there is an individual w
such that p.
,

I

will depart from Pom's approach

;
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(Pom gives

a

Hintikka-style modelling for L

Kripke-type semantics ror
for L 1#

^

V

14

,

ln fav °r of giving
a

'
)

k-.
The basic
notions in providing a
seman.

»

tics for L. are those of
model structure and model.

A modul structure is an
ordered triple <G,K,R>, where
K
G is a member of K and R
is a reflexive

is a set,

relation on K, in the present’

case defined for each agent

i.

Intuitively, we shall say that K
is the

set of all possible worlds and
G is the "real world".

two members of K, then

If Hj and H, are

means intuitively that H

is
2

in terms o' agent i’s possible
behavior.

similar^

^

From this we can see that R's

reflexivity-requirement is perfectly natural.

Additional requirements

tight also be added for R (symmetry
or transitivity, perhaps), but
we
shall see shortly that some of these
give undesirable results.
Given a model structure <C,K,R> and a
function i which assigns to
each member H of K a set

«H), called

the domain of H, (Intuitively, <(„)

is the set of all individuals existing
in H.) a model is a binary function

4(P,H), where the first variable ranges
over n-place predicate letters,
and basic D-statements and H ranges
over members of K.
,

with n occurrences of

is a subset of U

<K = ,H) is a subset of U

of L^

f

if a

^ a 2' ‘“’an

,

n
,

4(F*...*,H),

where U= “ «H).

Similarly,

specifically, for our present interpretation

are the members of U, ^( = ,H) is that subset of IT

whose members are all the ordered pairs of the form <a.,a
>.

We are now

in position to define inductively for a formula A
and a world H a truth-

14
15

See Ibid .

,

pp. 9f.

Cf. Saul Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", Proceedings of £ Colloquium on Modal and Many -Valued Logics, (Helsinki: 1963)
pp. 83-84.
:
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vaXue

relative to some assignment
of the members of „
to the free
individual .^bou of L
Given an assignment of

r

U

C°

V

Sl

is a member of

* (r (s
1

,

We deflne * <F(

«FW.„),

””‘") ,H ) =F '

^

V—

events

„>.«*

if the

a,

n.tupu

of

.

again with n occurrenees
of .... otherwisl

Pr ° Ceed tD deflne the
ituth-values of „ff s other

than predications of
individuals and equalities
^uduues, with
wifh h,
the exception of
basic D-statements according
,
to the following rules:
1> If «KA,H)=T, then
2)

if

^A,H)=F, otherwise

T;

A,H)=T, then 0(A,H)=T, otherwise
F;

3) if <K~A,H)=T or *(B H)=T,
then rf(A
f

4) if ^(p(s

)

->

B,H)=T, otherwise F;

,H)=T for each free individual
symbol

s

which is assigned to

some member of <(H) and at least
one free individual symbol is
so assigned,
then «$((w)p(w/s),H)=T, otherwise
F.

This gives

nents.

a

semantics for all the wffs of

^

except for its D-state-

Let us say that i assigns truth-values
to the basic D-statements

in some way such that the
following conditions are satisfied:
i)

if rf(D.p,H)=T and HR.H',

ii) if

^Kp,H)=T,

then

then tf(p,H')=T;

tf(C.*, p# H)=T-

iii) if «5(C.p,H)=T, then there is at least
one H' such that HR H and
i

$(p,H )=T
'

;

and

iv) if tf(~C.p,H)=T, then «S(D ~p,H)=T.
i
i

Given such an assignment, then non-basic D-statements,
those constructed
from basic D-statements by means of truth-functional
and quantif icational
rules receive their truth-values through the
application of rules l)-4)
on the last page.

Condition iv) presents

a

problem.

It gives rise to what is known,
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in De° ntlC L ° SlC
aS the GOOd
’
is a g ood Samaritan.

paradox.

Let us suppose that

One of the thing, he
does is to help

a

,

robber,

victim,

it is not compatible
with his helping the
robbery victim that
there should be no robbery.
We may take as
p, "There ts no robbery> „

Therefore

^p

is true.

That there is no robbery
is not compatible
with
everything the good Samaritan
does.
However it follows by
condition iv)
that D^p, the good Samaritan
makes it the case that there
is a robbery.
This surely is an undesirable
result.
The good Samaritan paradox
has plagued a great many
logics of action
and logics of obligation.
The paradox can be eliminated,
but only at
the cost of introducing some
much more complex technical
machinery. For
that reason and because
condition iv) plays no controversial
part in the
formal, arguments that appear
in Chapters

IX or X of this dissertation,

shall not attempt to circumvent
the good Samaritan paradox.
shall simply acknowledge that
this poses a problem for
a general

^

Rather

(and L

)

I

I

as

g

logic of action, but a problem
which is of no relevance for

the purpose of providing a
formal analysis of the stone paradox.

An interesting issue arises in
connection with the construction of
our D-statements.

Either we are forced to limit the kind
of wffs which

can replace p to those expressing
contingent propositions, or we are

forced to say such things as "i brings
it about that p v -vp."

The

latter course leads us to say some very
counter-intuitive things.

The

former course involves a considerable sacrifice
of systematic neatness.
The latter course is not really as awkward as
it appears at first.

V

P v

f\»

that p &

p ) is

implied by

C(p & ~p).

This latter wff expresses the claim

p is not compatible with everything that

i

does.

This claim
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n0t ° nly

"

Ue ’ bUt d ° eS " 0t eVCT
SeOT S Particularly
odd thing to say.
f this is kept in
mind, then the oddity
of D^p v „p) should
at
ast
be ameliorated.
We shall therefore
permit p to be replaced by
any wff
t!

/

U

whatsoever.
As specified so far,
the modal system T.

h

^

appears to he a semantical
counter-part to

With different conditions
on the

R,

„ e might make

a semantical counter-part
of some other modal
system.

If lt were

required that R be transitive
as well as reflexive,
then we would have
a counter- part to S4.
In this case, fomsulae
of the form (D^p -> D D
.

would be true.
it about
i

D.D.p would be read as:

that p.

exercise

j

i

brings it about that

i

.

p)

brings

This might be expressed in
another way by saying that

control over his doing p.

From this it is apparent that

(D.P

D.D p) ought not to be true by
virtue of the semantics, for we
(
do not want to say that every
person exercises control over
everything
he does.
If we added a symmetry
requirement as well,

then we should get that

every person exercises control
over everything he does not do.

Finally,

if we have the symmetry
requirement without the transitivity
requirement,

then we get that everyone forbears
to bring about anything that is not
the case.

Both of these alternatives are obviously
undesirable.

It is

for this reason that we do not require
R to be more than reflexive.

My language L
g

is also a two-sorted language based on
the language

of a secon 1-order predicate logic
with identity, on the one hand, and

based on Pom's language L
1

=

16

on the other.

D, C, L, F, 1, t, a, x,p.

The signs of L

are:
s

16

Again, to designate the first seven signs in the list we shall use the
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AH
8 a"16

of the above signs which
„ ere also slgns of

lnterV retatl °n f ° r L
'

.

two signs,

»L*

«

«»T

were given for

^

^

^^^^
Thls Uaves the

and ’p».

The sign

a-

is

The sign

v

is a bound propositional
variable.

the standard alethic modality
of necessity.

It will be used as
a medium for cross-reference
in quantif icational
contexts about proposi-

tions.

Instead of propositions, we
could also say that these
variables
are used to talk about states
of affairs or whatever
else it is that

agent make to be the case by their
actions.
al variable, then so is p'.

If p is a bound proposition-

W e will use

to designate the bound propositional
variables of L
s*

The wffs of L
s

are those given by rules l)-6) on
pages 127f. above 1

'

with the following added;
7)

If p is a wff Of L
s

,

then so is bp.

This is called the necessitation

of p and is read: it is necessary
that p is true.
8) If A is a D-statement (basic
or otherwise) of L
s

and the scope of at least one
D-operator
a bound propositional variable of L
g

,

or C.) occurir.g in A, q is

q

for every occurrence of the wff

then (q)A(q/p) is a wff of L

.

g

positional quantification.
is read;

s

and A(q/p) is the result of sub-

stituting an occurrence of the variable
p throughout A,

^

p is a wff of L

,

W e shall call this pro-

The propositional quantification (q)C (q/p)

everything is compatible with all

i

does.

signs themselves autonymous ly.
It is assumed here that *L
is substituted for
S
6) in adapting these rules for L .
'

s

'L

*

1

throughout 1)-

1?4

^^

°f

^

° ther than th °
Se giVGn b
*

D-6) (adapted),

and g)

"

The standard abbreviation:
Mp for ~L~ Pl and read
as;
P IS trUe> 18 “ Sed

"

L
s

on page 128 above.

-

*"

*/)

u „

those used fn h

and glve „

It may at first
glance see. peculiar
that we should

want Wffs of the hind
given in 8) above.
permit us to construct
such wffs as

8) is included in
order to

(Eq^q.

This is read as: there

i<

Because rule 8) provides
for such restricted
use of bound propositional
variables, their introduction
here leads to no
n«
type-theoretic difficul«.

,

ties.

m

providing a semantics for

I

will again give a Kripke-type

semantics, based on the notions
of model structure and
model. Given the
Way in which L expands on
the language
s
1.^ the notion of a model strutture which will be required
for L will have to be expanded
over that
s
Which was required for
Our new model structure will
be an ordered
quadruple <G,K,W,
where K is a set, G is a member
Rl
_ # fn>>
of K, and
#

W and R
l,j,...,n

aro ref l«:tve relations
on K.

Intuitively, we shall again

say that K is the set of all
possible worlds and G is the "real
world".

and H

If H
x

2

are two members of K, then

is possible relative to

means intuitively that H

Since every world is presumably
possible

relative to itself, reflexivity is

a

perfectly natural requirement on W.

In giving our model we shall
place additional requirements on W.
if H
1

H
2

and H_ are members of K. then

is similar to H

and n.

][

HR
1

h
H
n 2

Again

.
+
means intuitively
that
,>

>

,

in terms of the possible behavior of
agents i, j

Again reflexivity is

a

perfectly natural requirement.

For the

,

,
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reasons discussed above in
connection with

„o fruther restrictions

ought to be placed on R
i»J >••• ) n

Given a model structure (G,K,W,R
'

\
,n'

and 3

f
f unc tion

which
assigns to each member H of K
a set «H>, called the
domain of H, a model
is again a binary function
«P,H>, where the first variable
ranges over
n-place predicate letters, ...
and basic O-statements, and
H ranges over

members of K.
U".

,

j

,

. .

.

«((F*...*,H), with n occurrences
of

Similarly *(=,H> is a subset of U 2

model, if „ ,...,a
1

U

1

n

,

is

a

subset of

specifically, on the present

are the members of U, then
<U,H) is that Subset of

whose members are all the ordered
pairs of the form <a.,a.>.

We are

now in position to define,
inductively, lor a formula A and world
H,

a

truth-value <(a,H), relative to some
assignment of the members of U to
the free individual symbols of l
.
Given an assignment of elements a
g

p

...,a
a
1

n

of

,...,a

I

to

s
1

n

,...,s

n,

we defing 4(F(
Sl

s

n

),H)=T If the n-tuple

is a member of <(F*...*,H), again
with n occurrences of

otherwise *(r(s
1

s

n

),H)=F.

•*•;

We proceed to define the truth-values
of

wffs other than predications of individuals
and equalities, with the ex-

ception of basic D-statements, according
to rules l)-4) from page 130
with the following addition:
5) if tf(A,H')=T for every H'

such that HWH', then <6(LA,H)=T, otherwise F.

As before, our model assigns truth-values
to the basic D-statements
of
i)

in some way such that certain conditions are
satisfied, viz.:
if ^(D p,H)=T and HR H',
i

ii) if ^(~D p,H)=T, then
i

tf(C

then ^(p,H»)-T;

^,10=1;

iii) if ^(C.p,H)=T, then there is at least one H' such that HR H' and

^(p,H')=T; and

p

;

Iv) if <C~C
lP ,H)=T, then

rfCD^p.H^T

semantics for
Ls ls completed by addins
the foiio " ing
6)

"“* '

•

;

“

” •••" -

-

“•

u

••

••••

••
.

Since, in order to
capture the logic
S

required that

*L*

-

h.

the stone
paradox, it is

».
i
express
xpress qstrict
logxcal necessity, it
must be further
required that on our
present model W = KX K, since
every possible world
is logically possible
relative to every other
possibie world. Thls
coa _
pletes the semantics for L
.
t-

•?

*-

.

s

It is of interest
at this point to took
at some of the kinds
of „ff s
that turn out to be true
on the present interpretation
of i .
Before
§

doing this,

want to bring to mind the
definition of 'can^which was
informally introduced on
page 123 above:

Can(p(i ) ) -

I

(

df

t)C (p(i)), or in the
instance in which we shall be
t
inter-

ested in in connection with
the stone paradox,

Can

V

=

(t)c D

df

t

iP.

Among the wffs of L
g

that turn out to be true on
the present interpreta-

tion are all those of the
following forms:
1)

D^p

2)

p -> C p;

3

M)

)

.

,

l

4)

p;

C .~p

p

l

D.
l

5)

D.p

->

l

6)

D (p

’

c.p;
F
i

->

t

7)

r

i

’

q) -» (D p

->

D.p);

q)

->

C^q )

£

(p

->

->

(C^ p

;

;;

;

;
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D
9)

^(q

iP

D^p

p);

D^( p

->

10) D.D.p

->

q

.

)

D.p;

-»

11) O^D^p -> (D^p&D^p);
12) D^D. p
13) D

D p

i

14)

->

~D ~D
k

j

D.D.p
1

15)

D.-D^p;

->

M) D

->

i

J

.

p;
K>

j

-p;

,

j

pCs^&l s^s^

->

p(s
2

16) L P

->

17) p

p;

Mp

18) Lp

Mp;

O LMp;

19) Mp

20) Lp
21) Lp

MLp

O

22) Mp

LLp

MMp

23) L(p

->

24) LD.p
25) MD^p

(Lp

q)

-»

->

26)

;

Lp

-)

Lq);

;

M p;

Mp;

27) CanD.p

->

i

MD.p;
r
i

28) CanD p

Mp

^

29) D.p

(Eq)D.q;

30) CanD.p
1

->

(Eq)CanD

q

*

i

Of the above kinds of wffs, D-18),
23)-26) and 29)-30) are valid

m

L
g

as well.

The remainder depend for their truth
upon the interpreta

tion of W as KxK.

Some would remain true for many of the standard
inter-
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^^_

pretation o f W. bub ope could
gfvc fnbecprebablons
cf „
and 28) would be false.
Up example of such an lnterpretatlon
be If we stipulated
that
If and only lf not .
(n
On the entepded
interpretation, most of the

daims which we quite obviously
wish

see

comment however.

i

i

A few of

makes it the case that

makes it the case that
p.

„

above^f s

10), in particular is of
ipterest.

expresses tie claim that if
that p, then

to accept.

^

j

^

«prL

then,

warrant

D D.p

->

D p

makes it the case

Ip connection with
the stone

paradox, this means that if God
either creates or lifts the
stone through
Some other agency (Say, God
makes it the case that I lift
the stone.)
then God is still said to
create or lift the stone.

ID- 14 ), which also
concern what might be called
indirect agency, should be fairly
straightforward in light of 10).
Finally, 27)-30) bear some comment.
can perform p, then it is possible
that

i

clearly intuitive.
P,

mally expressing the stone paradox.

should perform

true that if

i

p.
i

This is
can perform

This will be important in for-

It is important to note here
that it

can perform p, then p ir the case.

If

can perform p, then there is some world
which is agent-similar (a world

i

H

in general,

i

28) makes the additional claim
that if

then it is possible that
p is the case.

IS not,

27) expresses the claim that
if

’

SUch that GR

i,j,..., n

H,) to the real world in which
p is the case,

hence some logically possible world (a
world H' such that GWH') in which
p is the case.

Ihis only leads to the conclusion that it
is possible

that p is the case, not that
p actually is the case.

29) and 30) express

the claims, respectively, that if performs or can
perform p, then there
is something such that

i

performs or can perform it.

This will be rele-

i:i9

vant in expressing the
claim that

i

is omnipotent.

This should give us a
logic by means of which
we can adequately
give formal expression
to the stone paradox.

,

:
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CHAPTER

ix

the formal argument and
the third premise revisited
Tho stone paradox can now
be represented with
complete formality as
the following argument:
H.

(1) CanD.((Ex)(Fx&~CanD Gx)
)v~CanD

.

J

(2) CanP

( (

j

Ex ) ( F x&'-CanD Gx ) )
.

->

~H j

(

(H*) (Fx&~CanD Gx)) "
j

.

—3) ~Can D ((Ex)(Fx&~CanD Gx))
.

(4) ~H j

The Interpretation of the
predicate letters and individual
symbols is as
follows
F:

is a stone;

G:

is lifted;

H:

is omnipotent; and

j:

God.

It is

readily apparent that this is an
adequate representation of the

ditional paradox.

H(l), on the given interpretation,
expresses "Either

God can make it the case that
there exists

a

stone such that God cannot

make it the case that that stone
is lifted, or it
God can make it the case that there
exists

a

make it the case that that stone is lifted."

is not the case that

stone such that God cannot
This is no more than a less

perspicuous way of saying "Either God can create

a

stone that He cannot

lift or it is not the case that God can
create a stone that He cannot

lift."

H(.l),

therefore, expresses the same disjunction as A(l).

In order to adequately assess the soundness
of argument H,

necessary that we make explicit our notion of 'omnipotence'.
ter

HI,

the following definition of

it

is

In Chap-

'omnipotent' was accepted:

L

D* t '

X lS OTnlp ° te '' t =

for any sentence
Cwff) p , lf
that x make It the
case h.
x can mahe it

df

u

Possible

the™ t^p^ ^’

We can formalize this
definition as follows:
Bef. 3: Ht =
df

(p)(MD p
t

Our conclusion, H(4)

11

.

CanD^p).

->

Hi"
J

i

c

D.p^CanD.p)",
J

«<«

t

r
therefore
logically equivalent
to "( Ep )[ M
«-k

J

H(l) is quite obviously
of the form Pj v ~Pi
J
that

and since
sinr. we have
assumed

names a member of the
domain of G, is therefore
true.
If «(2) and H(3) are
similarly true, then the
conclusion, that God
1S " 0t mnlPOtent
£0U °“ S - Chapter VII offered a
wide variety of criticisms of premise 3) of the
stone paradox - which is
reflected in H(3> .
which have beer, put forward
in the recent literature
on the paradox.
I
'

j

'

shall devote the rest of
this chapter to settling
the controversy over
that premise by showing
that, on the given
interpretation of
H(3) is
true merely by virtue of its
logic and semantics.
One thing is required in order
to show that H(3) is true,
that is
to show that "MD.((Ex)(Fx6c~CanD
Gx))"
'
is true
ls
assuming the
j
(4) antecedent
j
of H(3).
If lt is, then H(3) can
be proven true by the following
argument;
>

J.

(1) ~CanD.((Ex)(Fx&~CanD Gx))
J

Hyp.

J

(2) MD. ((Ex)(Fx&~CanD Gx))
J

To be shown

j

(3) MD.((E;c)(Fx&~CanD .Gx))&~CanD
J
(
^
(4)

(

(

J

n _r
r\
\
p&f-CanD
Ep ) (HD
p)

(Ex)(Fx&~CanD .Gx) )

(1)

(2)

j

.

.

3

(3)

j

(5) ~Hj
,

Def.

3

(6) ~CanD, ((Ex)(Fx& CanD Gx))
J

J

This proof is clearly sound as long as J(2)
is true and "(Ex) (Fx^CanD .Gx)'
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is a wff of L

Which it is on the
basis of ruies
rules 2)

of Chapter VIII.
I

shall show that J(2) is

5) from
f
pages 127f.

by reans ° f an lnf
°™sl demonstration
'

_
in the

4

metalanguage of L

.

s

Ut

"

M

’

35 3

non-agent individual symbol.

If,

func .

tion is to stand for some
non-agent individual symbol
whose Denticular
identity is of no concern
to us whatsoever.
Our first concern is
to es
tablish ”M(Fd&~Gd)".
"M(Fd6.~Gd” is true
precisely in the case that
there
in some possible
world H', such that GWH'
in which "Fd^-Cd”
.
is true.
Given that W=K*K, this is
the case precisely if
”Fd6.~Gd" is non-contradictory. ”Fd6.~Gd" is
obviously non-contradictory.
Therefore, there is
such a possible world.
Let us call that world 'H
By virtue of condition
i) of the semantics for
1^, given on page
135 of Chanter VIII, (I
remind the reader here that R.
is a reflexive

relation.) "~Gd" implies ”~DjG d”.

Therefore, "Fd6.~D.Gd” follows
from

"Fd&~Gd" and is also true in
f^.
r^Gd

is

existence of agent

non-contradictory.
i.

It is also consistent with
the

Therefore, there must be a possible
world

Whose domain includes agent

i

H.,

and in which "Fd6.~D.Gd” is true.

Moreover,
since the truth of "D.~D.Gd" does
not entail the violation of any of
the

conditions, i)-iv) on pages 135f.
of Chapter VIII, which must be satisfied by any assignment of truth-values
to the basic D-statements of L
,
there is s^me possible world H. in which
"Fd&D ~D Gd" is true
J
1

J

Again we have it, by conditions i) and
iii) on page 135 of Chapter
VIII, that "D ~D Gd" entails "~C D Gd".
J

true in

H.^.

1

J

It follows

that

"FdW i D

Gd" is
j

From this it follows quite obviously that the
following are

1*3

also true in H

"Fd&(i:t)(~ C D Gd)"
and ,h
f
therefore
t j
"Fd£.~(t)Cc D Cd)"
Thie last
•
,
,
dlmm y wff ls
* J
eguivalent, by
the
0,1
136 of Chapter
VIII, to "Fd&~CanD
jG d".
:

^

^

w e can now
dispense with

(Fx&~Can D.Cx)" is
J

(F ,
(Fx6c-CanD
GxV' AdO0S
na

"
.

^

u

‘

3

enta

“

n„r- a

FlnaUy

^

Variable an d have
it that »(v
(Ex

W

n° te th

«

-’

truth of "D
U-UIx)
(O ,

j
violation of the
conditions, t) _ v)
°n pages 135f.
of Chapter VIII,
which must be Mtl
e
^ any assignment
Of truth-values
to the basic
oasic D-statements
D st
th,«
of I
1S ’ theref ° r a,
some possible world
H
i
h
n
"
VHlCh D ((E:
’
4’
')(^~CanD Gx))" ls true
j
.
Since H is logically
possible
ie » xt
it follows
fnll
that GWH
Tf mm
«B C(Ex)(Fx&~CanDjOx)),
4
4 ““
Gx))
H
1
)
T
tb
ur
,
J
^)_ , then «MD ( (Ex)( F .
xi CanD Gx))
T
J
Therefore, J( 2 ) ls
true>
'

^

true.

It follows that
argument J is sound
and its conclusion,
’
H(3) is

,
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x

the second premise
ince the first
and third premises
P emises of argument
H have been
shown Co
be true by virtue
of -v
the semantics
given for L , aU
11 that
thaf remains
s’
to be
done » in oi der
to prove that
Cod is not
omnipotent is to
t-o a
demonstrate
*
that the
th. secondJ
premise is true
Lrue *
Thar
J hat
premise is,
H(2) CanD
((Ex)(Fx&~CanD Gx))
j
•*

j

or » to fill

H(2)

'

Can

^

Thl8

t hi s

(<Ex)<

out in lightL orf D
s
uet . 3 from page
141 of

“nD.Cx))

Ep ,( MD p& . CanD
p) _
.

°Ut t0

::
^tng
potent

—-(

i

"

*

*

-erau

y been
at the Informa!
statement of the
second P remlse,

C3n Create 3 Stone
that

supposed

cannot lift, then God
Is not on.nl-

the consequent a
PP ears to follow Because
of the existence
of a stone
3 "" 01 Uft Uf
«•
the logical!, pos^
as
which, it is claimed,
God cannot perform.
It Is clear that

“-

I;

I"

-—

at God should
perform It and y et God
the anteCedCTt ° f
A(2) -

*».

sequent of

-ght

-

^not

perform It, Is forthcoming
”

expect, then, that If
the con-

Is

derivable from the antecedent,
the last step 1 „ the
derivation should be from
something of the form MD
Gd&~CanD Gd , where d
stands for some non-agent
individual symbol
.

of L

"

th !re 18 t0
'

g

^

.

.

.

any Chance of der; vlng
something of this form
from n CanD, ((Ex)(Fx&~CanD c,))n
„
G
lt: must be
Possible first to derive
j
j
•

‘

’

*

1

~~~~~
remind the reader that- IT ITT I
—
lnning
of
Chapter VII I pointed out
that the second
premise of the ston
° paradox bas been generally
as innocuous.
accepted
I

"

!

.
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Inch asserts, under
the given interpretation,
the existence of
a stone of the
appropriate sort,
it was pointed
out at the end of
Chapter
HI that wffs of the form
CanD.p
->
P
p are nnr
P
ot » in general,
i
true by virtue of the semantics
given for L
tk
r
herefore,
looking at "CanD ((Ex)(F
s’
x
&~CanD Gx)) -> (Ex)(F
J
x &~CanD .Gx)" as an i„ Qf
*
tance of the schema,
j
CanD p ->
does
S
P>
no good here.
.

.

To show that the
consequent of H(2). does
not follow from the
antecedent, it is sufficient
to produce a model
which satisfies the
semantics
Siven for 1,, and such
that the antecedent
of H(2). is true and
the consequent false in some world
on that model.
Let us take a possible
world,
H
such that God is the only
f>
agent in its domain, <(H
).
Let us take a
f
model
such that it assigns
truth-values to the wffs of L
in some way
that is consistent with
the semantics given in
Chapter VIII
d „ lth the
following condition:

l

«S’l)

if «S’(Lp,H
f

V

)=T,

then (S'(D jP ,H )=T, otherwise
F.
(

It was shown in the
last chapter that there
was a possible world,

such that «D.((Ex)(Fx 6
,~CanD.Gx)),H

)

= T,

for some model i.

Since
that assignment is perfectly
consistent with both the semantics
given in
Chapter VIII and
l), we may further
stipulate that <‘<0^ (Ex)(Fx&~Can
D Gx )),H )=T.
Since « is logically possible,
4
j
it follows that H WH,
4
4

f

f

Therefore, ^(MD.((Ex)(Fx, CanD.Cx)),H
f

abbreviation for i <~L~D
'

.

(

> = T.

This, of course,

(Ex)(FxG~CanD .Gx) ) ,H )=T.
f

this and condition

in)

It

JJ

follows from

jr

that <*(~D ~D ((Ex)(Fx&-CanD.Gx)),H
t )=T.
j
j

Frot

this and condition ii) on page
135 of Chapter VIII it follows
that <-( C.
D.
j

(

(Ex)(Fx&~CanD Gx))
H ;)-T
x;;,H
-T *

TZSee

j

f

page 138, Chapter VIII.

Since

j

continues to be the symbol for

K6
God, the only agent
In the domain of H

unis
this last ,assignment
,
is iden-

,

f*

tical to 4'(CanD
((Ex)(Fx&~CanD.Gx)),H )=T.
J
f

J

Let us now take some
arbitraryy wff

d
T
of L
p,

»

« )=T.

This abbreviates < <~L~ D
p,„

f

,

that «S'C~D.~D.p,H

f

) =T .

From

^

a
Assume
that «J'(MD

.

g

tM .

and

^u

) = T.

p

Again from this and
f
condition 11) on page 135
of
Chapter VIII it follows
that
(C .D ,p,H )=T.
Finally, since God Is
f
still
the only agent In H
this
,
Is equivalent, by
f
definition, to <S'(CanD p,H
)
f
=T * SlnCe P haS St °°
d f °r
arbitrarily chosen wff, ft fo
i lows
'

y that

^

'

«S

<

(p) (MDj p

->

J

CanD^p),H^)-T, and i’(~(Ep)(MD
pi~CanD.p),H
J

=F,

We now have a model,
such that the antecedent of

world, H
f

,

on that model.

which satisfies the semantics
for L
s

H(2V

)

f

j

and

Is true and Its consequent
falsi in a

This shows that the consequent
of H(2)- does

not follow from the antecedent.
H(2) may, of course, be
true simply by virtue of the
facts of the
real world and the peculiarities
of the material conditional.

However,
H(2) is not rendered true
simply by virtue of the rules
of logic and the

semantics required for stating the
stone paradox.

derivable from the semantics given
for L
g

carried out in L
g

,

as it does in argument

,

Since H(2) is not

it cannot appear in a proof
11,

without prior assumption.

H is therefore not sound, and
the stone naradox proves nothing.

It is

somewhat remarkable that the stone
paradox breaks down precisely at the
point where it has generally been
considered so strong as not to merit
close investigation at all.
I

3

have examined previously

See Chapter VII.

a

number of writers who have attacked
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“

rt

;:V“
C
°"
5

“•

that PremiSe a

—

"

»
POOrly fOUnded

.. ..... ... ....
«"-•

not a weak spot tn
the paradox.

«»t

... ...

the third premise

u

There are yet other
writers who have
*.« the stone paradox does
decisively disprove the
omnipotence
GOd - ° lVlOUSly th
4
and 1
right,
in the reminder
of
thl8 ChaPt
1 ShaU l0 ° k
-ses that have been made
tor the
soundness of the ardent
of the stone paradox,
especially as they deal
with the second premise.

~

-

"

** -

«

The claim that the
stone paradox dors
prove that Cod is not
omnipoith variations, been
put forward in the recent
literature by
three philosophers in
tour different articles.
Ceorge Englebretsen,
The Incompatibility
of Cod's Existence and
Omnipotence", claims that we
can conclude from the
stone paradox that "there
Is no omnipotent Cod."
Englebretsen deals with the
second premise with dispatch,
"(2) and (3)
are clearly innocuous,'"
It .hnt.la
.
it
should be apparent from
what has been said
above that (2) (Englebretsen
's (2) is, "If Cod
can create a stone which
He cannot lift, then
there Is a task which God
cannot perform.") ls
not at all Innocuous.
The difference between
Englebretsen 's (2) and my
(2) (A(2) or H(2)) is
of no consequence for the
present issue, for if
Englebretsen
(2) were true, my A<2) and
H<2) would follow shortly.
A(2) and H(2) are false
precisely because it does not follow
from "God
can create a stone" that God
actually does anything, hence
that there

m

is

anything at all except God.
I

can only speculate at Englebretsen

4

Englebretsen, Og. Cit
.
5

Iblj »

»

P»

28.

,

p.

31.

's

reasons for saying that (2)

t
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(6)

......

...

ere is a stone which
God cannot lift,
and

(6)

^

cs

It is possible
that there
ere is ,a stone which
L
God cannot lift.
but net (5)
follows ^rom "God
,
ra
G° d C3n
Create a st °ne which
He cannot

(6), will imply either
conclusion, "There is a
tas
Which God cannot perform."
or "God is not

omnipotent ,

t

The

conclusion we can get
from (6) is
(7) :t iS P3ssible
that God is not
omnipotent

or
,
(8) It is rot the case
that God is necessarily
omnipotent.

Englebretsen may make the
tacit assumption,
(9) If God is omnipotent,
then God is necessarily
omnipotent.

H

(9) is true, then it
follows from (8) that God
is not omnipotent.

Tnat assumption, however,
was discussed in Chapter
IV above, and, as 1
showed there, it certainly
cannot be taken for granted,
as Englebretsen
would have to be doing in
order to get his conclusion.
Even with that
assumption we have seen that
Englebretsen's conclusion is
not to be had.
J.L. Mackie reaches much
the same conclusion in
Evil an d Omnipotence", viz, "That God's
omnipotence must in any case be
restricted in
one way or another, that
unqualified omnipotence cannot
be ascribed to
any being that continues
through time." 6 Mackie seems
clearly not to
take (9) as an assumption,
and, at the same time, almost
gives the solution to the paradox without
noticing it. He says,
S Clear that thlS is
3 paradox: ••• If we answer
"Yes"
tGod
n
eat S ethi
that He tannot control. 1 it
follows
??
that
God
t
d
Uy makes things which he cannot control
....
he is no?
,
not omnipotent
once he has made them: ...7

^

«

Hackle, Op. Cit
.

,

p.

212.

Ih9

”

—

Three things are obvious
from this brief
quoteMaCkle takeS

^-

U “

' SayS
f

"
’

U ^

CUar

eXPlanaU °n

"

thU

" hy 11 1S *

depth analysis.

-

the paradox 19
soun

This is followed by

-t

.

no attempt to give
an y

,
„ ery

i,

Mackle appatentl, feels
that further a„al sis
of the
y
argument of the paradox
is unnecessary.
2) Hackle does not
seem to accept assumption
(9).

Mackie says, n lt fol .
lows that if Cod actually
makes things which he
cannot control .... he
is not omnipotent
once he has made them: .....
Mackle does not say
God fails to be
omnipotent if He can make
such things, but rather
if He

^

~

make them.

This does not, of course,
amount to

a denial of (9),
but it does give one the
impression that Mackie would
allow that it does
not follow that if God can
but does not actually
make things which He
cannot control, He is not
omnipotent. This
mis last statement
staidoes constitute
a denial of (9).
i

3) Mackle is on the verge
of

it.

As

the solution to the stone
paradox, but misses

said above, Hackle gives
the impression that he wou!d
admit
that if God can but does
not actually make things
which He cannot control
it does not follow
that God is not omnipotent.
If this is so, the paradox dissolves. Hackle fails
to observe
that in this case it is not so
clear that there is a paradox.
I

J.L. Cowan has written two
articles on the stone paradox.

In his

first article, "The Paradox of
Omnipotence", Cowan claims
lSSUe lles ln one sim le fact - •••
P
Some
capacities imply limitations, there
are things one can do only
7

Ibid., p. 210
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If one cannot do
certain other thin,. a
note, moreover, that
the existence ,V
Predicates is a matter
S c*
we could define some. 8

U
Tt

.ft

0 Tan

tH ° 0356

f °r

<
ls

,

lm P° r tant to
"ih -tualiy
exclusive

dld not have them
already,

hiS existentia l claim
primarily on an example,

the capacity to create
a stone that the
9
stone's creator cannot
lift
If my arSm,ent at
the be8lnn1
<* '*>*• chapter is
right, however, then
that capacity does not
have the limiting feature
that Cowan claims for

^

It.

Cowan claims that the
existence of predicates naming
such capacities
15 3
° f l0SiC> and that
lf
did not have them already,
we could
define some. Cowan does
not present any argent
to the effect that such
predicates are forthcoming from
logic alone, nor does he
construct any
for us. Rather he depends
on his example. Moreover,
in the face of
subsequent attack on that example, 10
Cowan, in his second paper,
does
not give a logical construction
of some appropriately
limiting predicate,
and thereby shore up his
first
P
st article in a decisive
manner. Rather, he
abandons the entire project of
his first article and presents
a wholly
different argument. Since the
first article gives no more than
the ex-

-

,

ample, and since
I

I

.

.

cannot imagine what more Cowan
might have had in mind,

shall pass with no more comment
to his second article.
Cowan, in his

second article, presents the following
argument as a

construction of the stone paradox:
K.

(1)

(3y)(SyCxy-Lxy)v-(3y)(SyCxy-Lxy)

"

8

Cowan, 'The Paradox of Omnipotence",
p. 104.

9

In a slightly different context,
this case is treated in Chapter V
of this paper, pp. 74ff.
10 n
Cowan's second paper is, at least in part,
a response to the above-

mentioned papers by Savage and Wolfe.

))
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(10 Ta.(Pxa =

(y)((s y . Cx y) Z5Lxy))

(1") Tb. (Pxb

(3y )(Sy.Cxy.-Lxy)

=

(2) (3y)(Sy.Cxy.-Lxy)zD
(3z ) (T z . -Pxz
(3) -(3y ) (Sy.Cxy • -Lxy
)d( 3 z)(T Z .-P xz
(4 > (3z)(Tz.-P X2

)

)

(5) 0 X = (z)(Tz=>P xz
)
(6) -Ox,,

FlrSt ’

11

8iVe the lnt «pretation
of the predicate
letters in K:
Syi y is a stone;
1

c xy: x can create
y;

Lxy
Tz

:

x can lift
y;

:

is a task;

z

Pxz: x can perform z;
and
Ox: x is omnipotent.
I

should lrke to follow the
argument step by step.

tology of the form Pv~P,
and it therefore innocuous.
in passing that K(l)

ted in Chapter VII.

is the same as 0(1, of

“

K(l)

ls

a

tau-

It may be noted

Savaged construction, presen-

It was criticised in
that Chapter for not expres-

sing the first premise
of the traditional stone
paradox adequately. 13
That criticism still stands.
However, Cowan, unlike Savage,
is trying
to prove that some version
of the stone paradox does
work. Therefore,
it is of no consequent

if his argument is something
of a variant on the

traditional paradox as long as it
gives the result he desires.
11
Co~’an

12

,

The Paradox of Omnipotence Revisited”,
pp. 36f.

See p. 91, Chapter VII above.

13

See pp. 94f .

,

Chapter VII above.
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CUImed

t0

f.*».

a and b
such
,

„

1

shall com- back to
these later.

K<2) 8nd K<3)

fOUOW Clearly frM K(1 '>
and K(l") respectively,

and,

with K(l), give K(4)
by constructive
dilemma.
K(5) la an obvious
problem point.

In Chapter
r in
III it
p
lt was argued
,
that
or x to be omnipotent
it was not necessary
that x should be able
to per
form any task. Rather
it was retired that
x should be able
to parlors
any task which was such
that it unr
was ilogically possible
that x should perform it. Tus is a
problem, but one v,nich
which Cowen
Cowan can presumably
get
around. He Would have
to enlarge his language
by adding a predicate
to
express
perfo™s y" and by adding
the necessity operator,
but with
these additions, an
argument similar to K could
reach the conclusion,
KC6), which, in the
present case follows from
K(4) and K(5) by modus
tolens .
,

All this is not to say
that some variant on
argument K is sound.
The problem with X lies
in the notion of task
expressed by 'T'. The
is this, if ‘T’ expresses
anything close to a normal
notion of
task, then 'a' does not
name a task at all, and 'b'
does not name the

Cowan claims for it in his
informal explanation of K(l").
the other hand, if

'T'

is

On

merely a predicate formally
constructed in ac-

cordance, aL least in part,
with rules expressed by K(1

•

)

and K(l"), then

it is no longer the case
that some variant of K(5) is
true.

latter case the notion expressed
by

'T'

In this

will be very different from the

notion of 'task' which comes into,
play in the traditional definition
of

-

.

.

1!53
'

omnipotent

'

TO make this clear,
let us look at the
predicate which it
would b.
necessar, to introduce
it we were to
replace K (5 , „ lth an
adequate
.
n

;
y

If
;; give

•

Dxz

the

:

'D*

———

M

-

the interpretation,

x performs y.

I

take it that something
like the following
condition „ust hold(I) if T 2 .(P X2SQ
), where Q is some wff,
then there is some wff
R SU ch
that DxzSR.
For any task, if the
conditions are sepcifiable
under which we can say
that a particular agent
can perfo™ that task,
then the conditions
muse
to equally specified
under which we cat say
that that agent actually
ooes perform that task.
A condition of this
kind must hold simply
because
ere to be a task at all,
it must be possible
to say what is to constitute a performance of
the task * n*- whelt state
„
of affairs must hold
upon successful performance
of the taste,
task
Surh
such specification is what
is
necessary for any identification
of the

c

task.

Let us look at the supposed
tasks named by

KUO

'a’ and 'b'.
From
and condition (I) it
follows that there is some
wff R such that Ia . (DxaH
R) "
We ShaU eXPend ° ur
bulary a bit with the following
interpretations, in order to assist
in finding some appropriate
wff:

—

c ’xy: x creates
y; and

L'xy: x lifts y.

There are two initial candidates
for wff, to replace
(1) (y)(Sy.Cxy= L'Xy), and
(2) (y)(Sy • C xy
'

=>

L xy )
'

'R'

in this case:
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Neither of these will do the
job, however.

existence data.

Neither (1) nor

,

2)

mako any

Either of the m is true if
there are no stones.

If

there are no stones, then
a fortiori there are
no stones for God to
lift,
end, on any reasonably
nonral construal of .task',
no task, a, for God to
perform.

(1

'

)

The existence problem can be
resolved by changing (1) to
( 3 y)(SyCxy).(y)(Sy.Cxy
=>L' X y).

(Although

~

t andiS
-

>

will just deal with (1) here,
what

I

t0 (2) 35

WelU)

This

I

say will apply, mutatis

- specification of a, would
give us,

>

x performs a if and only
if x lifts every actually
existing stone which
is such that God can
create it and, in fact, there
is at least one such
stone.
The problem with this is that
the ability to perform the task

specified by (1-) is not the same as
the ability to perform the task
Pxa^= (y)(SyCxyr?Lxy).

that Tc.(Dxc

If we name the task specified
by (1')

= (3y)(Sy.Cxy).(y)(Sy.Cxy=>L-xy)),

Pxc— Oy)(>>y.Cxy)* (y)(Sy.Cxy ^>Lxy).

*

c ',

a.

such

it naturally follows that

x can perform c if and only if
x

can lift any actually existing
stone which is such that x can create
it
and there is at least one such
stone.

This must be the case because for

x to perform c there must actually
be at least one such stone, and,

therefore, there must also be such a
stone if we are to say that x can

perform c.

It follows from this that Pxa =£ Pxc.

Therefore, a^c.

This illustrates the source of
confusion in Cowan's approach.

For

it to be the case that God can lift
any stone that He can create it is

not necessary that there be any stones.

It is precisely for that reason

that one cannot generate from that formula any
task which it presumably

expresses God's ability to perform.

Cowan falls into the trap here
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b6CaUSe

^

° UOUS SaVa8e ln
allOWi "«

dichotomy in the flrst
premlLse
to turn on the
existence or non-existence
of a certain stone.
.

This confusion can be
further illustrated by
"X

Perf >rm
'

cannot

lift..

^

What-

13 3UPPOSCd

*

«»t

a

brief look at task
b

x can create a stone
that x

,
actually
means, according to K(l")
ls that there
is a stone which God
can create
tG hutbut not Uf tAccording to K(l"),
that there exists a
stone which God can
create but not lift is a
n eces „
sary condition for God's
being able to create such
a stone.
Yet we
would normally think that
God is ab!e to create
quite a number of thin,
which don't in fact exist.
Moreover, we would normally
think that God's
creating something is in itself
a necessary
condition of something's
existence.
In that case, the 'Cxy'
in KU") is rendered
superfluous by
the existential quantification
over the 'y. In any case,
'b' does not
name the task Cowan would
have us think it names.
-ft-

The above criticisms of
argument K are, of course,
based on the
fairly natural asswnption
that the quantifiers in K
range over only actually existing objects. Since
foliating these criticisms, I have
found
out, through correspondence
with Mr. Cowan, that he does
not intend the
range of the quantifiers to
be thus limited.
Although he does not state
this in his article, Cowan
intends the quantifiers in
K to range over
Meinongian unactualized possible
objects as well as actually existing
objects. On this construal of
the quantifiers, my criticism
of task b
in the paragraph immediately
above is no longer to the point.

Similarly, on a Meinongian construal
of the quantifiers, my criticism
of task a requires some revision.

Cowan writes,

Your argument against K(l') suffers from
the same confusion. The

f °/
Dxa ~ R " is Presumably
n( v w q
your (1)
„
0x
(Your (2)
will not do since it could bp Z“ # * <yKSy.Cxy=>L'xy)».
eV<?n
are other stones God
though there
could create
6
" hich he
not lift.) But this
(
u
be Vacuo
Vi
?
sly
cause there happened
simply beto be no Tr
?
bUt
c °uld not create
° nl ? lf God
any stones
nlCh C<1Se Hls
«ould fail on that ground. 14
“""‘Potence
/y

’

i

while this does save
ve rowan
Cowan

'c
s

^

"

a-,,,-.
. a
argument
from my earlier criticisms,
it

also opens the way to another
pair of criticisms.
First, Cowan is quite right
in claiming that if God
cannot create
any stones then He is
not omnipotent. Yet there
is a problem in claiming
that God performs task a
if and only if He lifts
every stone which He
can create.
It follows from that that
if God cannot create any
stones
then He performs task a.
This should raise some initial
doubt concerning
the legitimacy of the task
named b, .... It seems thoroughly
birzare to
think that the failure of God
or anyone else to have the
ability to

create stones should constitute
or imply that agent's performance
of
some actual task.

There is also a second and far more
serious problem raised by
Cowan- s rejoinder to my first
set of criticisms.
It would seem fairly
clear, I should think, that lif
tability is not predicable upon unac»

tualized possible objects.

*

Presumably only physical objects can be
lifted,

and unactualized possible objects are
certainly not physical objects.

If

this is true, then a thing's being an
unactualized possible object would
be a sufficient condition for its
not being liftable by any agent.

what

I

nave said so far in this paragraph is
right, then there is an oo-

7

14

If

—

fro ™. a letter which I received from Mr. Cowan,
dated November
1
ty/4, which he very graciously wrote in
reply to a letter which I
sent to him regarding the criticisms of his
article made in pages 152155, above.
*S
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vlous counter-example to K(2)
of Cowan's augment.
We must suppose
that
God dtd not create
every stone which He might
have created. Consider
a
atone which Cod can create,
but has not actually
created. Since this
stone is an unactualized
possible object, it is not
a physical object.
Since it is not a physical
object it cannot be lifted
by anyone, including God.
This situation satisfies
the antecedent of K(2),
Gy)(Sy.c*y.
-Lxy).
However, the situation is
also clearly compatible with
Cod's being
perform any logically possible
task, as normally think of
tasks,
at least.
It might be replied to
this that, for those
unactualized possible

objects within the range of
'y, "L'rcy" means that x lifts
y in any possible world in which
y is actualized.
This, however, will not do.
What
God can or cannot do In
other possible worlds has nothing
to do with
whether or not God is omnipotent
in the real world.
Perhaps Cowan is still right that
some variant of the stone paradox
1'
is sound.
If so, he has not shown that
to be the case in either of
his

articles or in his subsequent
correspondence with me.

The second article,

especially with the clarification
it is given through the
correspondence,
offers a very clever argument, K,
but that argument turns on an inade-

quate and/or wrong notion of ’task'.

Because K(l') does not give a

legitimate task at all, K(2) Cowan's
version of the second premise, fails.
My construction of the stone paradox,
H, is not beset by this difficulty, or any other that

I

can see.

It is a fundamentally correct

representation of the traditional stone paradox,
A.
failure of H(2), we can be sure that there

ITTCowan,

is at

Because of the

least one version of

"The Paradox of Omnipotence Revisited",
p. 35.

the stone paradox,
the traditional
one, that is not
sound.
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CHAPTER

XI

ORDERS OF ABILITY AND
FURTHER POSSIBLE DILEMMAS

WMle

the traditional atone
paradox has Been shown
to pose no threat
mnipotence, there is a
certain point in the
analysis where it
appears that Farther
dilemmas may he generated.
S P eci f icall
y , does Cod
have the ability to
exercise all of His
abilities, Another problem
is
whether God has the ability
to exercise certain
of His abilities and
yet
remain omnipotent. In
connection with the former
problem it may be helpfull to distinguish two
different types or orders
of ability: ability
t0
perform ordinary tasks and
ability to exercise other
abilities. This can
be handled iormally
within the language L with
no difficulty.
$

Talk of different orders
of abilities recalls to
mind J.L. Mackie's
solution to the paradox of
1
omnipotence.
Mackie, it will be remembered
from Chapter VII, distinguishes
between two orders of omnipotence,
and
accordingly two orders of ability:
ability to act and ability to
determine what abilities to act
things shall have. This distinction
is quite
similar to that mentioned in the
last paragraph and can equally
be expresse
in L .
It will be of interest, to
determine how well-taken such distincs
tions are with respect to the
problems of omnipotence.
Finally, the form of the paradox
which Mackie raises cannot be expressed in L .
It is
s

L.

(1) Either God can make things which
He cannot fully control, or God
cannot make things which He cannot
fully control.
(2) If God can make things which He
cannot fully control, then He is

not omnipotent.

II
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0)

"

not

ZTCZl:

WMch

thln8S

H=

ful1 ^

—1.

then Ke

(4) Therefore, God Is not
omnipotent.

While L obviously yields to the
same solution as version A of the
paradox, It can be seen that it
requires some extension on

adequately expressed formally.
sion,

I

While

1

in order to be

will not provide such an exten-

will briefly outline what must be done
to L
g

in order to get such

an appropriate extension.
It is initially obvious that God
does not have the ability to exer-

cise all His abilities concurrently.

make it the case that
case that

I

I

am sick tomorrow and the ability to make
it the

am not sick tomorrow.

abilities then

I

Presumably God has the ability to

If God were to exercise both of
these

would both be sick and not be sick tomorrov:.

Since this

latter situation is contradictory, it is
obvious that God cannot exercise
all of His abilities concurrently.

This is not, however, the problem that arises out
of my solution to
the stone paradox as given in the last chapter.

Rather the problem is

one of whether there are certain of God's abilities which
He has not the

ability to exercise.

The case that comes to mind is whether God can ex-

ercise His ability to create

a

stone which He cannot lift.

think that either answer is problematic.
a

One might

It appears that we might have

new paradox here, raised one level above the old stone paradox.
Let us state this proposed new dilemma as

M.

(1) Either God can exercise the ability to create a stone that He
cannot lift or God cannot exercise the ability to create a stone
that He cannot lift.
(2) If God can exercise the ability to create a stone that He cannot
lift, then He is not omnipotent.

II

1(1

(3) If God cannot
exercise the abilitv
not lift, then He is
not

^

omnipotent.

*

? *

c'

tone tha t He can-

(4) Therefore, God is
not omnipotent.

This argument is very
similar to argument A.
in

Argument M can be
expressed

as the argument

"* (1) CanD^D^
((Ex)(Fx&'“CanD^Gx))v-w CanD^P^
((Ex)(Fx&**CanD.Gx))
(2) c a"D D j((Ex)(Fx&~CanD
Gx))
j

^

->

~Hj

(3) ~CanD .D, ((Ex)(Fx&~CanD
Gx)) ->~ H i
(4) ~Hj.

We can now see how close
this new

me "t H>

f

°™

Chapter IX -

^

dll.

ls

to our old paradox.

Argu-

save the fo«al expression of
the old

paradox In t,.

Argument N Is Identical to
argument H except for having
a second iteration of
D
w-fi-Mn
«
ithin the ouvermost
group of praxiological
j
operators in both conjuncts of
the firciirst step
that argument and in the
f

1

m

antecedents of both the second and
third steps in the argument.
It should be apparent that
argument N is susceptible to
precisely

the same sort of analysis as
was given to argument H in
Chapters IX and
X.

This means that N(2> is not
true merely on the basis of
logic and
semantics and that, therefore,
argument N is not sound.
It Is possible
for Cod to have the ability to
exercise the ability to create a stone
that
He cannot lift and yet remain
omnipotent. God only fails to be
omnipotent
if He exercises the ability
to exercise the ability to create a
stone

that He cannot lift.

An infinite number of dilemmas can
be generated in this way.

We

can speak of "the ability to exercise
the ability to exercise ... the

ability to create

a

stone that God cannot lift”.

This can be formalized

)

.
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reiterations of 'D^' in the
same manner which
led from H to
N.
Each proposed dilemma
Is solvable In the
same way, that basic
approach
to which was given In
Chapter X above.
If a serious dilemma
is to be found, It must
be found in some
other
direction.
It may still seem strange

to say that God may be
omnipotent,

but only because He didn't
create a certain kind of
thing which He very
well could lave created.
Perhaps there is a further
dile^a coming from
this direction.
If God exercises His
ability to create a stone
that He
cannot lift, then He is no
longer omnipotent. Therefore,
God does not
have the ability to make it
the case that there is a
stone that He cannot
lift and that He is omnipotent.
There is, therefore, something
that God
cannot do.
It may be thought that
it follows from this that
God is not
omnipotent. This argument can be
expressed in L as
s

0.

(1 )

D ((Ex)(Fx&~CanD.Gx))
J

J

-> <^Hi
J

(2) ~CanD (D ((Ex)(Fx&~CanD,Gx))&Hi
J

J

llLl££IlDjlD
j

J

((Ex)(Fx^CanD Gx))&Hi)

->

^

(4) ~Kj

Let us follow this argument step by
step.

virtue of the semantics given for L

.

g

0(1) is clearly true by

If God makes it the case that

there is a stone that He cannot lift,
then there is such a stone.

Since

it is logically possible that any
stone should be lifted, if there is a

stone

that God cannot lift, then God is not
omnipotent.

0(2)

true and 0(3) is defective for precisely
the same reason.

The reason for God's being unable to make
it the case both that there is
a

stone that He cannot lift and that He is
omnipotent is that it is logic-

ally impossible that that should be the case.

That follows from the fact

that 0(1)

is

provable

Tf ir

•

lS

l08lC3Uy

that it should
b e the e se
t at there
is . stone that
Cod cannot lift
and that Cod

MnlP ° tent

—
if

’

*“ “

15

-sihie

th3t thC

that Cod should

-

mahe that the case.*
If lt ,
not logically possible
that Cod should mnhe
i, the case that there
is
a stone that He
cannot lift and that
He should he omnipotent,
then Cod.
inability to mahe that
the case does not
lead to the conclusion
that
Cod is not omnipotent.
Argument 0 is unsound,
failing in the third
premise.
In connection with
the first-t n
rn Ki
Problem

,
dealt
with in this chapter,
,

expressed by arguments M
and N, a number of t-M
things are now apparent:
1)
The various orders of
ability
j
wo found
hlCh We
7 which
ourselves able to develop
are all easily expressible
in L,.
2) He can go to any
order of ability

"

UkS

ln atteraPtin§ t0
COTStrU

-

sound extension on the
stone para.
Oo*. but we will
never be able to construct
a sound dile„a so
long as
proceed merely by raising
the level of the
traditional statement of
the paradox.
3) Therefore,
distinguishing orders of ability
in this
*

manner is of no consequence
to any attempt to
construct new dilemmas

in

this way.
1)

It is obvious from the
start that we are not dealing
here with
two orders of ability,
as we might have
suspected at the beginning of
this

chapter, but with an infinite
number of different orders of
ability.
There is the simp le ability
to act; the ability to
exercise the ability

theorem schemata^M) ^nd
and 28) from
’
ly,

sent5n ' ® follow from Instances of
the
137 of Chapter VIII, respecitive-

This conclusion follows from
definition

:

3

from page 141 of Chapter IX.
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act; and so on ad
infinitum .

T

1

^
^

w ere , Is

n0t talk 3bOUt

^

s*

ablU “-

PSE

«

within the language L
S

haS the

ablUt ^

-

P" within h
s

^

appropriate „ ff of

*1 St ° ne ParadOX
’

"

G ° d has the ablUt
>

cannot lift." Is expressed
In

(Fx&^CanD.Gx)" is thp wff
j

^
t

'

by "Ca n
.

.

^

In the instance

f«n) create

y

by "CanD q"

a stone that He

(Ex>(Fx& ~CanD.Gx))'’.

«( fa )

J

.

whlch is appropriate for
expressing the

s

task of creating a
stone that God cannot
lift.
In order to explain
how certain types of
wffs of L

express claims
s
that agents have abilities
of certain orcer, a
new bit of technical terminology needs to be
introduced. Let us say that
for any task p, "i
Performs p" is expressed
in L
by "D^q". where
q is some wff of
s
then
the
"
task wff of p.
"(Ex)(Fx & ~CanD.Gx)" is thus the
associated task wff Of creating
a stone that God
cannot lift.

y

U

In order to be able to
speak about such things as
my ability to make
It the case that
someone else exercises the
ability to ....

let us say

that any description of an
ability is in its standard form
when it is in
the form
'the ability to make it the
case that
exercises the ability
...

to make it the case that
x

n

exercises the ability to perform
r',

a

fir st - order ability if it is
described in

where r is some simple act.
An ability may be called

standard form by a description
of the fora -the ability to perform
r',

again where r is some simple act.

An ability is of the n th -order when its

standard form description contains n-1
occurrences of the expression 'exercises the ability’.

We may now say that if p is any task and
q is the
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associated task wff of n
P. then
sign, n occurrences
of

'D»

V
i

.

contains, slatting
with It, leftmost

prior t0
tn tKn
P
the

ooo«rsnce of any other
sign of
” hlch ls not an
agent symbol or quantifier
s
nririer if
If and
,„h only
,
if the ability
to perform
p is an abilltJr of order n+1>

,

.

l

-

recognize a certain
arbitrariness in the notion
of order given
above. One might well
want to say that the
ability to make it the
case
‘ hat J ° neS haS
(n0t
to perform r ought to
be counted as a second-order
ability rather than as
a first-order ability.
B,.
that as it may, there
is no wholly non-arbitrary
notion of order of
ability at hand. What is
important at this point is
to note that for
any specification of
orders of ability that may
be given, certain forms
of wffs of L can be
specified which will express
s
the possession or exercise of those orders of
ability.
I

2)

M/N

It should be apparent
from looking at the treatment
of argument
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ability are expressed in L
s

-

at the way i„ „ hlch higher
order$ of

that a sound paradox at a
higher order of

ability, but otherwise
identical to the paradox of
the stone, is not to
be found.
If there is to be a sound
argument against the omnipotence
of
God, it must be found in
some other quarter.
3)

It follows from this that
distinguishing orders of ability in

this manner is of no help
in any effort to construct
a sound version of
the stone paradox. Moreover,
it has become apparent that
distinctions

among various orders of ability
are drawn according to largely
arbitrary
One is left with the feeling that
there is probably very iittle

benefit at all to be derived from
making such distinctions.
Since we have yet found no sound
argument against God’s omnipotence,

1(6

we do net yet stand
in need of a solution
tl0 ° rCO any a
P ™dox of omnipotence
.
u
Among others,
Mackie's solui-ion
ution is unnecessary.
We do not
nn t n eed
y
to dis" £U
bCtWen 0rd6rS ° f
MPOten
'
any more t , an
.
b
tstinsuishin8
•

,

™

;

;°;

““

„

’

x

!oo, for a moment at
the seneral pract i c e
of distinguishing
amon g
various t yP es of
abilities to see what
relevance it has in
g enerai to
the problem of
omnipotence.

Ceneral ly the differences
amon g different

t yP es of abilities
will
c.ed in L_ b y differences
among the types of wffs
which are th»
associated task wffs for
the tasks of the
appropriate type.
(A task
t

IS of type n if and
only
6 aDl
y if the
abilitv
*
lity to perform
t is an ability
of

type n.)

This was obviously the
case with the distinctions
among orders
°f abilities which
were made on the last
page.
This is also the case
With Mackie's distinction
between abilities to act
and abilities to
determine what abilities to act
things shall have. Let
us call the
former sort of abilities
'abilities^ and the latter
'abilities^. We
m3y n °" S3y th3t lf
P 15 3
-d , is the associated task wff of
p,
contains a non-eliminable
q
occurrence of 'Can' if and only
if
the ability to perform
is an

^

p

ability^

We can, of course, draw
many other distinctions: the
ability to
create (The associated task
wff here expresses an
existential claim.) as
opposed to the ability to affect
already created entities; and
many
others which are less natural.
They are relevant to the problem
of omnipotence only if 1) they provide
a solution to some argument
which proves
that Cod is not omnipotent,
or 2) they enable us to construct
such an

argument.

At this point, such distinctions
are of no help in providing
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a solution to any
case against Cod’s
omnipotence precisely
because we

have found no solid
dox doesn’t work.

ardent

against God’s omnipotence.

The stone para-

If some better argument
can be found against
Cod’s

omnipotence, then It would
depend on the nature of
that argent whether
distinctions among various
kinds of abilities would
be at all helpful.
Also, there is no reason
to suppose that such
distinctions give any
lp in the effort to
construct a sound argument
against omnipotence.

because they give us nothing
which we didn't have before.
These distinctions only allow
us to make various new
groupings of things
which we already have. If
there is to be an ardent
against omnipotence based on problems about
abilities, it will proceed by
posing two
incompatible abilities. There
is no other way that
omnipotence can be
shown to be impossible.
But to do this all that we
need to be able to
talk about are particular
abilities.

Different kinds of abilities never

enter into the problem.

The conclusion, then, is that
distinctions among various types of
ilitieo serve no legitimate purpose
in connection with the issue
of
omnipotence.
The final problem that presents
itself is Mackie's argument L. 4

Argument L cannot be expressed in L

.

g

The reason for this is that L
s

has no device for quantifying over
relations, only over individuals and

wffs.

In order to express the notion
of

pletely control

'

'things which God cannot com-

we would need to be able to quantify over
relations,

since for God to completely control something
he must be able to make
it the case that any consistent predication
on that thing holds true.

4

See this chapter, pages 159f.
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This requires an extension
on

V

While

a

third-order extension on L

which would allow sufficient
quantification over relations
could be constructed, that would require
considerable complexity. At
this point
it

should certainly be apparent
from the similarity between
ardent H/N
and argument A/H and from
the analysis given to the
latter arg»ent
within L that Mackie's argument
is susceptible to the
s
same solution as
the traditional stone paradox.
In this chapter

I

have tried to look beyond the
traditional stone

paradox to see whether there may
not be

a

sound argument against God’s

omnipotence coming from some other
quarter.

While

I

definitely cannot

say for certain that there
is no sound argument against
God’s omnipotence,
I can say with complete
confidence that there is no sound
argument against
God's omnipotence coming forth from
those directions from which one
might
be most expected.
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CONCLUSION

Smce

the publication, twenty
years ago, of J.L. Hackle's
famous
article, "Evil and
Omnipotence", a good deal has
been written about
the
atone paradox.
Despite an abundance of
literature on the stone
paradox,
it remains the subject
of controversy.
It has been my hope. In
this dissertation, to provide a
decisive solution to the
stone paradox.
To begin with, it has been
necessary to show that God is
subject to
the laws 01 logic, and
that, therefore, His failure
to perform some task

Whose description is
self-contradictory does not count
against His omnipotence.
if this much is denied,
it follows that theological
language
becomes utter nonsense.
The notion of 'omnipotence'
which
the notion of

I

have accepted dispenses with

'performing a task' in favor of the
more accessible notion

of 'bringing about a
state of affairs' or, to make
it more formal and
still more accessible, 'bringing
it about that a certain
sentence is true'
I

have accepted the following as
a definition of 'omnipotent':

x is omnipotent =

df

I

for any sentence
p, if it is logically possible that
make it the case that
p is true, then x can make it
the case that p is true.
x

hasten to point out that "it is logically
possible that x make

it the

case that p is true" is necessary
in the antecedent of the definiens
instead of just "it is logically
possible that p is true" in order to avoid
our having to say that God is not
omnipotent because God cannot make it
the case that there exists a stone
which God cannot create.

"There

exists a stone which God cannot create." may
be a self-consistent sentence, but "God makes it the case that there
exists (creates) a stone
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Which God cannot create."
la certainly not.
While this notion of
'omnipotence- may depart
radically from the
notions of 'omnipotence' held
by many, if not most,
contemporary theologians,, it is a notion with
considerable appeal to laypersons
and philosophers. Moreover, it is
the notion of 'omnipotence'
on which the stone
paradox poses the strongest
threat to divine omnipotence.
With these preliminaries
out of the way, we may move
to the solution
itself. Clearly one of the
following is true: either I)
it is logically

necessary that God is omnipotent,
or
r II)
LL)
h
*
that God is omnipotent.

lt:

n

ls „ntnot ilogically necessary
•

Whether I) or II is true is
somewhat hard to

say.

There is a strong tension between
the sui generis character of
God
and the freedom of God's agency.
Those who have placed major
emphasis on
the former have tended to
maintain the truth of I), while those
who have
Placed major emphasis on God's freedom
have generally maintained the
truth of II).
Regardless of which of them is true,
it is certainly the
case that one of them is.

Let us assume that it is logically
necessary that God is omnipotent.
In this case, the consequent of
premise 3) of the stone paradox (if God

cannot create a stone which He cannot
lift, then He is not omnipotent.)
does not follow from its antecedent.

If it ls logically impossible that

God is not omnipotent, then it is not
logically possible that there should
be a stone that God cannot lift.

To speak in the idiom of possible-wcrld

semantics, if God is omnipotent in every possible
world in which He exists, then a stone that God cannot lift does not exist
in any possible

”
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world.

(In a world In which
God does not exist
there will be no such

any entity in that world.)
Fron, the

above definition of
'omnipotent', we have It
that
x Is not omnipotent =
there Is some sentence
p such that It is
possible that x makes it
the case that
and x cannot make it the
case that p is true.

"

W£ „

y

If It is logically
impossible that there exists a
stone that God cannot
lift, then it is also
logically impossible that God
should make it the

case that there exists a
stone that God cannot lift.
From this we can see
that it does not follow
f rOT the truth of the
antecedent of 3) that there
exists any sentence
p, such that it is logically possible
that p is made
true by God, and God cannot
make it the case that
It does
p is true.

follow from the truth of the
antecedent of 3) that there is

sentence

a

P such that God cannot make it the case
that p is true, but that
p,

"There is a stone that God cannot
lift.", is also such that it is
not
logically possible that God make
it true.

This much of the solution is not
new.

A number of writers on the

stone paradox have made points similar
to the one

I

offer above, on the

tacit assumption that it is logically
necessary that God is omnipotent.

1

To my knowledge, however, it has
never been supported in recent litera-

ture on the stone paradox as an explicit
position.

Nor, for that matter,

has it been explicitly claimed that
the contrary might be true.

The

issue of whether it is logically necessary
that God is omnipotent has been

sadly ignored in discussion of the stone
paradox, despite its centrality
See Keene, 'Capacity-Limiting Statements";
Mavrodes, Op. Cit .
dey's and King-Farlow's contributions to Londey, et al., Op
.

and LonCit.
;
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to the paradox.

II

Let u, now assume the
contrary, that it is not
logically necessary
that God is omnipotent.
(This has been the ass^ption
of Chapters V-XI
above.) In this case, the
consequent of premise 2) of
the stone paradox
(If God can create a stone
that He cannot lift, then
He is not omnipotent.) doe, not follow from
its antecedent.
From "God can create a
stone
that He cannot lift." we
cannot get "There is some
sentence p such that
It is logically possible
that God makes it the case
that p is true, and
God cannot make it the
case that p is true." The
sentence p, which God
presumably cannot make true, that
is generally assumed to issue
from
God can create a stone that He
cannot lift." is "Stone X is
lifted."

Clearly we have no way of getting
that sentence or anything like
it.
We
could only get it on the basis of
some additional principle such
as, "For
any sentence p, if God can make
it the case
that p is true, then God does

make it the case that
p is true."
such a principle.

There is no reason, however, to accept

Rather there is every reason to think
it false.

From "God can create

a

stone that He cannot lift." the most we
can

get is "It is logically possible that
there should be

cannot lift."

a

stone that God

From this it does not follow that God is not
omnipotent,

only that it is logically possible that
God should fail to be omnipotent,

which is only to restate our assumption
that it is not logically necessary that God is omnipotent.
Again, to use the idiom of possible-world semantics, if
God can

create a stone that He cannot lift, then we may suppose, at most, that

173

^

there 1. s„„e logically
possible world in „ hlch
God do3s
eate
^
Fron this it follows that
there is some logically
possible world
ln WMCh thnre 1S
8UCh 3
«-t in some logically possible
world the sentence "There
is a sentence
p (i.e. "Stone X is lifted.")
such that it is logically
possible that God makes it
the case that
p is
true, and God cannot make
it the case that
p is true." is true. Again
all that follows is that
there is some logically
possible world in which
God is not omnipotent.
This means only that it is
not logically necessary
that God is omnipotent. No
conclusion follows with respect
to God's
omnipotence in the real world.
God can be omnipotent as
long as He does

„

not choose co create the
stone.
It may sound strange to say
that God is omnipotent because
He chose
not to create a stone of a
certain sort. However, this is
not really

so remarkable as it seems.

It is important to remember
that omnipotence

IS a relational property,
relating God to the created order.

Any rela-

tional property that God possesses
contingently is such that God could
have created a different order in
which He would not have possessed that
property.

Since we are operating here on the
assumption that it is not

logically necessary that Cod is omnipotent,
it follows that it is logic-

ally possible that God could have created

a

world to which He bore quite

different power-relations than He does
to the real world.

If

it is

logic-

ally possible that God should fail to be
omnipotent, then God could have
created a world in which He would not have
been omnipotent.
It can now be seen that on either
assumption,
of the stone paradox is unsound.

either

I

I

or II, the argument

Since it is a truth of logic that

or II must hold, it follows that the stone paradox proves nothing.
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appendix
At the end of Chapter
IV

I

promised that

^^

t would
proof that a( 3) failed if
It is assumed first
that God is necessarily
omnipotent. Here is that
proof.

A(3) is rendered formally
as
H(3) ~CanD
((Ex)(Fx&~CanD.Gx)) -*~Hi
J
J

*

J

To include the assumption
that God is necessarily
necessarilv omnipotent, we
alter
the semantics for L given
in Chapter *!« by adding
s
the following condition to those given on
pages 135f. which must be
satisfied by any assignment of truth-values to
the basic D-statements of L
:

s

v) if 4(D.p,H')=T for some
H- such that HUH', then
<(CanD jP ,H)=T.
It shoulo be noted that
with our augmented semantics
for 1^ the proof
given in Chapter IX for H(3) no
longer goes through. Wlth'th.
addition
of v) to the conditions which
must be satisfied by any assignment
of

truth-values to basic D-statements
of

^

,

it is no longer the case
that

"the truth of -D.~D.Gd' does
not entail the violation of
any of the con-

ditions"

1

of v).

Therefore, the proof of H<3) does not
go through.

which are given on pages 135f. of
Chapter VIII with the addition

As with H(2) in Chapter X, to show
that the consequent of H(3) does

not follow from the antecedent,
it is sufficient to produce
satisfies the augmented semantics for

,

a

model which

and such that the antecedent of

H(3) is true and the consequent
false in some world on that model.

As it

turns out, H(3) is false on every model
for our augmented semantics.

To show this, let us start by assuming the
negation of the antecedent

Chapter IX, page 142 of this dissertation.

° f H<3)
’

<(CanD ((EXKF
J

^

CanD Gx) )* G >= T
J

pase 137 of Chapter VIII
that

this

Cx»
j

>

„,). T •

follows by

«M(( b ,( Kxt ^. nDj6t))>0)-T#

° l0 ” S that there
ls som e world H'
such that niH'

(Fx&~CanD

n

L e t us take the
dummy variable

^
'd

'

8) on

^^

^

«««

to stand for

J

appropriate non-a ent
g
Individual symbol. -He
may then say that
Fd&~Ca„D.Gd),ri')=T, and
that «S(~CanD jG d,H’
)=T.
But obviously -Gd'
Is
" 0t S COntradiCti °n
’
consistent. Pro, this
it follows
th3t
"»,«
Violate any of the
conditions
i)-lv) on pages 135f.
of Chapter
VIII1 °
or
vl of
P
r v>
° f ,i
the ,immediate past
page
there is some world H»
such that rf(D jG d, „.)=!.
Since W=KxK,
It
Hows fro, this by condition

~“

—-

HW.

v) above,

presents us with a contradict
inn
tradiction.

that (S(CanD^Gd,H' )=T.

This

tv>

Therefore the antecedent
of H(3) ls

true.

The negation of the
conseouent
t nf
Of H.3J is, according
M
to Def. 3 on
page 14! of Chapter IX,
short for Cp)( MD
.p -> CanD.p).
Its truth, hence
the falsity of the
consequent of H(3), follows
directly fro, condition
v) above.
This completes the
proof
or tnat
that M3J
Af?') ic
P
is false on the
assumption that

God is necessarily
omnipotent.

